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Abstract
My research lies at the intersection of international trade and industrial economics. I
contribute to the rms and trade literature, both empirically and theoretically, focusing
on the impact of the nancial crisis of 2008-09 on various dimensions of rmsactivities.
In particular, I study the response of international trade to the shock, focusing on the
reaction of importers to the reduction in demand. Additionally, I explore the impact
of the crisis on rms innovation decisions, together with the implications of this for
rmsexport participation. I pursue these avenues of research as the Great Recession
constituted a large shock, impacting severely various aspects of rmsoperations. This
allowed me to study the impacts of the fall in demand on trade, and the e¤ects of liquidity
scarcity on innovation and exporting.
In Chapter 2 I exploit detailed Slovenian custom data to explore the product dimension
of the trade crisis. I nd that imports of inputs accounting for a larger share of rms
costs underwent an enhanced reaction during the event. This nding is explained with
an inventory adjustment model which predicts a more than proportionate adjustment for
high cost-share inputs because of their higher storage costs. In the Chapter 3 and 4, I
concentrate on the e¤ects of the 2008 crisis on rmsinnovation decisions and selection
into exporting. I augment the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) framework to include process
innovation subject to liquidity constraints, and show that a reduction in liquidity for
innovation has opposing outcomes on innovators and exporters: innovative activity is
reduced but entry into exporting is stimulated by a reduction in the industry-wide degree
of competition. Evidence supporting these theoretical predictions is found in an empirical
analysis with Slovenian rm level data in Chapter 4.
1
1 Introduction
The research constituting this thesis is dedicated to the study of the impact of the 2008-2009
nancial crisis on various dimensions of rms activities. The perspective of my analysis
places this work at the intersection of international trade and industrial economics. In par-
ticular, I focus on the response of international trade to the shock, examining the reaction of
importers to the reduction in demand. Additionally, I am also interested in the e¤ects of the
crisis on rmsinnovation decisions, together with the implications of this for rmsexport
participation.
The main motivation for placing the lense of my analysis on the Great Recession is that
this period constituted a large, arguably exogenous, shock which severely a¤ected rms
operations in numerous ways. This specic event allows me to study the e¤ects of the fall
in demand on trade, and the e¤ects of liquidity scarcity on innovation and exporting. More
broadly, this thesis contributes to a deeper understanding of the multi-faceted challenges that
importers, exporters an innovators face due to imperfections in nancial markets.
In Chapter 2, Product cost-share: a Catalyst of the Trade Collapse, I exploit detailed
custom transaction-level data for Slovenia1, to explore the product dimension of the trade
crisis. Despite a rich literature which studies the dramatic reduction in world trade triggered
by the crisis of 2008-09, no work to date has investigated the responsiveness of di¤erent
intermediates imported by rms according to their share in rmscosts. I uncover a new
source of heterogeity in the response of rms to the crisis, namely that imports of higher
cost-share inputs underwent a more pronounced reaction in both the downturn and recovery
phases of the collapse. I nd that a 10 percentage points increase in the cost-share is associated
with a 1 percentage point deeper drop of imports in the downturn and a 0.59 percentage point
larger rebound in the recovery, accounting for 7.6% and 19% of the average growth in the
two sub-periods.
I explain this empirical nding with a simple model of inventory adjustment, based on
Arrow et al. (1951). This model sees rms optimizing the stock of inventories in an attempt
to minimizing storage costs. In a trade crisis, rms may adjust purchases of high cost-
share inputs di¤erently from low cost-share inputs if, for instance, in the attempt to retain
liquidity rms reduce their working capital targets and destock inventories, with higher cost-
1Only a few authors have exploited the Slovenian data (De Loecker 2007, De Loecker & Warzynski 2012
are prominent examples), but the richness of the dataset has hitherto not been fully exploited.
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share products being more sensitive to the adjustment. The intuition behind this mechanism
is that, regardless of whether the products stored consist of materials for a manufacturer or
nished goods for a retailer, higher cost-share products might be stocked in lower amounts
if their storage cost is higher than that for lower cost-share products. This leads to a larger
adjustment, in proportional terms, to a fall in demand for these inputs2. The predictions of
the model are supported empirically by estimates from reduced form equations.
Importantly, all these results are robust to controlling for whether transactions are under-
taken by independent suppliers (arms length trade), or whether they are performed within
the rm boundaries (intra-rm). Interestingly, I nd that for higher cost-share products,
intra-rm trade acted as a further accelerating factor. This can be explained again with ref-
erence to an inventory mechanism, where multinationals store a lower amount of inventory3,
which is in turn more sensitive to a change in input demand.
Overall, the research in Chapter 2 points to the cost-share of intermediates as a key factor
for rms attempting to downsize activity and trade in a recessionary environment.
The contributions of the remaining two substantive chapters of this thesis are tightly knit
together. In these, I concentrate on the e¤ects of the 2008 crisis on rmsinnovation output
and on the interaction of innovation with participation in the export market. Chapter 3, The
E¤ect of Liquidity Constrained Innovation on Exporting, explores this topic theoretically,
whereas Chapter 4, From Innovation to Exporting in Times of Crisis: Evidence from Slovenia,
tests empirically the prediction of the theoretical model.
Chapter 3 extends the Melitz-Ottaviano (2008) heterogeneous rmsframework by intro-
ducing process innovation, subject to liquidity constraints, on the supply side of the model.
Firms pay a xed cost to access innovation and only those rms with su¢ cient internal liq-
uidity are able to do so. The most productive rms select into innovation, but there is a set
of rms that could protably innovate and are prevented from doing so due to insu¢ cient
internal liquidity. The model shows that if external liquidity is suddently reduced, i.e. liq-
uidity constraints become more binding, access to innovation becomes more selective and the
level of product market competition is reduced: this imparts a shock with opposing outcomes
to rms at di¤erent points of the productivity distribution, which reallocates market shares
2This results applies even if demand were to fall by the same proportion on all inputs, e.g., for a manufac-
turer whose production function is Leontief and uses inputs in xed proportions, because the adjustment is
calculated relative to the amount stored, which is lower for higher cost-share items.
3This scenario is plausible if, for instance, multinationals facing higher opportunity cost for storing invento-
ries, or are able to adjust more promptly to shocks because of a more e¤ective management of the information
stream.
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from rms in the middle range of the productivity distribution to both the most and the least
e¢ cient producers. The reduction in innovative activity results, therefore, in more entry into
the domestic market and, in a scenario where the shock to innovation is symmetric across
trading partners, in a lower productivity threshold to access exporting. In the aftermath
of this shock, the model predicts an industry populated by rms that are, on average, less
productive and that charge higher prices and higher markups.
This analysis shows how a sudden tightening in external liquidity for innovative rms
can provoke a loss in innovation output and e¢ ciency but, at the same time, through its
anti-competitive e¤ect, a positive indirect e¤ect on entry into exporting.
These theoretical predictions are tested empirically in the Chapter 4 of the thesis, where I
exploit again Slovenian rm level balance sheet data, matched with innovation surveys (CIS)
and rm level trade data. Due to the endogenous links and simultaneous determination of
the main variables under analysis an indirect test of these proposition is performed. External
nance on one side, and innovation and exporting on the other, tend to be subject to both
reverse causality and omitted variabale biases; futhermore there is vast literature studying the
deep interconnections between exposure to trade and investment in innovation (among many
others, Bustos, 2011; Bloom et al., 2015; Becker and Egger, 2013; Damijan et al., 2010). For
these reasons the analysis exploits a di¤erence-in-di¤erence strategy, whereby I estimate that
in sectors characterized by higher vulnerability to a shock to external nance for innovation,
the 2008-09 nancial crisis reduced the probability of innovating and increased the probability
of exporting, relative to sectors characterised by lower external nancing vulnerability. These
results are robust to controlling for the availability and use of internal nancial resources.
Additionally, rmsmarkups, computed by exploiting the De Loecker and Warzinsky
(2012) procedure, are found to have increased by more in sectors where the reduction in the
probability of innovating was larger. It is important to note that conditioning on markups
dampens signicantly the impact of the shock to innovation on exporting. This supports the
rationale that the better exporting perfomance estimated in sectors characterized by higher
external nancing needs for innovation, was indeed mediated by the anti-competitive e¤ects
resulting from the reduction in innovation, that I pick up by controlling for rmsmarkups.
Finally, the decomposition of the shock across quartiles of the rm size and productivity
distributions shows that the negative impact on innovation and the positive impact on ex-
porting were highest in the middle range of the distribution, as predicted by the theoretical
4
framework of Chapter 3.
The rest of this thesis is organised as follows. In the next section, I describe the Slovenian
data exploited throughout the thesis. Subsequently, each of the following sections presents
a Chapter: Section 2 I is dedicated to Product cost-share: a Catalyst of the Trade Collapse;
Section 3 consists of the theoretical chapter on The E¤ect of Liquidity Constrained Innova-
tion on Exporting and Section 4 presents From Innovation to Exporting in Times of Crisis:
Evidence from Slovenia. Section 5 concludes.
1.1 The Slovenian Data
The data that I exploit in this thesis are rich rm level datasets from various Slovenian
sources, all strictly protected by statistical condentiality. In particular, the datasets that I
received access to are:
(a.) External Trade data: the Statistical O¢ ce (SURS ) and the Custom Administra-
tion (CARS ) provide transaction-level data, recording all foreign transactions of Slovenian
rms, at a monthly frequency, disaggregated at the Combined Nomenclature (CN) 8-digit
level. For each shipment I extracted the value of the imported and exported product in EUR
currency, the physical quantity in units of output (pieces or kilograms), the CN and the
Broad Economic Categories (BEC ) codes, the origin and destination ISO country codes. I
obtained data spanning from 2000 to 2012.
(b.) Firm characteristics: the Agency of the Republic of Slovenia for Public Legal
Records (AJPES ) provides balance-sheet and income statements for all Slovenian rms, on
a census basis. These data include complete nancial and operational information, among
which sales; costs of intermediate goods, labour, materials and services; operating prots and
losses; the value of total, current and xed tangible assets (the latter was used as a measure
of physical capital); depreciation; short term operating receivables and liabilities; the NACE
4-digit industry code. The time span for balance sheet data is 1994-2012.
(c.) Community Innovation Surveys (CIS): these are biannual surveys investigating
the innovative behaviour of enterprises, carried out by EU members on a voluntary basis. In
Slovenia the survey is carried out by the Statistical O¢ ce (SURS), and data are collected
through a combination of a stratied sample for rms between 10-49 employees and a census
survey for bigger rms, covering about 2,200 rms in each survey. In the third chapter
of this thesis I used the last seven innovation surveys, carried out between 2000 and 2012:
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CIS3, Statistical Report on Innovation Activity 2002, CIS4, CIS2006, CIS2008, CIS2010,
CIS2012. The CIS is a harmonised survey designed by Eurostat to provide information on
the innovativeness of sectors by type of enterprises, on the di¤erent types of innovation and
on various aspects of the development of an innovation, such as the objectives, the sources of
information, the public funding, the innovation expenditures and the obstacles encountered.
The data from all three sources can be matched using a common rm identier.
Besides these three main Slovenian sources, I also extracted information from the owner-
ship database of ORBIS (Bureau Van Dijk) and Compustat: I will describe these sources in
more detail the data sections of the respective chapters to which they relate.
I obtained access to the Slovenian protected microdata by signing a condentiality agree-
ment, which required that all the analysis needed to be conducted in the Secure Rooms at
the Statistical O¢ ce of the Republic of Slovenia, in Ljubljana. The benet of being able
to use these extremely rich data came at the cost of having to perform the analysis within
a strictly limited time and by using the computers and statistical software provided at the
Statistical O¢ ce. The time constraint, in particular, forced me to focus the analysis on its
main objectives, over ve trips to Slovenia. Nonetheless the di¢ culties and the organizational
challenges that accessing the Slovenian data implied, I am extremely grateful to the Depart-
ment of Economics at the University of Sussex for the nancial support provided for my stay
in Ljubljana and to the Statistical O¢ ce of the Republic of Slovenia for data preparation and
access.
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2 Product cost-share: a Catalyst of the Trade Collapse
2.1 Introduction
The 2008-2009 great recession was characterized by a dramatic collapse in international trade.
This reduction in world trade attracted considerable attention, both because of the unprece-
dented size of the fall a 30% reduction from September 2008 to January 2009 with respect
to the 3% drop in GDP (Bricongne et al. 2012) and because of its suddenness and homo-
geneity across OECD countries (Baldwin and Evenett 2009). Levchenko et al. (2010) conrm
the exceptionality of this episode detecting a 40% shortfall in imports by examining the de-
viations of the trade time-series from the norm4. This unexpected collapse raises important
questions and the literature that has emerged points to the decrease in real expenditure, the
existence of vertical linkages in production and the tightening of credit supply as the main
causes of the event (Bems et al. 2012).
This chapter contributes to the understanding of the dynamics of the trade collapse
by exploring a new channel: the cost-share of imported products. In order to uncover a
source of heterogeneity in the response of rms to the crisis, I examine Slovenian trade and
investigate the reaction of di¤erent products, depending on their cost-share5. My primary
aim is not, therefore, to shed light on the root causes of the trade crisis or to quantify their
relative importance, but rather to identify a factor that might have amplied the reaction of
imports to the demand shock caused by the nancial crisis. I nd that productscost-share
was associated with an increased responsiveness of trade of intermediate goods, in both the
subperiods of the crisis; in other words, imports of inputs accounting for a larger cost share
fell more than proportionately in the downturn and rebounded more than proportionately in
the recovery. This result is robust to controlling for the impact of rm a¢ liation. Besides
conrming the role of inputscost-share as a catalyst of the trade collapse, the study of the
role of intra-rm and arms length trade provides an additional contribution of this paper:
intra-rm trade is not observed to perform di¤erently compared to arms length trade in the
crisis. This latter nding di¤ers from the results of Bernard et al. (2009), observing intra-rm
trade of US rms to be more resilient than arms length trade during the 1997 East-Asian
crisis, and Altomonte et al. (2012), estimating an enhanced reaction of trade of French rms
in the 2008-09 collapse when shipments took place within rmsboundaries.
I address these questions by studying the trade collapse in a small open economy, Slovenia,
4The demand for import as predicted by domestic absorption, domestic price and import prices.
5The cost-share variable is computed as the average value of an imported product with respect to rms
costs, as explained in Section 2.5.
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using high frequency custom data matched with rm balance-sheet and ownership informa-
tion. This highly disaggregated dataset allows a detailed examination of the trade crisis6. To
the best of my knowledge no previous work explores the cost-share hypothesis in the trade
collapse, a channel that can induce a higher elasticity of trade ows to a demand collapse
and the explanation for which may lie in the dynamics of inventory adjustments.
The literature has investigated both demand and supply side factors in order to explain
the collapse. On the demand side, the change in real expenditure is identied as the main
factor responsible for the strong reduction in trade (Bems et al. 2010, 2011, 2012; Eaton
et al. 2011, Bussière et al. 2013): the asymmetric reduction in expenditure across sectors,
largest for the more traded goods, transmitted the demand shock heavily to the border. In
the attempt to understand what caused trade to deviate from levels predicted by benchmark
theoretical models, authors have studied determinants of the trade wedge7 (Levchenko et al.
2010, Alessandria et al. 2011, Bems et al. 2012). A standard aggregate CES import demand
equation predicts a unit elasticity of trade with respect to a change in aggregate expenditure,
and candidates for the larger measured responsiveness of transactions in 2008-09 are durability
of goods (Engel and Wang, 2009; Petropoulou and Soo 2011), input linkages across sectors
and the adjustment of inventories, especially within Global Value Chains (Alessandria et al.,
2010a, 2011; Altomonte et al., 2012). Global Value Chains (henceforth GVCs) are viewed as
an important locus of the trade crisis, because of the large fraction of trade originating within
them due the worldwide fragmentation of production (Bems et al. 2011). Here I analyse a
mechanism that can enhance the reaction of trade to a demand shock, within GVCs8.
On the supply side, the literature mostly points towards the role of the nancial shock
in impairing rms production and exporting activities through the constrained access to
working capital (Amiti and Weinstein 2011, Bricongne et al. 2012, Chor and Manova 2012,
Paravisini et al. 2012, Behrens et al. 2013) and the reduction in trade nance (Korinek et
al. 2010, Malouche 2011, Coulibaly et al. 2011, Antràs and Foley 2014). The rst set of
studies sought to identify the e¤ect of reduced bank credit on rmsactivity by examining pre-
crisis nancial vulnerability measures (e.g. external nancial dependence, payment incidents)
to avoid the endogenous link between credit and production decisions: they all nd some
evidence of harm to rmsactivity by the nancial shock, with this channel accounting for
about 15-20% of the trade collapse. The second group of studies focused instead on the
6Only a few studies exploited similarly rich data sources Bricongne et al. (2012) and Altomonte et al.
(2012) for France; Behrens et al. (2013) for Belgium with no study taking into account Slovenian trade,
whose experience might di¤er from that of the other two countries.
7The deviation of the trade time series from the levels predicted by the evolution of domestic demand and
prices.
8 Identied by the role of intermediate goods, for which the main results are found.
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importance of bank- versus rm-intermediated trade nance: the general conclusion is in
favour of a moderate impact of the reduction in trade nance, especially when intermediated
by banks via, for example, letters of credit. However, the case study of Antràs and Foley
(2014) nds evidence of exporters relying more on cash-in-advance agreements during the
crisis than in normal times, while Coulibaly et al. (2011) show that the behavior of rms
that were able to switch to between-rm arrangements away from nancial credit experienced
lower declines in sales. These studies therefore attribute some relevance to rm intermediated
nance for understanding the heterogeneity in responses to the nancial crisis. In order to
insulate the identication of the impact of productscosts-share on trade from the e¤ects of
the credit-crunch and the lack of trade nance, a proper set of rm-month-origin xed e¤ects
is exploited in estimation.
My paper adds to this literature by unpacking the dynamics of the trade collapse along
its product dimension and observing the responsiveness of shipments depending on products
cost-share. The relevance of the cost-share arises in particular for inputs used by rms in
production: in a trade crisis rms may adjust purchases of high cost-share inputs di¤erently
from low cost-share inputs if, for instance, in the attempt to retain liquidity rms reduced
their working capital targets and destocked inventories, with higher cost-share products being
more sensitive to the adjustment. This is the mechanism that I propose as an explanatory
factor of the estimated higher responsiveness of higher cost-share inputstrade.
A secondary contribution of this paper arises from conditioning the main results on the
degree of integration of the value chain. The integration via the acquisition of ownership
rights creates business groups within which so-called intra-rm trade can be observed, whose
dynamics are likely to di¤er from arms length trade, consisting of shipments between una¢ l-
iated rms. Multinationals could adjust more promptly to a shock for reasons such as better
and faster communication and the overall lower degree of uncertainty, or else groups could
show higher resilience - especially at the extensive margin - given the di¤erent cost struc-
tures and depth of integration pursued to overcome the hold-up problem (Antràs, 2003). The
contemporaneous presence of o¤setting channels could explain why no signicantly di¤erent
performance between intra-rm and arms length trade is detected in my estimation.
Finally, the data permit to perform a detailed decomposition of trade margins, separating
among the rm-, destination- and product-extensive margin and the intensive margin of
Slovenian trade. These four margins are then further decomposed along the intra-rm versus
arms length dimensions, to evaluate the relative contribution of the two organisational modes
of cross-border production. To my knowledge, only Bernard et al. (2009) separate intra-rm
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from arms length trade margins, examining the East-Asian crisis of 1997, whereas no study
so far decomposes trade margins considering the role of intra-rm trade in the recent crisis.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 exposes a possible mechanism
underlying the unequal trade adjustment of di¤erent products. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 present
the data and describe the trade collapse for Slovenian rms. In Section 2.5, I discuss the
methodology before proceeding to the exposition of the results in Section 2.6. Section 2.7
presents reduced form estimates in support of the main channel hypothesised in Section 2.2.
Section 2.8 shows the results from the margin decomposition. Section 2.9 concludes.
2.2 The hypotheses
The magnied movements in international trade following the fall in sales have been ex-
plained, among other things, by the severe adjustment of inventory holdings (Alessandria
et al. 2010a, 2011): following a negative shock to demand which is expected to persist,
rms nd themselves with an excessive level of inventory and therefore cut back on orders.
Moreover, since rms involved in international trade hold larger stocks of inventories than
domestic rms do (Alessandria 2010b), the response of trade is larger than that of production.
Intuitively, since imports equal sales of imported goods plus inventory investment and both
sales and inventory investment decline in a recession, imports are more volatile than sales.
This amplication mechanism has the potential to explain the short-run elasticity of imports
to demand shocks and the movements in the trade wedge: Alessandria et al. (2011) quantify
it by arguing that inventory adjustments accounted for about 30% of the wedge measured
for the United States and about 20% of the decline of US imports. Production chains can
be an ideal locus for examining further aspects of this phenomenon. Concentration of trade
relationships and rapid communication among rms along a chain of production may explain
the speed of inventory adjustments and why the downsizing of trade was so synchronized and
homogenous worldwide.
2.2.1 The cost-share hypothesis
The value of certain imported inputs accounts for a larger share of total costs and this can
be a source of heterogeneity in the response of trade to the demand shock, potentially due
to inventory adjustments. The cost-share of imported intermediates might lead rms to
di¤erentiate inventory management strategies across products: in the attempt of minimizing
the cost of running the inventory system, higher purchasing and carrying costs associated
with higher cost-share inputs can lead to lower inventories for these products, which therefore
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present a higher responsiveness to a symmetric demand reduction. This is summarised by
Hypothesis 1:
Hypothesis 1: the responsiveness of trade to a shock to sales is larger for inter-
mediates accounting for a larger share in rms total costs.
This hypothesis is supported by a model of inventory management9. I exploit the "lot
size-reorder point" model, or (S, s) model, originally derived by Arrow et al. (1951). This
model sees rms optimizing the stock of inventories in the attempt of minimising storage
costs. Objective is to derive the optimal quantity S of inventory to order and the optimal
reorder point r at which to place the order, given a rate of demand  and a procurement
lead time  . The reorder point denes the safety stock s, i.e. the amount of inventory on
hand when the procurement arrives. With a rate of demand ; quantity S is depleted in
time T = S=, which denotes the length of a cycle. Optimal values for S and r minimise the
cost of managing the inventory system. Under the assumptions of a xed ordering cost A, a
constant marginal purchasing cost c; a linearly rising marginal cost of sourcing and handling
inventories10 !S2 and an instantaneous carrying charge I proportional to the value of the
stock cS and the time over which the items remain in inventory, the optimal order quantity
S is derived. Average inventory, denoted by Scan be shown to be:
S =
S
2
=
s
A
2 (cI + 2!)
(1)
The reorder point r is derived following Hadley and Whitin (1963). If m denotes the
largest integer less than or equal to =T , then an order is placed when the on-hand inventory
reaches:
r = (  mT ) =   mS; (2)
while the on-hand inventory is exactly zero at the time the order arrives11.
It follows directly from equation (1) that average inventory S varies inversely with the
square root of the marginal cost c, so that the average inventory for high cost intermediates
9The model is fully elucidated in the Appendix; here I provide a summary of the main mechanism.
10 I refer to marginal cost d
dS
 
!S2

= 2!S as "sourcing and handling cost"; this could conceivably capture
a variety of factors that make the cost of holding inventories rise with the quantity stored. An example could
be rising transportation costs, if the distance from suppliers increases when sourcing additional items from
alternative locations that are further away. Alternatively, there may be rising labour costs, related to the
operations of receiving, inspecting and handling a larger quantity of items. Also storage costs could be convex
in the quantity stored (Chazai et al. 2008). Finally and more generally, this rising cost could capture a higher
degree of complexity in coordinating the management of an increasing quantity of items stored.
11This rule ensures the rm has a zero safety stock s, and only if the cycle length T is not an exact multiple
of the lead time  , does the rm place the order just a bit before reaching the zero inventory oor.
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is lower than for low cost intermediates. Consider two inputs h and l, where h denotes a
high unit-cost intermediate and l denotes a low unit-cost intermediate, such that ch > cl.
It can be shown12 that although Sh < S

l ; the higher cost input corresponds to a higher
value of the stock Shch, such that S

hch >
Sl cl, which in turn implies a higher cost-share
Shch=
 
Shch + S

l cl

. Intuitively, this is because the elasticity of average inventory quantity
to cost is less than 1:
Hypothesis 1 states that a fall in demand induces a larger response of imports of higher
cost-share products compared to lower cost-share ones. Since an inventory adjustment cor-
responds to a change in the ow of imports13, Hypothesis 1 is conrmed in the model since
@( Sc)=@
Sc is increasing in c. In particular:
@
 
Sc

=@
Sc
=
1
2(1 + 2!cI )
and
@
@c
 
1
2(1 + 2!cI )
!
=
!I
(cI + 2!)2
> 0: (3)
The responsiveness of inventory stocks to a demand change increases in the unit-cost of
the items, and therefore also in their cost-share. The intuition behind this mechanism is
that, regardless of the technology used by rms in production, higher cost-share products14
are purchased in lower amounts if their storage cost is higher than that for lower cost-share
products. This leads to a larger adjustment, in proportional terms, to a fall in demand
for these inputs. Notice that this result applies even if demand were to fall by the same
proportion on all inputs, e.g., for a manufacturer whose production function is Leontief and
uses inputs in xed proportions, because the adjustment is calculated relative to the amount
stored.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the average cost (AC) of running a single item inventory system
as a function of the quantity ordered S (convex curves), together with the locus of points
mapping the optimal quantity stored S as a function of the unit cost c (more vertical curves).
A reduction in demand causes the average cost curve to shift inwards (dashed line), such that
its minimum is now found at a lower level of S : this determines a reduction in the quantity
of inventories ordered.
12See Appendix for full derivation.
13 It is straightforward to show that the ow of imports is mononically linked to the average stock of
inventories. Consider the accounting equation Mt = St + (It   It 1), where Mt denotes imports in year t,
St denotes sales of imported goods, It denotes the stock of inventories of imported goods so that It   It 1 is
inventory investment. An increase in the average stock of inventories It; and therefore of inventory investment,
leads to an increase in the ow of imports.
14 I cannot distinguish between price and quantity when measuring the cost-share in the data, hence a high
cost-share product could either be a relatively inexpensive product purchased in large amounts, or else a
relatively expensive product purchased in small amounts
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The optimal quantity curve shows instead two facts: rst, that regardless of the demand
rate, higher cost items are ordered in lower amounts; secondly and more crucially, that
a change in the demand rate causes a change in the slope of the optimal quantity curve,
indicating that higher cost items see their optimal quantity reduced in a way which is more
than proportionate relative to lower cost items.
Figure 2.1: Average cost of managing the inventory system, and optimal quantity stored.
S, S*
AC, c
Optimal quantity (S*)
Average Cost
This more than proportionate adjustment of higher cost-share products "accelerates" the
reaction of imports during a crisis, conferring to the cost-share a role of catalyst of the collapse.
This mechanism can nd an explanation in the attempt of rms to absorb shocks to internal
liquidity through changes in inventory investment. Carpenter et al. (1994) nd systematic
evidence of this behaviour for three US recessions throughout the 1980s, whereas for the 2008-
09 event Udenio et al. (2015) conrm that rmswillingness to retain liquidity prompted
a reduction in working capital targets, mostly accounted for by inventory liquidation. The
downsizing of inventory levels could have therefore been more sensitive to the demand collapse
when involving higher-cost share inputs.
The intra-rm versus arms length e¤ect The responsiveness of di¤erent products
could potentially di¤er depending on rm a¢ liation: due to inventory adjustments, various
mechanisms can explain a di¤erential response of intra-rm versus arms length trade. In
the language of the (S, s) model exposed in section 2.1, multinationals might order a lower
quantity S of inventories even in good times if they can be assumed to be subject to a higher
carrying charge I. The carrying charge mostly captures the cost of capital; i.e. the opportunity
cost of investing in inventories rather than in interest bearing assets. It is conceivable that
this opportunity cost is larger for rms belonging to groups, because of their greater ability
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to di¤erentiate their investments of di¤erent kinds and their deeper involvement in nancial
markets. To see this consider that:
@
 
Sc

=@
Sc
=
1
2(1 + 2!cI )
and
@
@I
 
1
2(1 + 2!cI )
!
=
cw
(cI + 2dw)2
> 0: (4)
Equation (4) shows that, regardless of the unit-cost of the items, the responsiveness of
the stock of inventories to a demand shock is increasing in the carrying charge I.
Alternatively, and more simply, intra-rm trade might show a more pronounced reaction
to a drop in demand because of the faster and more e¤ective management of the information
stream between trade partners belonging to the same business group (Altomonte et al., 2012).
Both these mechanisms would lead to an accelerated reaction of international trade during
the nancial crisis of 2008-09, conferring also to intra-rm trade a role of catalyst of the trade
collapse.
Hypothesis 2: intra-rm trade of intermediates accelerates the reaction of trade
to a shock to sales, compared to arms length trade.
A word of caution is due here: alternative mechanisms that explain a di¤erential reaction
between intra-rm and arms length trade to a demand collapse are conceivable, even though
they would be harder to rationalize within the stylized example o¤ered by the (S, s) model15.
The ndings reported in the empirical section are, in fact, consistent with this theoretical
framework, but, with the data at hand, other explanations cannot be ruled out.
2.3 Data
The analysis necessitates high frequency transaction-level trade data matched with ownership
information. The availability of this kind of data is restricted to a limited set of countries;
here I look at Slovenia.
Slovenia is a small, open and fast developing economy, with well-established trade and
production relations with the major European countries, besides the group of ex-Yugoslavian
economies. The European process of east-west integration triggered the emergence of inter-
national networks of production, involving states of Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs)
and Western European economies, mainly Germany and Italy. A further statistic conrming
the relevance of GVCs for this country is that Slovenian trade is dominated by intermediate
15 If intra-rm trade was more resilent during the trade collapse, as found by Bernard et al. (2009) for the
East Asian crises of 1997, it would impart an e¤ect of opposite sign, compared to the cost-share hypothesis,
to shipments of intermediates in a recessionary environment. Alternatively, the two factors would show a
cumulative e¤ect if both the cost-share and rm a¢ liation acted as catalysts during the 2008-09 event. The
interaction of the two channels is, therefore, also explored empirically.
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goods (72% of imports). Looking deeply at the trade dynamics for this particular country
appears therefore of interest. I use matched datasets from three sources:
a. Trade data: the Slovenian Custom Administration (CARS ) provide transaction-
level data, recording all foreign transactions of Slovenian rms, at a monthly frequency, at
the CN-8 level. For each shipment I extracted the value of imported and exported product
in EUR currency, the physical quantity in units of output (pieces or kilograms), the CN and
the Broad Economic Categories (BEC ) codes and origin country codes.
b. Firm characteristics: the Statistical O¢ ce (SURS ) provides balance-sheet and in-
come statements for all Slovenian rms.
c. Ownership: this information is extracted from ORBIS (Bureau Van Dijk). This
database allows to track the proprietary network of a¢ liates belonging to the same head-
quarter and located worldwide, up to the 10th level of subsidiarity16. I identify, for each
rm, whether it belongs to a Slovenian or a foreign multinational group, or whether it is an
independent rm. If transactions are undertaken by independent rms there is no doubt that
this is arms length trade, but shipments by Slovenian a¢ liates can include both a component
of trade with related parties and a component with non-related parties. To solve this prob-
lem I follow the approach of Altomonte et al. (2012). Bas and Carluccio (2009) show that
88% of trade by a¢ liates to/from a certain destination/origin is made either by following a
pure arms length or a pure intra-rm strategy, with the remaining 12% following a mixed
strategy. I therefore assume that transactions are intra-rm when they are directed to/come
from a country where there is a subsidiary belonging to the same business group. On the
other hand, if transactions are directed to a country with no co-a¢ liates, they are certainly
going to be arms length shipments17.
All data span from 2000 to 2011, except for the ownership information which describes
the status of proprietary networks in 201118.
16These levels are dened depending on the immediate owner of a subsidiary. A rm might in fact own
another one while being owned by a headquarter rm at a higher level. The full ownership information used
in this paper includes chains up to the 10th level.
17The assumption by which intra-rm and arms length trade are identied introduces some measurement
error. It is asymmetrical (consisting of a fraction of arms length shipments being wrongly labelled as intra-
rm), but it can be argued to be random, causing an attenuation bias in estimation, as I do not have reasons
to think of factors causing a systematic misallocation of these shipments. In Appendix I provide gures that
provide some insight about the size of the bias.
18The reasons for this are outlined in Appendix.
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2.4 Slovenian trade in the crisis
Slovenias economic activity is dominated by small and medium enterprises, whose trade
participation is high compared to larger countries19. The custom data allow a detailed picture
of the impact of the crisis on Slovenian trade to be drawn: the shock had a sudden and deep
impact on both exports and imports, with the deepest point reached in mid-2009, but with
growth rates remaining negative for over a year and reverting to positive values only in 2010
(left panel of Figure 2.2).
Figure 2.2: Growth of exports and imports 00-07; Growth of imports of consumption, capital and intermediate goods.
The right panel of Figure 2.2 illustrates growth rates of consumption, capital and inter-
mediate goods separately (BEC). Consumption goods showed a higher degree of resilience
relative to the other categories; while intermediates dipped less and for a shorter period than
capital goods. This visual inspection shows evidence of compositional e¤ects emerging from
the heterogeneous response of the three aggregates; however, what is not immediately evident
is a preponderant role of intermediates in the collapse. The larger fall of trade in interme-
diates, to which the literature attributed part of the responsibility in accelerating the trade
crisis (Yi 2009) does not immediately appear to be dominant in the Slovenian case.
In estimation the analysis runs from September 2008 to September 2010, with the trough
identied at November 2009, as trade kept growing at a negative rate until then. By Sep-
tember 2010 the value of imports had approximately recovered to the pre-crisis level (Figure
2.3, left).
The identication of the cuto¤ dates according to the Slovenian experience could spur
worries of endogeneity if the Slovenian case were somehow a¤ected by peculiar characteristics
of Slovenian rms that I cannot control for in the econometric specication20. However, these
concerns can safely be excluded here for a variety of reasons, the main one being that the
19Export participation in the manufacturing sector in 2002 was 48%; the same gure for the US was 18%
(Bernard et al. 2012).
20 I could be introducing a selection bias and reduce the degree of exogeneity of the shock.
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timing used in estimation is highly compatible with the evolution of merchandise trade at
the world level during the same period (Asmundson et al. 2011). Secondly, I estimate all
regressions with rm-month-origin xed e¤ects, thereby controlling for any rm and origin
specic unobservable shock, which is common across products imported by each rm from
each country in each month. Finally, given its economic size, Slovenia could not a¤ect the
evolution of the nancial and subsequent trade crisis. The shock can thus be considered
largely exogenous to Slovenia.
Figure 2.3: Value of total Slovenian imports in logs 00-12; Growth of imports by CN categories, 00-11.
The synchronicity of the 2008-09 collapse further supports the choice of conning the
analysis to the above described dates: the behaviour of aggregate imports is the outcome
of the coincident path of fall and rebound of the various product categories over the crisis
(Figure 2.3, right). Disentangling the experience of the collapse across goods accounting
for di¤erent shares in rms costs, this synchronicity is observed again (Figure 2.4). It is
reassuring that the crisis cuto¤ dates were similar across various segments of the cost-share
distribution: this suggest that the impact of the cost-share on trade detected in estimation is
not due to a di¤erent timing of reaction for di¤erent products (i.e. longer/shorter downturn
and recovery) but to a deeper trough of the crisis, as one would expect to be caused by a
catalyst of the collapse.
The right panel of Figure 2.4 is particularly eloquent in terms of the key nding of this
paper: for intermediates it is immediately evident that higher cost-share products (5th CS
quintile) experienced a larger fall over the downturn and a correspondingly higher rebound
in the recovery.
Limiting the data between September 2008 and September 2010 leads to the identication
of a nal sample of 8,498 rms importing 8,733 di¤erent products from 227 origins.
Of interest for this work is also rm ownership and the decision of a rm to relocate part
of the production abroad with the establishment of a¢ liates, or to licence an una¢ liated
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supplier outside its boundary of activity to source intermediate inputs21.
Figure 2.4: Growth of imports for quintiles of the cost-share distribution, all goods (left) and intermediates (right).
Panel A of Table 2.1 reports the import activity of rms belonging to multinationals22
regardless of the sender of the shipments. Firms belonging to groups perform 37.2% of import
transactions, corresponding to 64% of the total value of ows, despite them being only 15%
of importers. In terms of a comparison with previous ndings, the UNCTAD (2000) report
estimates that, at the world level, intra-rm trade accounts for one third of total trade, while
another third is accounted for by transactions that see multinationals at one of the two sides
of the exchange, bringing the percentage of transactions operated by groups to about 60% of
the total value.
Table 2.1: Activity of multinationals and intra-rm trade in Slovenia, 2007-10.
Firms Number Transactions Value transactions*
Panel A: activity of multinationals
Groups Not in groups Groups Not in groups Groups Not in groups
1,444 8,301 2,567,242 4,319,398 47,135 25,814
Panel B: Intra-rm trade
Intra Firm Arms Length Intra Firm Arms Length Intra Firm Arms length
998 9,574 1,308,626 5,578,014 32,799 40,151
Source: AJPES, CARS, SURS and authors calculations.
*Note: value of transactions is in millions of Euros.
A comparison with country-level gures, most of which focus on U.S. rms, is inuenced
by the peculiar structure of the Slovenian trade: participation to trade is high in Slovenia
and it is a less concentrated activity relative to larger countries. This explains the larger
gure reported by Bernard et al. (2009) for the US 90% of US trade being mediated by
21Being aware of the imperfect match of the ORBIS data for 2011 with the rm level data for years before
2011, I matched the ownership information to trade data from 2007 onwards only, to reduce the likelihood of
wrongly identifying a rm as belonging to a group in case the status of a¢ liation changed over time
22With domestic or foreign headquarter, where the threshold for ownership was set at 50.01%.
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multinationals, compared to the about 60% measured for Slovenia where there is a lower
export participation by smaller and independent rms.
Exploiting also the information about the origin of shipments and matching this with the
map of network a¢ liation allows to identify intra-rm trade. These are transactions operated
by rms belonging to groups and originating from destinations with rms belonging to the
same group. The share of intra-rm imports in total trade is 44.96%: over the four years this
share remained constant.
2.5 Empirical strategy
To assess the role of productscost-share as a catalyst of the trade collapse, the growth rate
of imports at the rm-product-origin level is regressed against a number of controls. Using
monthly growth rates spurs worries of attrition bias23; furthermore, using standard growth
rates would not allow to take into account the extensive margin variation, since all rm-
product-origin triplets that are not observed between two consecutive periods (i.e. the same
month of two consecutive years) would be dropped from the analysis.
To cope with this, I follow the approach of previous studies24 and use mid-point growth
rates, computed on the single ow Mkic;t dened as the import ow M of each CN-8 product
k; by a Slovenian rm i; from a given origin c in month t. The mid-point growth rate serving
as dependent variable is:
mpkic;t=
Mkic;t  Mkic;t 12
0:5 (Mkic;t +Mkic;t 12)
: (5)
However, all the results are also presented exploiting as dependent variable the log change
of imports:  ln(Mkic;t) = ln(Mkic;t)   ln(Mkic;t 12): This provides considerable robustness
to the results as it shows that the transformation by which the mid-point growth rates are
computed does not a¤ect ndings; furthermore, it reassures about the stability of the ndings
when investigating only the intensive margin of imports and, nally, it provides more directly
interpretable coe¢ cients25.
In addition to import values, I also present estimates using the growth rates (mid-point
and log-change) of import volumes and unit values (value/volume). This allows me to evaluate
how much of the e¤ects that I estimate are a consequence of the change in the quantity shipped
or of the change in prices over the crisis.
To explore the rationale that a larger share in rmscosts can generate an accelerated
23Non-random entries and exits over the the crisis would bias estimates if one were to use standard growth
rates.
24Davies and Haltiwanger (1992), Buono et al. (2008), Bricongne et al. (2012)
25Since the mid-point growth rate is by contruction bound between -2 and 2, the interpretation of the
coe¢ cients is more direct when exploiting the log-di¤erence as dependent variable.
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reaction of trade in a recessionary environment, the cost-share (henceforth CS ) variable is
constructed using:
CS
costs
kj =
1
YN
2007P
y=2000
NP
i=1
 P12
t=1 imkic;yt
Ciy
!
; (6)
where imkict denotes the value of product k imported by rm i, from origin c; in month
t : N denotes the number of rms, Y the number of years, C costs of goods, materials
and services. The cost-share of the imported product (6) has a sectoral dimension j since
each product k might present a specic relevance depending on the sector j where the rm
operates. The rm level cost-share is therefore averaged over all rms within each sector,
with the resulting measure being specic for each of the 8,733 products in each of the 462
NACE 4-digit sectors. Using all years available in the data up to the year before the crisis
(2007) allows me to compute a possibly exogenous time invariant value of how much, on
average, each imported product is worth in rmscosts.
I also compute an alternative cost-share measure, to show that the cross-product hetero-
geneity unveiled by the CS variable does not strictly depend on the aggregate against which
the value of the product is measured, i.e. costs. The sales-based measure is given by:
CS
sa les
kj =
1
YN
2007P
y=2000
NP
i=1
 P12
t=1 imkic;yt
Siy
!
; (7)
where S denotes total sales. (7) can be seen as a measure of intensity of use of a product as
an input since it approximates an input-output (IO) requirement coe¢ cient, i.e. the technical
coe¢ cient of use of inputs in downstream industries26. Furthermore, the cost-share variables
(6 and 7) are re-computed using only the last two years preceding the crisis, to reassure that
the measure can be considered a stable product characteristic over time.
Table 2.2 presents some core statistics relating to the cost-share variables:
Table 2.2: Cost-share variables
Unique values Mean Std.
Cost-Share (w.r.t. costs) 142,817 0.041 0.989
Cost-Share (w.r.t. sales) 142,817 0.031 0.682
Cost-Share (w.r.t. costs - only last 2 years) 121,597 0.030 0.145
Cost-Share (w.r.t. sales - only last 2 years) 121,565 0.024 0.257
Source: SORS, AJPES and authors calculations.
The main equation estimated by OLS is:
gkic;t= 0+1CSkj+2Intkic;t+3 (CSkjIntkic;t) +ic;t+"kic;t; (8)
26A similar measure constructed with the US BEA Input-Output tables was used by Levchenko et al. (2010):
they constructed a measure of downstream vertical linkages, by computing the average use of a commodity in
all downstream industries.
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where gkic;t denotes either the mid-point growth rate of imports (5) or the log-change of
imports of product k received by rm i from origin c in month t ; CSkj denotes the cost-share
variable, Intkic;t denotes a binary variable identifying intermediates; ic;t denotes rm-origin-
month xed e¤ects. 3 tests the hypothesis that relatively higher cost-share intermediates
were subject to larger adjustments in the crisis.
Estimation of (8) circumscribes the analysis of the collapse to a full cycle of downturn
plus recovery. The role of catalysts of the trade crisis could however emerge more neatly when
observing the dynamics within the cycle, rather that the growth of trade over the entire span
of the event. The impact of the cost-share has therefore also been separated between the
downturn and the recovery phases. If the cost-share imparts a larger reaction to trade, this
should be evident with a deeper trough, i.e. a larger fall in the downturn coupled with larger
rebound in the recovery - as descriptively shown in Figure 2.4, right panel.
Specication (9) controls for the within cycle dynamics:
gkic;t= 0+1
 + 2
  recovery + "kic;t (9)
where 
 denotes the right hand side of equation (8) and recovery is a binary variable
picking up shipments after November 2009, identied as the trough of the crisis. The e¤ect
of the cost-share as a catalyst is identied by a negative 3 in downturn and a positive one
in the recovery.
To verify that the e¤ect of the cost-share is robust across di¤erent degrees of integration of
the value-chain (i.e. intra-rm against arms length trade), I employ specication (10), where
I interact the e¤ect of the CS with the e¤ect of rm-ownership: this identies whether the
adjustment di¤ered depending on the relative cost-share of products, when they are traded
within the rm boundaries.
gkic;t=0+1CSkj+2IF ki;t + 3Intkic;t+4 (CSkjIntkic;t) +5 (IF ki;tIntkic;t)
+6 (CSkj  IF ki;t) +7 (CSkj  IF ki;tIntkic;t) + i;t+"kic;t (10)
The right hand side of equation (10) is also interacted with the recovery dummy, as shown in
(9). In (10) I can only exploit rm-month xed e¤ects because for each rm the IF indicator
does not vary within origin.
It is to be observed that the rm-origin-month xed e¤ects account for a great deal of
unobserved confounding factors and that I am only exploiting within rm-origin-month cross-
product variation in estimation. Any demand or supply shock that had aggregate, rm or
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origin specic e¤ects in any time period is thereby controlled for: these include the change
in real expenditure (Levchenko et al., 2010; Behrens et al., 2013), the credit-crunch (Chor
and Manova, 2012) and the reduction in the availability of rm intermediated trade nance
(Korinek et al., 2010, Coulibaly et al., 2011), other than rm constant and rm time varying
characteristics such as size, capital intensity, employment and productivity. Standard errors
are always clustered at the rm level27.
Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics of main variables - Chapter 1
Imports
Entire sample Downturn Recovery
Obs. Mean Std. Obs Mean Std. Obs. Mean Std.
Dep. var. - mid point growth rate (value) 5,672,551 -0.075 1.697 3,395,569 -0.079 1.695 2,276,982 -0.067 1.701
Dep. var. - mid point growth rate (quantity) 5,454,565 -0.056 1.683 3,294,607 -0.059 1.688 2,159,958 -0.051 1.675
Dep. var. - mid point growth rate (unit value) 5,454,565 -0.046 1.632 3,294,607 -0.035 1.629 2,159,958 -0.063 1.636
Dep. var. - log change (value) 1,784,484 -0.068 1.452 1,095,030 -0.130 1.458 689,454 0.030 1.436
Dep. var. - log change (quantity) 1,780,387 -0.088 1.607 1,092,570 -0.153 1.161 687,817 0.015 1.588
Dep. var. - log change (unit value) 1,780,387 0.020 0.803 1,092,570 0.023 0.812 687,817 0.015 0.788
Intermediates (binary indicator) 5,672,551 0.515 0.499 3395569 0.512 0.499 2,276,982 0.512 0.499
Intra-Firm (binary indicator) 5,672,551 0.173 0.377 3395569 0.172 0.377 2,276,982 0.174 0.378
Source: SORS, AJPES and authors calculations.
2.6 Results
This section presents the estimates of the behaviour of Slovenian importers in the crisis,
separating the impact of the shock according to the cost-share of products and the type of
rm a¢ liation.
2.6.1 The cost-share of intermediates, a catalyst of the collapse.
Table 2.4 reports the results from estimating specications (8) and (9) for the value (Panel A),
quantity (Panel B) and unit-values (Panel C) of imports. In columns (1)-(6) the dependent
variable is the mid-point growth rate (5), which allows to take into account every single
shipment at the product-rm-origin level of disaggregation, even if discontinued with respect
to the same month of the previous year. In columns (7)-(12) I instead exploit standard
growth rates dened as the log-di¤erence of the shipment: this implies that only product-
rm-origin triplets that are present in at least two consecutive time periods (the same month
of two consecutive years) are included in the analysis. In other words, using standard growth
rates only exploits the intensive margin of trade, with the mid-point growth rate picking up
a great deal more data points given the relevance of extensive margin changes at this level
27Clustering at the NACE 4-digit sector level leaves the results unchanged.
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of disaggregation. Despite this di¤erence, the results are strikingly similar across the two
variables.
Table 2.4: The Cost-Share as a Catalyst of the Collapse
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Mid-Point Growth Rates Standard Growth Rates (Log-change)
PANEL A: Imports - Values
CS -0.004*** -0.004***-0.004*** -0.004*** -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
Int 0.027***0.034*** 0.030***0.046*** 0.008** 0.010** 0.013** 0.016***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Int*CS -0.003 -0.049*** -0.029* -0.100***
(0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.027)
CS*Rec -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007)
Int*Rec -0.008 -0.029*** -0.011 -0.016*
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
Int*CS*Rec 0.117*** 0.159***
(0.024) (0.043)
PANEL B: Imports - Quantity
CS -0.004*** -0.004***-0.004*** -0.004*** -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003)
Int 0.024***0.032*** 0.026***0.043*** 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Int*CS -0.009 -0.041** -0.019 -0.065**
(0.016) (0.019) (0.016) (0.026)
CS*Rec -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006)
Int*Rec -0.006 -0.027*** -0.009 -0.013
(0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009)
Int*CS*Rec 0.081*** 0.103***
(0.025) (0.039)
PANEL C: Imports - Unit Values
CS -0.003*** -0.004***-0.003*** -0.003*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Int. 0.030*** 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.049*** 0.009** 0.009*** 0.009** 0.010**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Int*CS 0.025** 0.014 -0.010 -0.035***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012)
CS*Rec -0.000 -0.000 0.001* 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Int*Rec -0.012* -0.031*** -0.002 -0.003
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Int*CS*Rec 0.023 0.056***
(0.018) (0.018)
FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 5380701 5672551 5380701 5380701 5672551 5380701 17508541784484 1750854 17508541784484 1750854
Note: Standard errors clustered at the rm level in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Hypothesis 1 is conrmed very strongly in Table 2.4: for imports of intermediates, prod-
uctscost-share worked as a catalyst of the collapse. Starting from columns (1) and (7), on
average and over the entire period of the crisis, imports of products accounting for a larger
share in rmscosts grew less, but signicantly so only for the mid-point growth rate. Over
the entire cycle one would not expect a di¤erential behaviour across products if the cuto¤
dates were identied precisely; however, as evident in Figure 1.4, the path of shipments at
di¤erent quintiles of the CS distribution is rather heterogeneous in the recovery, making it
di¢ cult to pin down the end of the cycle with precision.
In contrast, the path of intermediates is more homogenous, and this is mirrored in the
coe¢ cient on the interaction Int.*CS in columns (3) and (9): a higher CS did not imply
a stark di¤erence for imports of intermediates when no distinction is made between the
downturn and the recovery.
Observing the within collapse dynamics is more directly informative of the role of the CS
as a catalyst of the crisis. For this purpose in columns (4)-(6) and (10)-(12) I separate the
impact of the CS on undi¤erentiated products and on intermediates between the downturn
and the recovery period. The overall negative performance of higher CS products found in
column (1), is the outcome of a more pronounced fall in the downturn, with no signicant
di¤erence detected in the recovery (column 4).
For intermediates instead, for both mid-point and standard growth rates and for both
the value and the quantity of trade (column 6 and 12), the CS acted as a strong catalyst,
accelerating the drop of imports in the downturn, with a signicant and large rebound in the
recovery. Firms reacted to the shock reducing purchases of inputs accounting for a larger
share of their costs more than proportionately in the rst period of crisis, and then increased
them when the cycle picked up, again more than proportionately. This larger responsiveness
could possibly be due to larger inventory adjustments by rms trying to downsize the stock
of relatively high cost-share intermediates, in an attempt to raise liquidity in a recessionary
period28. The di¤erential impact of the crisis across products highlights a relevant role for
the cost-share in explaining part of the trade collapse. For mid-point growth rates, a 10
percentage points increase in the cost-share (two and a half times the mean, but only about
one tenth of a standard deviation) corresponds to a 0.49 percentage point larger fall of trade
in the downturn and a 0.68 percentage point larger growth in the recovery (-0.049 + 0.177),
accounting for 6.8% and 10% of the average growth in the two subperiods. For standard
growth rates, a 10 percentage points increase in the cost-share lead to a 1 percentage point
28A more formal explanation for this mechanism is left to be explained in section 2.7.
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faster drop in the downturn and a 0.59 percentage point faster rebound in the recovery,
accounting for 7.6% and 19% of the average growth in the two subperiods. Finally, notice
that the positive coe¢ cients of the intermediate dummy in the downturn (columns 5 and 11)
increase by 25-50% when controlling for the cost-share of products, whereas the coe¢ cients
in the recovery phase become more negative and acquire signicance. In both subperiods of
the event it therefore appears that higher-cost share intermediates performed in a way which
is opposite to lower cost-share intermediates.
Table 2.5: The Cost-Share as a Catalyst of the Collapse - CSsales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mid-Point Growth Rates Standard Growth Rates (Log-change)
PANEL A: Imports - Values
CS -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006)
Int 0.035*** 0.046*** 0.010** 0.016***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006)
Int*CS -0.027* -0.086*** -0.077*** -0.164***
(0.015) (0.032) (0.018) (0.046)
CS*Rec 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.010)
Int*Rec -0.029*** -0.018**
(0.007) (0.009)
Int*CS*Rec 0.116** 0.289***
(0.054) (0.076)
PANEL B: Imports - Quantity
CS -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005)
Int 0.032*** 0.043*** 0.002 0.006
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Int*CS -0.031** -0.075** -0.061*** -0.127***
(0.016) (0.028) (0.023) (0.035)
CS*Rec 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.010)
Int*Rec -0.026*** -0.014
(0.007) (0.009)
Int*CS*Rec 0.084* 0.218***
(0.045) (0.062)
PANEL C: Imports - Unit Values
CS -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Int 0.036*** 0.049*** 0.009*** 0.010**
(0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004)
Int*CS 0.025** 0.029 -0.016 -0.037*
(0.012) (0.019) (0.013) (0.021)
CS*Rec 0.000 -0.000 0.002* 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Int*Rec -0.030*** -0.003
(0.007) (0.006)
Int*CS*Rec -0.007 0.071*
(0.029) (0.037)
FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 5388408 5388408 5388408 5388408 1749482 1749482 1749482 1749482
Note: Standard errors clustered at the rm level in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.5 presents the results from estimating the same specications of Table 2.4 replacing
the cost-share in terms of costs (6) with the cost-share variable computed in terms of sales
(7).
The two measures have a somewhat di¤erent interpretation because equation (7) repre-
sents rather an average intensity of use of a product across rms in an industry. Despite
this, it is noticeable that the main results are fully conrmed when exploiting the cost-share
in terms of sales: this suggests that the ndings are stable regardless of the main aggregate
- costs or sales - against which the value of inputs is measured.
In conclusion, for both Table 2.4 and 2.5, I present also the results from estimating the
impact of the CS on the growth of the quantity of shipments (mass in kg or units) and the
growth of unit-values (value/quantity). Comparing the coe¢ cients across the three panels
within the tables allows to disentangle whether the results are due to a change in the quantity
shipped, or to changes in prices over the crisis. The literature so far pointed towards the
change in quantity as the main driver of the collapse, with prices only playing a marginal role
(Bricongne et al., 2012; Behrens et al., 2013): the same conclusion is conrmed in this work.
The e¤ects of the CS on the value of trade are detected also when only quantity changes
are observed. For unit-values instead, proxying the price of products, in the mid-point growth
rate regressions all the relevant coe¢ cients are insignicant. In the regressions exploiting the
log-change of imports, given that unit-values equal the ratio between values and quantity,
the coe¢ cients are, by construction, equal to the di¤erence between the coe¢ cient for import
values and the coe¢ cient for import quantities. All together, these results hint at the fact
that price changes are not signicantly associated with the e¤ects under examination in this
work.
Stability of the cost-share measures over time As a robustness check for the main
results shown in the previous section, I recomputed the CS measures (6) and (7) using only
the last two years of data preceding the trade crisis, i.e. 2006 and 2007, rather than all
available years in the data. This reduces the number of observations since products that are
not imported in the 2006-07 period do not enter the calculation of the CS measures, while
the measures become less dispersed (e.g. the standard deviation for (6) falls from 0.98 to
0.14), providing a further robustness check29.
All the main coe¢ cients remain statistically signicant with their size increasing between
20% and 100%. These results provide robustness for the main ndings of Table 2.4, consid-
ering also that they are obtained from a measure whose variability is reduced in a signicant
29Here I show the table for the CS in terms of cost; the table for the CS in terms of sales is in Appendix.
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way.
Table 2.6: The Cost-Share as a Catalyst of the Collapse - Only 2006-07 for CS calculation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mid-Point Growth Rates Standard Growth Rates (Log-change)
PANEL A: Imports - values
CS -0.044*** -0.036*** -0.041*** -0.030*** -0.070*** -0.063** -0.097** -0.065**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.027) (0.031) (0.006) (0.036)
Int 0.034*** 0.044*** 0.008* 0.015**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006)
Int*CS -0.050** -0.095*** -0.021 -0.124**
(0.025) (0.030) (0.046) (0.059)
CS*Rec -0.020 -0.040 0.131** 0.031
(0.026) (0.037) (0.057) (0.068)
Int*Rec -0.027*** -0.016**
(0.007) (0.009)
Int*CS*Rec 0.152** 0.212**
(0.058) (0.093)
PANEL B: Imports - quantity
CS -0.046*** -0.037*** -0.042*** -0.031*** -0.052** -0.041 -0.068* -0.042
(0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.008) (0.025) (0.027) (0.038) (0.029)
Int. 0.032*** 0.041*** 0.001 0.006
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Int*CS -0.058** -0.089*** -0.031 -0.101*
(0.026) (0.028) (0.040) (0.052)
CS*Rec -0.025 -0.038 0.078 0.013
(0.028) (0.037) (0.049) (0.066)
Int*Rec -0.025*** -0.013
(0.007) (0.009)
Int*CS*Rec 0.110* 0.151*
(0.056) (0.086)
FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 5267877 5267877 5267877 5267877 1734962 1734962 1734962 1734962
Note: Standard errors clustered at the rm level in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
2.6.2 A rm level cost-share measure
The results presented in Tables 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 explore the trade adjustment of products
accounting for a di¤erent share of rms costs (or rms sales), where the CS measure is
specic for each CN-8 product in each NACE (4-digit) sector.
In order to explore the CS heterogeneity further, an attempt has been made to compute
the CS measure at an even ner level of disaggregation, making the CS ratio product-rm
specic, rather than product-industry specic30. The main results (Table 2.14) are broadly
conrmed, with the CS of imported products being associated with a larger response of
imports in both the subperiod of the crisis. One noticeable di¤erence, relative to the main
results of Tables 2.4 and 2.5, is that when exploiting the rm-product level CS measure
this accelerating impact appears to be driven by non-intemerdiate products. However, when
30Full details about the CS measures and the results are provided in Appendix.
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analysing only the subsample of intermediates (Table 2.15) a sign pattern compatible with
the CS acting as a catalyst of the collapse is detected again.
Despite the similarity of results between the product-industry and the product-rm CS
measures, the variable that is preferred in terms of the main nding of this paper remains
the product-industry measure. This is because it can be better interpreted as a stable char-
acteristic of the product and it is less likely to be determined by idiosyncratic rm-level
features. Overall, it is reassuring to nd that productsCS is associated with an enhanced
trade adjustment across such a large variety of amendments of the CS measure.
2.6.3 Unpacking the CS e¤ect across the intra-rm versus arms length trade
dymension of the collapse.
Conditioning on rm ownership, the main result about the impact of product CS on trade is
upheld. This is a key nding emerging from disentangling the intra-rm versus arms length
dimension of the trade collapse. Regardless of whether transactions are operated by related
parties - intra-rm trade (IF), or unrelated parties - arms length trade (AL), shipments of
inputs accounting for a larger CS underwent a larger adjustment both during the downturn
and the recovery phase of the crisis.
Furthermore, controlling for the type of rm a¢ liation, other than strenghtening the main
nding of this chapter, allows to uncover a secondary mechanism that characterized the trade
adjustment: IF trade might have worked as an additional catalyst of the trade collapse for
higher CS products, while there appears to be no di¤erence between the response of IF and
AL trade when no distinction is made across products.
In Table 2.7 the impact of the CS is interacted with that of rm a¢ liation, as shown in
specication (10). In columns (3), (4), (7) and (8) the analysis contrasts the two subperiods
of the crisis and reveals the two key ndings: rst, the accelerating e¤ect of the CS on
imports of intermediates, discussed in the previous sections, is fully robust to controlling
for the impact of rm a¢ liation (Int*CS and Int*CS*Rec coe¢ cients in columns 4 and 8);
second, IF trade might have worked as an additional catalyst of the trade collapse for higher
CS products. This latter nding appears strongly in columns (3) and (7), with higher CS
products experiencing a larger fall in the downturn coupled with a larger rebound in the
recovery. However, this e¤ect does not look to be specic to trade of intermediates, at least
not in the downturn, where the negative coe¢ cient on IF*CS is unchanged (or even becomes
larger) when controlling for the impact on intermediates (columns 4 and 8). In other words,
while for both IF and AL trade the reaction of higher CS inputs was larger than that of
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lower CS inputs, the di¤erence between IF and AL trade consists of an enhanced reaction for
higher CS consumption and capital goods, relative to lower CS ones. In the recovery instead,
the positive rebound of higher CS products traded IF (relative to AL imports) appears to be
driven by intermediates. In Table 2.7 this is evident for the mid-point growth rate regressions,
however, when the alternative CS measure is exploited (Table 2.7B in Appendix) the positive
rebound for IF imports of higher CS intermediates is found for both the mid-point and the
standard growth rate3132.
Table 2.7: Firm a¢ liation and cost-share.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mid-Point Growth Rate Standard Growth Rate
IF -0.012 -0.00690 0.007 0.009 -0.013 -0.005 -0.008 -0.013
(0.022) (0.024) (0.029) (0.030) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.016)
CS -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.003* -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.016) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
IF*CS -0.014** -0.021*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.031 -0.133* -0.147** -0.211**
(0.006) (0.05) (0.004) (0.003) (0.026) (0.078) (0.063) (0.086)
Int 0.029*** 0.035*** 0.008* 0.009
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
Int*IF -0.013 -0.008 -0.015 0.006
(0.018) (0.024) (0.012) (0.015)
Int*CS -0.007 -0.040** -0.041** -0.111***
(0.015) (0.019) (0.019) (0.026)
Int*CS*IF 0.076** 0.038 0.152* 0.175
(0.036) (0.061) (0.084) (0.113)
IF*Rec -0.040 -0.035 -0.013 0.022
(0.035) (0.036) (0.021) (0.024)
CS*Rec 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.003
(0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006)
IF*CS*Rec 0.077** -0.288* 0.248** 0.252
(0.037) (0.162) (0.098) (0.194)
Int*Rec -0.015* -0.000
(0.008) (0.009)
Int*IF*Rec -0.016 -0.055**
(0.024) (0.022)
Int*CS*Rec 0.087*** 0.162***
(0.026) (0.044)
Int*CS*IF*Rec 0.347** -0.154
(0.175) (0.225)
FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 5380701 5380701 5380701 5380701 1750854 1750854 1750854 1750854
Note: Standard errors clustered at the rm level in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The availability of IF and AL dummies, allows to perfom an additional simple excercise,
i.e. to estimate whether IF trade exhibited a di¤erential response relative to AL trade on
31Tables 2.7, 2.7B (in Appendix) and 2.8 show the results for nominal imports. For the sake of brevity I do
not show the tables for quantity, but results are extremely similar to those for the value of imports.
32Over the entire cycle (columns 1,2 5 and 6) it appears that higher CS products grew less when traded
intra-rm compared to when traded at arms length, with this e¤ect being driven by consumtion and capital
goods rather than intermediates, which instead show a better performace (Int*CS*IF coe¢ cients). These
e¤ects are larger when the standard growth rate is used as dependent variable, but they are estimated more
precisely when exploiting the mid-point growth rate.
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average, without exploiting the CS margin. Table 2.8 shows the results from these regressions,
which do not reveal a statistically di¤erent response between the two organisational modes.
Table 2.8: Intra-rm versus arms length trade.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mid-Point Growth Rate Standard Growth Rate
IF -0.009 -0.001 0.009 0.015 -0.014 -0.008 -0.012 -0.019
(0.021) (0.023) (0.029) (0.029) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.017)
Int 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.007 0.005
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
IF*Int. -0.017 -0.014 -0.010 0.013
(0.016) (0.022) (0.010) (0.015)
IF * Rec. -0.044 -0.039 -0.003 0.030
(0.033) (0.035) (0.020) (0.024)
Int* Rec 0.005 0.006
(0.008) (0.010)
IF*Int*Rec -0.008 -0.061***
(0.023) (0.022)
FEs. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 5672551 5672551 5672551 5672551 1784484 1784484 1784484 1784484
Note: Standard errors clustered at the rm level; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
IF trade is not observed to have a¤ected the reaction of trade in the crisis di¤erently
from AL trade, when the e¤ect is averaged over all products, or when separating the e¤ect
for intermediates; neither over the entire cycle (columns 1, 2, 5 and 6), nor when separating
the e¤ect over the downturn and the recovery (columns 3,4, 7 and 8). Only for standard
growth rates it appears that, in the recovery, there was a negative premium for shipments
of intermediates when taking place intra-rm relative to arms length: too little to conclude
anything in favour of an accelerating or dampening impact of IF trade overall.
Summarizing the ndings of this section, the role of product CS as a catalyst of the
collapse is upheld when controlling for rms a¢ liation. Furthermore, IF trade did not
a¤ect the reaction of trade di¤erently from AL trade when the impact is averaged over all
products, or when productsCS is not controlled for. The only margin along which some
action is detected is when contrasting the performace of shipments accounting for a larger
share of rms costs between the two subperiods of the crisis. These results suggest that
IF trade might have deepened the collapse of imports, relative to AL trade. There appears,
therefore, to be a cumulative e¤ect imparted by the CS and rm a¢ liation, with the di¤erence
that for both IF and AL trade the CS impacted trade of intermediates (and this results is
robust to controlling for rm ownership), whereas the di¤erential impact of IF with respect
to AL trade is mostly evident for capital and consumption goods in the downturn and for
intermediates in the recovery.
Several factors can explain why the analysis of IF against AL trade failed to show well
dened results. First, all regressions are run with rm-month xed e¤ects; so there is likely
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to be little within rm-month variation to be estimated from between IF and AL trade.
Secondly, the identication of IF and AL transactions su¤ers from measurement error: as
explained in Section 3, the misallocation of a fraction of shipments from AL to IF trade
causes the coe¢ cients on these variables to be biased towards zero, again preventing the
detection of a signicant impact. In this case, however, it can be argued that this limitation
works against my identication strategy and that the di¤erences I detect between IF and
AL trade would just be stronger if I could separate the two groups more precisely. Lastly,
even though the stylized (S, s) model o¤ers a simple rationale to expect a larger reaction of
IF trade, the presence of alternative mechanisms of opposite sign is well possible in a trade
crisis33. In case o¤setting mechanisms were at work, this can further explain why only a mild
gap is uncovered between the response of one trading mode with respect to the other.
Importantly, heterogeneity across the CS of imported products seems to be the relevant
margin of intervention of rms when attempting to downsize activity in a recessionary envi-
ronment: the accelerating impact of the CS persists when controlling for the e¤ect of rm
a¢ liation and it is the only margin along which a di¤erential impact between IF and AL trade
is detected, possibly because of a di¤erent inventory mangement strategy, or more simply a
di¤erential potential to quickly adjust to a shock.
2.6.4 A bullwhip e¤ect triggered by the adjustment of intermediates?
The cost-share of imported products imparted to imports of intermediates a more than pro-
portionate response to the change in demand in the 2008-09 collapse, in both the downturn
and in the recovery phase. This deeper trough experienced by intermediates hints at a U-
shaped reaction for these goods over the crisis. If this path can nd an explantion in the
dynamics of inventory adjustments by rms along a value chain34, this U-shaped reaction
recalls what the value chain literature denes the bullwhip e¤ect (Forrester, 1961), a response
induced by demand variability, which is lowest for the most downstream product along a
chain of production, and highest for the most upstream producers. Escaith et al. (2010)
argue that the greater the distance between a rm and the nal consumer, the more demand
uncertainty the rm faces and the greater its inventory holdings. A demand shock leads
downstream rms to reduce orders and run down inventories in expectation of lower future
demand: this is reected in an amplied shock for upstream rms, which are forced to hold
more inventories. During the recovery phase the opposite should be observed, with a more
33 IF trade of US rms was reported to be more resilient than AL trade during the East Asian crises of 1997
(Bernard et al. 2009).
34This channel is going to be analysed in Section 2.7.
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than proportional increase of shipments along the chain when inventory stocks go back to
the pre-shock level.
The results of Table 2.4 do not show the existence of a bullwhip e¤ect for all intermediate
products. In columns (5) and (11) I expressly control for this e¤ect, which would result in a
negative coe¢ cient on the intermediate dummy in the downturn, coupled with a positive one
in the recovery. There appears instead to be a faster growth of intermediatesimports in the
downturn, with no signicant di¤erence in the recovery. On the other side, importantly, the
bullwhip e¤ect emerges when controlling for the CS of intermediates: the faster fall in the
downturn coupled with the faster rebound in the recovery found for inputs accounting for a
larger CS, consists in a result corresponding to a bullwhip e¤ect. The additional accelerating
impact exerted on trade of high-CS products by IF trade contributes to strengthen the
nding that, within GVCs, the relevant source of cross-product heterogeneity acting as a
catalyst of the trade collapse is the relative CS of the items imported by rms.
2.7 Empirical tests of the inventory mechanism
In this section I provide evidence in support of the channel hypothesised as a determinant of
the enhanced trade adjustment of higher CS products and the larger reaction of IF relative
to AL trade.
Hypotheses 1 and 2 relate the trade adjustment to the management of inventories. In
order to test their implications about the relevance of productscost-share and rm a¢ liation
in determining the stock of inventories (i.e. a higher CS corresponding to a higher value of
the stock and IF trade rms accumulating less inventories than AL trade rms) and the
inventory adjustment (i.e. a higher CS leading to a larger adjustment and IF trade adjusting
more than AL trade), I would ideally need inventory data at the level at which I measure the
cost-share (CN-8 product level). Additionally, to observe the adjustment over the crisis these
data would need to be at a monthly frequency. Having inventory data only at the rm level,
at a yearly frequency, an empirical test of the hypotheses can be approached only indirectly.
Because of this weakness of the data and in order to provide more robustness to the inventory
adjustment channel, I pursue two alternative strategies.
2.7.1 Frequency of shipments as a proxy for inventory adjustments
The change in the frequency of shipments at the transaction level can be an indication that
rms are changing the stock of inventories of a certain product (Chen and Juvenal, 2015).
With transaction level data, I can compute the growth of the frequency of imports of each
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product, in each sector, in each month35.
As in the main specications of this work, both the mid-point growth rate and the log-
change of the frequency of shipments at the product-sector-month level has been computed.
These have then been exploited to replace the growth of imports on the left-hand-side of
specications (8), (9) and (10) to test whether higher CS products underwent larger inventory
adjustments and whether IF trade lead to a faster adjustment of trade relative to AL trade.
Table 2.9 shows the results of these regressions, for both the CS costs and the CS sales
measures.
Table 2.9: Frequency of shipments - Inventory adjustment. Cost-share.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Mid-Point Growth Rates Standard Growth Rates (Log-change)
PANEL A: Frequency of shipments. CS costs
CS -0.002*** -0.002***-0.002*** -0.002*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.001* -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Int 0.017***0.022*** 0.017***0.031*** 0.007***0.007*** 0.006***0.007***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Int*CS -0.007 -0.035* -0.022** -0.025**
(0.011) (0.018) (0.001) (0.012)
CS*Rec 0.000 -0.001 0.002** 0.002**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Int*Rec 0.000 -0.021*** 0.017 0.001
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Int*CS*Rec 0.069*** 0.005
(0.020) (0.010)
FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 5313521 5578068 5313521 5313521 5578068 5313521 837575 856555 837575 837575 856555 837575
PANEL B: Frequency of shipments. CS sales
CS -0.003*** -0.002***-0.003*** -0.002*** -0.001 -0.000 -0.002*** -0.001*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Int. 0.018***0.022*** 0.017***0.031*** 0.007***0.008*** 0.006***0.008***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Int*CS -0.001 -0.056** -0.055** -0.058*
(0.016) (0.028) (0.028) (0.031)
CS*Rec 0.000 0.000 -0.003** -0.003***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001)
Int*Rec 0.000 -0.021*** 0.017 0.001
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Int*CS*Rec 0.095*** 0.006
(0.041) (0.013)
FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 5309737 5578068 5309737 5309737 5578068 5309737 837032 856555 837032 837032 856555 837032
Note: Standard errors clustered at the rm level in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
What emerges is that the growth of the frequency of shipments is signicantly associated
with the CS of products. In particular, shipments of intermediates accounting for a higher
35 It has also been experimented with the computation of this variable at the rm level, but the level of prod-
uct disaggregation and the monthly frequency do not allow to have meaningful variation when disaggregating
the growth of the frequency by products, sector, and rms.
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CS contracted more in the downturn and grew back more in the recovery phase. For standard
growth rates this result is found also without distinguishing between the end use of products
(column 10). The ndings in Table 2.9 mirror therefore closely those of Table 2.4 and 2.5:
if the change in the frequency of shipments can be considered a good proxy for inventory
adjustments, it can be inferred that the accelerating impact of products cost-share in the
trade collapse was likely driven by a reduction in the stock of inventories in the downturn
and to a corresponding increase in the recovery.
Table 2.10: Frequency of shipments - Inventory adjustment. Firm a¢ liation and CS costs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mid-Point Growth Rate Standard Growth Rate
IF 0.024 -0.008 0.011 0.011 -0.002 0.004 0.000 0.006
(0.058) (0.080) (0.007) (0.010) (0.005) (0.006) (0.001) (0.007)
CS -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
IF*CS -0.012** -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.020 -0.187*** -0.039 -0.228**
(0.004) (0.03) (0.002) (0.001) (0.024) (0.051) (0.035) (0.056)
Int 0.022*** 0.031*** 0.008* 0.007**
(0.003) (0.011) (0.002) (0.0029)
Int*IF -0.001 -0.003 -0.010** -0.011*
(0.009) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005)
Int*CS -0.004 -0.037** -0.024** -0.026*
(0.009) (0.015) (0.010) (0.014)
Int*CS*IF 0.035 0.026 0.204*** 0.236***
(0.025) (0.043) (0.055) (0.064)
IF*Rec -0.021 -0.019 -0.004 -0.006
(0.017) (0.020) (0.021) (0.011)
CS*Rec 0.000 -0.000 0.002** -0.002**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
IF*CS*Rec 0.021 -0.276* 0.042 0.132
(0.029) (0.155) (0.029) (0.088)
Int*Rec -0.021*** -0.004
(0.006) (0.005)
Int*IF*Rec 0.004 0.003
(0.016) (0.009)
Int*CS*Rec 0.089*** 0.006
(0.020 (0.014)
Int*CS*IF*Rec 0.276 -0.113
(0.163) (0.091)
FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 5313521 5313521 5313521 5313521 837575 837575 837575 837575
Note: Standard errors clustered at the rm level in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 2.10 I control for the impact of IF trade36. Again, conditioning on rm ownership
leaves the impact of the CS unaltered. Focusing on the gap between IF and AL trade shows
that the e¤ect of IF trade on the change in the frequency of shipments is less clearcut than
the e¤ect detected on the growth of trade. Most of the coe¢ cients in Table 2.10 take the same
36Table 2.10 shows the results for the CS costs variable, Table 2.10B in Appendix shows the results for
CS sa les : Furthermore, I only present the estimates where the e¤ect of IF and the CS are interacted, given
that in isolation IF shows no impact in the crisis (Table 2.8). When exploiting the change in frequency of
shipments as dependent variable this result is conrmed.
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sign as those in Table 2.8, but the deepening impact of IF trade on the frequency of imports
of higher CS product is not always statistically signicant at the conventional levels (columns
3, 4, 7 and 8). Hence, I cannot draw strong conclusions about the channel driving the e¤ect
of IF relative to AL trade; however more evidence in support of the inventory adjustment
channel is provided in Section 2:7:2:
2.7.2 Reduced form estimation of inventory adjustments at the rm level
A second way in which I attempt to support the rationale of hypotheses 1 and 2 is by
attempting a reduced form estimation of the main results of the (S, s) model exposed in
Section 2.
As I am limited by the lack of inventory data at the level at which I measure the CS
(CN-8), and in order to be able to run a rm level regression, I average up to the rm level
the CS of the products that a rms imports over a year: CSit = 1K
PK
k=1CSkj where CSit
is the CS of rm i in year t37. According to equation (1) the average stock of inventory is
negatively related to the unit-cost of the item, but positively to the cost-share (equation (81)
in appendix). Taking (1) to the data leads to a specication of this form:
Nit = 0 + 1CSit + 2Sit + i + t + 1t+ 2t
2 + "it (11)
whereN denotes the stock of inventories, CS denotes the rm level cost-share ratio, S denotes
sales, i and t denote rm and year xed e¤ects, t and t
2 denote a linear and a quadratic
time trend38, i and t index rms and years. Firm xed e¤ects capture factors that can be
considered rm specic and constant over time, like the ordering cost A, the complexity
coe¢ cient ! and the carrying charge I; any time varying factor common across rms that
determines a change in these costs (e.g. interest rates) is captured by the time xed e¤ects.
1 and 2 capture the contemporaneous impact of the CS and sales on inventories: the
CS should be positively associated with the value of the stock, whereas sales could come
with a negative coe¢ cient if contemporaneous sales are di¤erent from rms expectations
and inventories act like a bu¤er stock. In order to take into account rmsexpectations and
the adjustment of inventories due to sales and the average cost-share, specication (11) can
37The product level CSkj does not present a time index because the CS is constructed to be time-invariant.
The rm level CSit has instead been calculated averaging the product level cost-share for each rm, year by
year, over the products imported. This approach for the rm level CS has been chosen for two reasons:
a. it seems realistic to think that the average CS of the stock of inventories of a rm changes from year to
year, depending on the adjustments performed by the rm.
b. preserving a time dimension allows the use of rm xed e¤ects in estimation.
38Since the average stock of inventories (1) is a function of the square root of demand and the cost-share,
linear and quadratic time trends are consistent with targets that increase with time and its square root.
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be amended in this way:
Nit = 0 + 1CSit + 3CSit 1 + 3Sit + 4Sit 1 + i + t + 1t+ 2t
2 + "it (12)
Concerning hypothesis 2 and the unequal inventory management strategy between IF and
AL trade rms, an indirect test has been attempted by exploting specication (13):
Nit = 0 + 1Groupi + 2Sit + 3Sit 1 +
X
r
rXi;t + t + 1t+ 2t
2 + "it (13)
where Group denotes a dummy variable taking value 1 if the rm belongs to a multina-
tional group, S denotes sales and X denotes a vector of rm level controls39 included because,
as the Group dummy time-invariant, it is not possible to exploit rm xed e¤ects likewise in
the above specications.
Table 2.11 provides the results of the estimation of (11) and (12), for both CS measures.
The data are taken from rmsbalance sheet information (AJPES), for all years between
2000 and 2011. The inventory and sales variables are scaled by rmss value of total assets.
Table 2.11: Inventories as a function of the CS.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CS costs CS sales
CS_rm(t) 0.00051** 0.00078*** 0.00054*** 0.00087** 0.00165*** 0.00137***
(0.00021) (0.00014) (0.00018) (0.00044) (0.00031) (0.00040)
CS_rm(t 1) -0.00032***-0.00059***-0.00045*** -0.00048***-0.00101***-0.00066***
(0.00010) (0.00011) (0.00017) (0.00014) (0.00019) (0.00028)
Sales(t) -0.00026+-0.00023+ -0.00023+ -0.00024+ -0.00016***-0.00023+ -0.00022+ -0.00024+
(0.00018) (0.00016) (0.00016) (0.00017) (0.00005) (0.00017) (0.00016) (0.00018)
Sales(t 1) 0.00022 0.00027+ 0.00034+ 0.00022 0.00027+ 0.00033+
(0.00021) (0.00021) (0.00024) (0.00021) (0.00021) (0.00024)
CS_rm(t)*Crisis 0.00014 -0.00083
(0.00040) (0.00080)
CS_rm(t 1)*Crisis -0.00103*** -0.00027
(0.00056) (0.00098)
Trends yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm. FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 0.192*** 0.192*** 0.192*** 0.188*** 0.185*** 0.192*** 0.192*** 0.188***
(0.00127) (0.00133) (0.00133) (0.00133) (0.00121) (0.00133) (0.00127) (0.00133)
N 110169 81448 81020 86734 110115 81434 80999 86705
Note: Standard errors clustered at the rm level in parentheses; + p < 0.2, p < 0.15,* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The contemporaneous average rm-level CS ratio is always found to be positively asso-
ciated with the stock of inventories, as expected. It also emerges that contemporanous sales
39The controls are capital intensity, skill intensity, number of employees and TFP, computed by use of the
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) estimator.
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are negatively associated with the value of the inventory stock: this seems compatible with
the classical interpretation that sees inventories as a bu¤er against unexpected increases in
sales, in order to avoid stockout costs (Hadley and Whitin 1963, Abel 1985, Carpenter et
al., 1994, 1998). The optimal stock (equation 1 in the model) increases with sales; hence in
columns (2) and (6) I attempt to control for the adjustmet induced by the CS, replacing the
contemporaneous CS with its one year lag: conditional on sales (or past sales), a past higher
average CS induces rms to adjust inventory holdings to a lower level in order to minimise
carrying costs: this explanation is compatible with the negative coe¢ cient estimated for the
lagged CS ratio. In columns (3) and (7) I control for all factors jointly: all coe¢ cients take
the expected signs, including the sales variables, whose level of signicance does however not
reach the conventional levels.
Lastly, in order to control whether the inventory adjustment behaviour was enhanced
during the trade collapse, in columns (4) and (8) I interact the rm level CS and its one year
lag with a dummy picking up the di¤erence between these coe¢ cients for all the other years
and 2009.
The contemporanous CS doesnt show a signicant di¤erence during the crisis, but the
lagged CS is associated with a negative premium for the crisis year (signifcant only for the
CS in terms of rmscosts). This suggests that if rms tend to respond to a higher CS by
reducing the stock of inventories, they did so more strongly during the trade collapse.
Table 2.12: Inventories and rm a¢ liation.
(1) (2)
Group -0.025*** -0.023***
(0.005) (0.005)
Sales(t) 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
Sales(t 1) 0.004* 0.004*
(0.002) (0.002)
Group*Crisis -0.006**
(0.003)
Trends yes yes
Firm. FE no no
Firm Controls yes yes
Year FE yes yes
Constant 0.247*** 0.247***
(0.0068) (0.0068)
N 23849 23849
Note: Standard errors clustered at the rm level
in parentheses; p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 2.12 presents the results from estimating specication (13). In line with hypothesis
2, rms belonging to multinational groups are found to accumulate a lower stock of inven-
tories, on average, relative to independent rms. Furthermore, the interaction between the
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group and the crisis dummy shows an additional negative coe¢ cient, conrming the possibil-
ity that rms trading intra-rm might have undertaken larger inventory adjustments during
the crisis.
The results in Table 2.11 and 2.12 appear to broadly endorse the (S, s) model and the
predictions of hypothesis 1 and 2. Despite the evident caveats arising from the data structure
available to test these propositions, there is some - admittedly rudimentary - evidence in sup-
port of the inventory adjustment channel as an explanation of the role of the CS heterogneity
in accelerating the trade collapse. A higher average CS of imported products is associated
with a higher value of inventories, and rms whose average CS of imported products is higher
appear to reduce their inventory holdings, after controlling for their level of sales: this mech-
anism could help explaining the accelerating impact of the CS on imports of intermediates
estimated in Tables 2.4 and 2.5, and its role as a catalyst of the trade collapse.
Also the IF versus AL hypothesis obtains support in this section: a sizeable gap is detected
in the amount of inventories that a¢ liated and una¢ liated rms carry, with a further premium
during the crisis year.
2.8 Intensive and extensive margin of trade in the crisis
The literature attributed the largest fraction of the variation in trade during the crisis to
adjustments at the intensive margin, mainly performed by large exporters (Bricongne et al.
2012, Wagner 2012, Behrens et al. 2013). The availability of monthly transaction level data
allows to perform a detailed intensive/extensive margin decomposition, and to separate the
extensive margin further along the rm, destination and product dimensions. One of the
novelties of this work consists in the possibility of decomposing these four margins further,
distinguishing between IF and AL trade.
The results of section 2:6 and hypothesis 2 point in direction of a di¤erential reaction
during a trade collapse depending on the ownership structure linking agents of international
trade. Further in support of a di¤erential impact of shocks between IF and AL trade, there are
the di¤erent cost structures relating to the two organisational modes as well as the so-called
hold-up problem40 (Antràs, 2003; Antràs and Helpman, 2004; Nunn and Treer, 2013). With
respect to trade margins, deeper integration leading to the establishment of multinationals,
due to the presence of sunk costs and market rigidities, could imply that in a trade crisis
40A main determinant of intra-rm trade vs outsourcing has been shown to be the share of inputs provided
by the headquarter rm relative to the share of inputs provided by the subsidiaries. In case the bargaining
between the parties of an outsourcing agreement breaks down after investment in inputs and production by
the two parties took place, the degree of control on the outside options is what induces the rm providing the
larger share of inputs to integrate with the foreign supplier in order to minimise losses. (Antràs 2003, Nunn
and Treer 2013).
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adjustments along the intensive margin are preferable to extensive margin adjustments. If
some adjustment along the extensive margin is required, then this could be preponderant for
arms length trade. For example, Bernard et al. (2009) measure a larger negative extensive
margin adjustment for arms length compared to intra-rm trade during the East-Asian crisis
of 1997.
The margin decomposition, distinguishing between intra-rm and arms length transac-
tions, is a further dimension of heterogeneity in the collapse explored in this work. Bernard
et al. (2009) is to my knowledge the only paper to date performing such a decomposition,
analysing US trade during the 1993-2003 period. The decomposition applied here is based
on Bricongne et al. (2012)41: for each month I measure the intensive margin and the three
extensive margins (rm, destination and product margins), separating then these further be-
tween IF and AL transactions. The net margins are given by the sum of the positive and
negative contributions42.
During the crisis the adjustment of Slovenian trade took place mostly at the intensive
margin, with this fraction of the overall variation possibly also underestimated because of the
high level of data disaggregation and frequency. From Figure 2.5 it also is evident that the
rm and destination extensive margins play a smaller role compared to the product margin:
this conrm the similarity of the Slovenian experience to what the literature showed for
France, Belgium and Germany.
Figure 2.5: Net rm, destination and product extensive margin adjustments, 2007-2011.
41Since the methodology is borrowed from Bricongne et al. (2012) I specify the details in Appendix.
42Notice that while the entirety of the empirical analysis in this chapter exploited data on imports, for
the margin analysis I am showing results obtained with data on exports. The reason is that, being the
margin decomposition computationally intensive, especially when disaggregating the margins across IF and
AL transactions I could not perform the analysis with the import data. In the Slovenian trade data, the import
data include a much larger amount of observations relative to the export data, reason why the application
of the Bricongne et al. (2012) methodology on imports was not possible with the computer at hand in the
Secure Rooms at the Statistical O¢ ce in Ljubljana.
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The complete decomposition is presented in Table 2.13, where the marginscontributions
are averaged over the main periods characterising the event43.
Table 2.13: Net intensive and extensive margin adjustments, 2007-2011, in %.
Pre-crisis Downturn Recovery Post-crisis
Jan 07 - Dec07 Sep 08 - Nov 09 Dec 09 - Sep 10 Oct 10 - Dec 11
IF AL IF AL IF AL IF AL
Firm
Entry 0.49 3.78 0.40 2.95 0.62 2.92 0.43 3.51
Exit -0.07 -1.84 -0.91 -3.26 -0.44 -3.34 -0.29 -2.80
Net Firm 0.42 1.94 -0.51 -0.29 0.17 -0.41 0.13 0.70
Destination
Entry 1.95 5.66 1.46 4.72 1.91 5.88 2.11 5.71
Exit -1.14 -4.75 -1.99 -5.93 -1.57 -4.87 -1.61 -4.21
Net Dest 0.81 0.90 -0.53 -1.21 0.33 1.01 0.49 1.50
Product
Entry 4.91 8.92 2.98 4.83 9.03 6.31 6.20 6.49
Exit -4.61 -8.24 -4.82 -7.38 -8.54 -6.89 -5.80 -5.83
Net Prod 0.30 0.67 -1.83 -2.55 0.49 -0.57 0.40 0.65
Total Extensive
Pos 7.36 18.3 4.85 12.51 11.5 15.1 8.74 15.7
Neg -5.83 -14.8 -7.73 -16.57 -10.5 -15.1 -7.70 -12.8
Net Ext 1.53 3.52 -2.88 -4.05 1.00 0.00 1.04 2.86
Total Intensive
Pos 13.3 10.6 9.01 8.04 13.8 12.3 12.0 13.0
Neg -8.81 -8.17 -17.3 -15.4 -7.33 -9.34 -7.99 -8.13
Net Int 4.49 2.43 -8.36 -7.39 6.47 3.04 4.09 4.95
Tot. Exp 6.02 6.00 -11.2 -11.4 7.48 3.06 5.13 7.82
Source: CARS, SURS and authors calculations.
In the pre-crisis period, the contributions of intensive and extensive margins are about
similar. During the downturn the intensive margin absorbed over double the share of the
overall fall in trade compared to the extensive margin; with also the subsequent recovery
being dominated by an increase in the value of continuing links rather the creation of new
ones. It is the product margin that contributed the most to the extensive margin variation:
this is represented by discontinued shipments of products by incumbents within destinations
that continued to be served with other products. This is a within rm-destination margin
that might appear of secondary importance and certainly not evident in more aggregate
data which could however represent a rst order issue in the light of new ndings of the
heterogeneous rms trade literature: importing rms productivity can be harmed in case
rms are no longer able to source inputs that are not perfectly substitutable in the production
process (Gopinath and Neiman, 2014); or else, exporters might have su¤ered in case they
43Table 2.13 includes the gures underlying gure 2.5. For each sub-period the margins are evaluated
separating the contributions to IF and AL trade, but summing horizontally the within sub-period margins
the aggregate gures represented in gure 2.5 are obtained.
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were unable to nd buyers for the varieties they produce following importers willingness
to concentrate purchases from the suppliers best suiting their preferences (Ottaviano et al.
2014).
The existing literature on the trade crisis has not explored the disaggregation of trade
margins taking into consideration whether shipments are between related parties or not. In
all sub-periods, except for the recovery, the contribution of the extensive margin to the overall
variation in AL trade exceeds the contribution to the variation in IF trade. A signicative
comparison can be made especially in the rst two sub-periods, because both before the
crisis and in the downturn the overall variation is split roughly equally between the two
organisational modes, but it is evident that the composition of this variation di¤ers between
IF and AL trade: intensive margin changes are prevalent for IF trade; extensive margin
changes prevail for AL trade. Once a rm is integrated with the foreign supplier, in a crisis it
might be preferable to reduce the value of the shipments, rather than severing the o¤shoring
link. This could nd an explanation in the di¤erent cost structures relating to these di¤erent
modes of cross border production, with larger sunk costs and lower variable cost associated
to IF trade; or else, in the reasons why rms decide to acquire the ownership of the foreign
supplier, rather than subscribing an outsourcing agreement. The literature triggered by
Antràs (2003) explained that intra-rm imports increase in the share of non-contractible
inputs provided by the headquarter rm: once investment in customised inputs took place, a
rm will have losses if the agreement breaks down. Therefore, the larger this investment the
more likely the acquisition of control over the supplier.
This interdependence between the two ends of the production chain could be another
reason why intensive margin adjustments were larger for IF trade. Outsourcing contracts,
on the other hand, might be less negotiable in case production needs to be cut: this could
reduce the extent of intensive margin changes, while increasing the extensive margin share
in case a rm defaults on its obligations altogether. A further di¤erence between IF versus
AL trade arises when looking at the stability of the extensive margin links over time: even
though the net contribution do often not show a stark di¤erence between IF and AL trade 
especially for the rm and destination margins , the creation and destruction of links that
went into the creation of the net variation show a much higher variability of AL compared
to IF transactions. The channels leading to this di¤erent behaviour might again derive from
the explanations pushed forward above, and nd theoretical support in the property rights
approach to organisational modes.
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2.9 Conclusion
This work addresses the impact of the 2008-09 nancial crisis on international trade by
analysing high frequency transaction level data matched with rm balance-sheet and own-
ership information. The main contribution of this paper consists of the identication of a
new channel that accelerated the reaction of trade ows to the shock. The share of imported
intermediates in rmscosts was identied as a catalyst of the trade collapse, because ship-
ments of higher cost-share inputs fell more than proportionately compared to lower cost-share
inputs in the downturn, and rebounded faster in the recovery. This larger responsiveness in
both sub-periods of the event suggests that the trough of the collapse was indeed deeper
for transactions involving higher CS products. This result is robust to expoiting only the
intensive margin variation of trade; or to the amendment of the cost-share measure (from the
share in total costs to the share in total sales).
Notwithstanding being unable to identify the exact source of this behaviour, this phe-
nomenon appears compatible with the hypothesis that rms adjusted more promptly the
inventory stock of higher CS inputs, in the attempt to react to the reduced actual and ex-
pected level of demand. Inventory adjustments have been shown to be among the causes of
the large elasticity of trade to the demand variation in 2008-09 (Alessandria et al. 2011):
if, plausibly, rms attemped to o¤set the shock to internal liquidity caused by the demand
collapse by reducing the amount of inventories carried, the optimisation of inventory stocks
could have been more prompt for higher CS intermediates, leading to the larger estimated
reaction for these goods. A simple (S, s) type model with xed ordering costs, constant mar-
ginal purchasing costs and rising marginal handling costs gives theoretical support to this
intuition.
The degree of integration of GVCs was also examined, with the role of intra-rm trade
being analysed from several perspectives. Overall, IF trade was not seen as performing di¤er-
ently from AL trade. Despite this, rm a¢ liation could have acted as a further accelerating
factor in a trade crisis for transactions involving relatively high CS products. The lower de-
gree of uncertainty and the more rapid and e¤ective communication characterizing business
relations between parties related by ownership rights, could lead to a more e¤ective manage-
ment of inventory stocks both in good and in bad times: the size of the inventory bu¤er is
likely to be smaller, but the reaction in case the stock needs to be downsized could be stronger
in proportional terms, with this responsiveness being even larger for high cost-share products.
This hypothesis could explain why a larger adjustment was measured in both the downturn
and the recovery for imports of higher CS products when involving related parties, relative
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to AL trade. This result is mostly driven by consumption and capital goods. The reaction
of IF trade di¤ered from AL trade also with respect to trade margins: possibly due to the
di¤erent cost structures relating to the two organisational modes and the ease of adjustment
of o¤shoring (IF) versus outsourcing (AL) agreements, the share of intensive margin relative
to extensive margin adjustments was seen to be larger for IF trade; conversely, the share of
extensive margin variation was larger for AL trade.
In conclusion, although the precise mechanisms by which the CS of intermediates works
in determining a higher elasticity of trade ows to a demand contraction cannot be observed
with the data at hand, the identication of this catalyst of the collapse is the strongest
and most reliable contribution of this paper. This source of heterogeneity across di¤erent
products a¤ected the responsiveness of international trade to the demand shock of 2008-09
and, crucially, it seems to be the relevant margin of intervention by rms when attempting
to downsize activity and trade in the recessionary environment.
The fact that di¤erent types of products exhibited di¤erent performances during the crisis
can shed light on the strategies pursued by rms to cope with these events.
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3 The E¤ect of Liquidity Constrained Innovation on Export-
ing
3.1 Introduction
Innovation and exporting are activities characterized by a high degree of interdependence.
Firms decision to undertake innovative projects and invest in R&D can lead to a higher
propensity to enter the export market (Roper and Love, 2002; Lachenmaier and Woessmann,
2006; Cassiman et al., 2010; Damijan et al., 2010; Ganotakis and Love, 2011; Becker and
Egger, 2013). At the same time, exposure to trade has been found to stimulate rmsinno-
vation e¤orts, through a variety of channels: access to a larger market (Treer and Lileeva,
2010; Aw et al, 2011), export revenues (Bustos, 2011), higher product-market (Impulliti and
Licandro, 2013) and import competition (Denicolo and Zanchettin, 2009; Liu and Rosell
2013; Fernandez and Paunov, 2013; Bloom et. al, 2015). In this chapter I propose a stylized
theoretical framework to explore the interconnection between innovation and exporting from
a novel perspective.
I develop a monopolistically competitive model with liquidity constraints to study the joint
e¤ects on selection and exporting arising from a reduction in innovative activity in an indus-
try of producers with heterogenous e¢ ciency. The 2008-09 nancial crisis and subsequent
recession exerted a negative impact on the innovative activity pursued by rms (Archibugi et
al., 2013; Lee et al., 2015). The reduction in exteral liquidity made available by the banking
sector resulted in cuts in innovation spending (Campello et al. 2010), even the abandonment
of innovation projects (Paunov, 2012). In light of the well-known nexus between innovation
and trade, the overall lower innovation output and the likely loss in e¢ ciency that resulted
from the nancial shock could in turn have a¤ected rmsparticipation in exporting. My con-
tribution to the existing literature is to examine the role of competition e¤ects on the relation
between innovation and exporting, such that participation to exporting can be facilitated by
a shock harming rmsinnovation.
The key mechanism that I examine consists of the reduction in the industry-wide degree
of product market competition that arises from a reduction in the average productivity and
quantity produced by rms whose innovative activity is interrupted by a tightening in liquidity
constraints for innovation. In an open economy where the shock to liquidity is symmetric
across trading partners, access to exporting could be facilitated by the anti-competitive e¤ects
resulting from the reduced access to innovation.
This chapter provides an extension of the work of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), adding
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innovation to the original model. I model R&D innovation as a costly activity that generates
e¢ ciency gains in a way which is similar to Bustos (2011), but whose outcomes di¤er because
of the endogeneity of markups generating competitive e¤ects which are absent in Bustos
framework. My model is also related to the work of Impullitti and Licandro (2013), which
features a dynamic industry of oligopolisitic rms with endogenous markups and cost-reducing
innovation, but where innovation is an ongoing decision undertaken by incumbent rms.
This di¤ers from my one-step technological upgrading choice. Impullitti and Licandros work
belongs to a class of dynamic models that study the e¤ects of trade on competition, selection
and innovation in a unied framework (Costantini and Melitz, 2007; Atkeson and Burstein,
2010; Burstein and Melitz, 2011). In these works, expected or actual changes in the trading
environment are observed to generate endogenous export market selection and changes in
innovation intensity, which in turn feed into each other and amplify productivity di¤erences
between exporters and innovators on one side and non-exporters and non-innovartors on the
other.
The modelling structure that I present in this chapter is simpler, in that I propose a static
model where innovation is a one-o¤ decision that depends on the e¢ ciency rms discover that
they have at birth. However, my model di¤ers from this literature in that I make innovation
subject to liquidity constraints. As there is a cost associated with accessing innovation,
then liquidity constraints at the rm level come into play: the capacity to overcome these
constraints is endogenously determined in this model since liquidity constraints interact with
productivity heterogeneity. I impose a structure whereby rms operate over two periods
of time: in the rst period rms make an irreversible investment to enter the domestic
market, then randomly draw a productivity level from a distribution of marginal costs and,
if they are protable enough, rms produce and generate prots. In the second period,
rms decide whether to innovate and upgrade their original productivity by paying a xed
cost: a fraction of this cost can be borrowed externally, but the remaining fraction needs to be
nanced internally through the liquidity generated in the rst period. This is the simplest way
possible to model a liquidity constraint. Only rms that accrue prots exceeding the fraction
of the innovation cost that needs to be nanced internally are able to access innovation in the
second period: if this fraction is su¢ ciently high there is a set of rms that could protably
innovate in the absence of liquidity constraints, but are prevented from doing so. In the
second period rms can also decide to export to the (symmetric) foreign partner, assuming
a standard iceberg trade cost44.
44Following the original Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) framework, exporting is not subject to xed costs, but
only variable costs.
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Note, I make a further set of symplifying assumptions, in order to keep the model tractable
and centered on the main research question. Since there is no dynamics and only two time
periods over which the industry operates, for simplicity, there is no discounting in the model.
Also, innovation only a¤ects the supply side of the market, being it modelled as an e¢ ciency
gain in production, not a¤ecting the quality of products: this di¤ers from related works
modelling innovation in the Melitz-Ottaviano framework, (e.g. Di Comite et al., 2014; An-
toniades, 2015) and implies that the same set of preferences applies to varieties produced by
innovators and non-innovators. Finally, whereas rms can access an external capital market
and borrow a fraction of the innovation xed costs, this possibility is precluded to consumers,
whose income is given by the labour supplied.
I draw from Chaney (2013) and Manova (2013) when modelling the liquidity constraint,
though with a few di¤erences relative to their frameworks. Both Chaney (2013) and Manova
(2013) model liquidity constraints a¤ecting entry into exporting, since in their models (as in
Melitz 2003) to access the foreign market there is barrier represented by xed exporting costs.
There are no xed exporting costs in my model, since the existence of a per-unit iceberg trade
cost is su¢ cient to generate selection between rms and to induce only the more productive
rms to export. Furthermore, as reported by Aw et al. (2011), although there are entry costs
for both exporting and innovation, the costs of undertaking R&D activities are larger than
the costs of exporting: this motivates my choice of featuring a xed innovation cost which,
together with the assumption that borrowing externally to innovate is di¢ cult, generates
liquidity constrained producers.
Furthermore, I structure my model over two periods of time because, in contrast to
Chaney (2013) and Manova (2013) where rms pledge prots from the domestic market to
enter the foreign market, rms in my framework reinvest prots into innovation in order to
upgrade technology for the same market. The rst period is therefore instrumental for the
accumulation of internal liquidity (in heterogeneous amounts), which in turn generates con-
strained and unconstrained producers in the second period. Finally, Manova (2013) proposes
a richer structure, modelling also a nancial sector lending to producers in exchange for a
collateral that can be seized in case of default. While it would enrich the model, this further
structure imposed by Manova (2013) would also increase its complexity without qualitatively
altering the predictions of the model. My main intention is to show how a reduction in inno-
vative activity a¤ects entry into exporting, and so I preferred to abstract from this additional
complexity and focus on the key mechanisms under analysis.
There is a vast literature on the importance of liquidity constaints for innovation. For
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several reasons R&D investment can be driven below the level that would be optimal in
a world of perfect nancial makets. Lack of collateral value and asymmetric information
problems are among the well-known reasons why rms struggle to raise external nance to
sustain their innovation spending (Hall and Lerner (2010) provide a comprehensive summary
of this literature). However, despite the simplicity of my modelling framework, to the best
of my knowledge no work so far has introduced liquidity constraints for innovation in a
heterogeneous rm model that jointly studies the decisions to export and innovate. This
allows me to explore, in a novel way, how the degree of product market competition can
work as a channel linking a negative shock to innovation - that I model as a tightening of the
liquidity constraint - to participation in exporting.
The modelling structure and the research question are inspired by the events of the
nancial crisis of 2008-2009, during which innovative rms were subject to a credit rationing
that worsened relative to more normal times. The theoretical predictions of this chapter are
taken to the data in Chapter 4 of this thesis.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 I expose the model, the
closed economy version in section 3.2.1. and the open economy version in section 3.2.2.
In section 3.2.3 I analyse the impact of a tightening in the liquidity constraint on rms
innovation and, through the change in product market competition, on exporting. In Section
3.3 I test empirically whether the sorting of rms produced by the model into the categories
of domestic producers, innovators and innovators-exporters is conrmed in the data. Section
3.4 concludes.
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 Closed Economy
The model works over two periods of time, t1 and t2. In t1 rms can only produce domestically
and have no access to innovation. This rst period is therefore identical to the closed economy
version of Melitz-Ottaviano (2008), of which I describe the key features. In the second period
rms will make a decision about investing in innovation and, in the open economy version
of the model, exporting part of their production abroad. This section describes the closed
economy equilibrium.
The economy has L consumers, each supplying one unit of labour.
Demand
The quadratic utility function developed by Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) is ex-
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ploited for the demand side of the model:
U = 
Z
iS
qidi  
2
Z
iS
q2i di 

2
24Z
iS
qidi
352 + qo (14)
Each consumer derives utility from a continuum of di¤erentiated varieties, i  S; and a ho-
mogenous good (qo), used as a numeraire. The demand parameters , , and  are all positive
constants and respectively represent the preference for any variety in the di¤erentiated sector
in terms of the numéraire qo, the degree of product di¤erentiation and the substitutability
across varieties;
Maximising (14) with respect to the budget constraint
R
qi(s)pi(s)ds+ qo = y yields the
sector demand function for each rm/variety i.
qi =
L
 + N
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where L is the number of consumers, N the number of consumed varieties and p =
N 1
R
pi:
Inverting (15) the idiosyncratic price level pi can be obtained:
pi =

 + N
  
L
qi +
N
N + 
p (16)
Since demand is linear, there exists a choke price pmax at which demand for a variety i is
driven to zero:
pmax =
 + N p
N + 
(17)
Supply - First Period
The only factor of production is labour which is inelastically supplied at its aggregate level
L, an index of the sectors size. Firms enter the industry by paying a sunk entry cost fE and
subsequently randomly draw a marginal cost ci (inversely relate to the a productivity level)
from a Pareto distribution G(c). The numeraire qo is produced at a unit cost, which pins
down the wage to unity.
Firms produce the di¤erentiated varieties using a constant returns to scale technology
and face the following total costs function:
TCi;t1 = ciqi; (18)
where ci is the randomly drawn marginal cost and qi is the quantity produced. Firms that
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can cover the marginal cost survive and produce, all other rms exit immediately. Writing
down the prot function i = (pi   ci)qi; by use of equations (15), (16) and (18) and solving
the prot maximisation problem yields the optimal45 quantity q(c)i ; optimal price p(c)

i and
optimal prot (c)i for each rm i:
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(21)
In maximising its prot a rm takes as given the residual demand for its product, which
depends on the average price level p and the number N of rms in the industry.
If the prot maximising price (20) is above the choke price (17), the rm exits. Denoting
cD as the marginal cost of a rm that makes zero prots and whose price is therefore just
equal to its marginal cost46, I can write p(cD) = cD =
+N p
N+ = pmax: This allows to re-write
(21) as:
(ci)

t1 =
L
4
(cD   ci)2 (22)
Supply - Second Period: Innovation
The model as described so far is a two-period variant of Melitz-Ottaviano (2008). I now
nest this framework adding a second period of time during which rms can decide to upgrade
their initial productivity draw by paying a xed cost fI . For simplicity I do not model
time discounting and do not allow for the possibility for rms to exit at the end of the rst
period: this implies that the decision to pay the entry cost and draw a marginal cost is made
considering expected prots over the entire lifetime of the rm, i.e. two periods, as will be
evident when computing the industry equilibrium47.
This chapter proposes an approach to modelling innovation in a heterogeneous rms model
which di¤ers from previous analysis in the literature.
Recent works modelling innovation within the Melitz-Ottaviano framework assume that
45Optimal values of variables such as quantities, prices and the resulting prots are indexed with *.
46This would correspond to the pricing rule in a perfectly competitive industry; in the monopolistic compe-
tition setting under examination here only the least e¢ cient rm is subject to this and is therefore indi¤erent
about remaining in the industry.
47Allowing for exit at the end of the rst period would imply that rms base their entry decision on the
expected prot that are to be made in the rst period only, when no competitor can innovate or export.
Firms would then reassess the possibility of producing in the second period, or exiting, by evaluating the
prot that can be made in an evironment that features innovators and exporters. Since adding this structure
to the model does not alter qualitatively the theoretical predictions of my framework, I opted for keeping its
structure simpler and impeding exit at the end of the rst period.
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the gain for innovating consists of a higher demand for the varieties produced (Antoniades
2015). In my work, the innovation gain is on the supply side. Aw et al., (2011) report that
there are signicant entry costs associated with innovation48; hence, depending on the initial
productivity draw, some rms nd it optimal to trade o¤ a xed cost with an innovation
gain that allows rms to produce with a higher e¢ ciency compared to that drawn at birth.
Innovation is therefore modelled as an endogenous decision, based on the initial cost draw.
I assume that the improved technology is produced by an outside sector and is exogenously
given.
A similar supply side gain arising from innovation is modelled by Bustos (2011). However,
an important di¤erence between this work and Bustosapproach is that the latter endogenizes
the decision to upgrade technology nesting the Melitz (2003) model. This implies that the
model in Bustos (2011) features a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function,
which yields constant markups and prices, whereas in my model prices and markups are
a function of the industry-wide degree of competitive pressure. From this follows that the
shock to innovation that I model has a di¤erent outcome to that in Bustos framework: I
will return to this point more precisely in the section 3:2:3, which examines the comparative
statics following the shock.
The assumption of rms trading o¤ higher e¢ ciency with a xed innovation cost fI is
expressed with the following cost function:
TCi;t2 =

TCi = ciqi i 2 NI
TCi = ciqi   !qi + fI i 2 INN

; (23)
where ci is the randomly drawn marginal cost, qi is the quantity produced and ! is the
exogenous innovation gain49, such that 0 < ! < 1. NI denotes non-innovators, INN denotes
innovators.
The e¤ect of innovation is stronger the larger is qi, hence there is more to gain for rms
that produce more.
Marginal costs are distributed according to a Pareto distribution G of the form: G(c) =
(c=cm)
k bounded within [1, cm]. I chose the unit of measurement of marginal costs such that
the lower bound of the cost distribution is set to 1, with no loss of generality. This latter,
48The innovation cost fI can be interpreted both as a xed or as a sunk cost. The xed (sunk) innovation
cost could be paid either in the rst or the second period of this model, with no di¤erence to its implications.
Once the innovation cost is paid, rms produce with constant returns to scale.
49This model features an additive innovation gain, whereas in Bustos (2011) the gain is proportional to the
productivity of the rm. My predictions about which rms innovate change if the innovation gain is additive
or proportional to rmsinitial productivity. In my work, the higher productivity rms innovate if the gain
! is additive in the cost-function; whereas if the gain is proportional to productivity, lower productivity rms
nd it optimal to innovate.
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together with the assumption that 0 < ! < 1; allows to avoid rms operating with negative
marginal costs (that could arise if ci < !). Hence a very e¢ cient rm operating close to the
lower bound of the cost distribution would have a small but still positive marginal cost in
production.
Using again the expression for prots i = (pi   ci)qi, by substituting in equations (15),
(16) and (23) I solve the prot maximisation problem yielding the optimal quantity for each
rm i that decides to innovate. Exploiting again that cD =
+N p
N+ = pmax gives:
q(ci)

INN;t2 =
L
2
(cD   ci + !) (24)
where q(ci)INN;t2 denes the optimal quantity produced in period t2 by an innovator with
marginal cost ci: By use of the inverse demand function (16) the prot maximising price for
an innovator can be shown to be:
p(ci)

INN;t2 =
1
2
(cD + ci   !) (25)
Finally, from equations (24) and (25), equations for revenues, mark-ups and prots at the
optimum can be written as:
r(ci)

INN;t2 =
L
4

(cD)
2   c2i + !2

(26)
(ci)

INN;t2 =
1
2
(cD   ci + !) (27)
(ci)

INN;t2 =
L
4
(cD   ci + !)2   fI (28)
Note that equations (24)-(28) converge to those of Melitz-Ottaviano (2008) when ! = 0.
Operating over the two periods, rms accrue the following prots:
(ci)

NI = (ci)

t1 + (ci)

t2 (29)
if the rm does not innovate in the second period;
(ci)

INN = (ci)

t1 + (ci)

INN;t2 (30)
if the rm innovates in the second period.
In this closed economy there are two cost-cuto¤s to analyse. First, the exit marginal cost
cuto¤ cD, at which non-innovating rms are indi¤erent between producing or leaving the
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industry, since their prots are zero. This corresponds to the x-axis intercept of the prot
function for non-innovators in Figure 3.1.
(ci)

NI = 0 ! cD = pmax (31)
Second, the innovation cost cuto¤ cI : As evident from Figure 3.1, there is a marginal cost
at which rms are indi¤erent between innovating or not. At this level of productivity, the
innovation gain ! gives an advantage that in terms of prots corresponds exactly to the value
of the xed innovation cost fI : This marginal cost represents the closed economy innovation
cuto¤ cI , in other words, the cost draw that makes innovation for the marginal rm optimal.
To see this set:
(ci)

NI = (ci)

INN ! cI = cD +
!
2
  fI 2
!L
(32)
In order to observe an industry with both innovators and non-innovators, the exit cut-o¤
cD needs to be lower than the innovation cuto¤ cI : For this to be respected the following
condition needs to hold:
fI >
L!2
4
(33)
Condition (33) implies that the innovation cost fI needs to be high enough to prevent all
rms from innovating. This condition requires a larger xed innovation cost in markets that
are larger (larger L), in the presence of higher innovation gains (!) and where varieties are
less di¤erentiated (lower ).
This result can also be explained by drawing on the main implications of the original
Melitz-Ottaviano (2008) framework: in larger markets, or where varieties are closer substi-
tutes, competition is "tougher", i.e., cD is lower. Given a certain innovation cost, a lower
cD reduces the range of cost draws over which innovation is not optimal. Finally, it can be
envisaged from this that a larger exogenous innovation gain ! increases the degree of compe-
tition (lowers cD). At the same time there is a direct e¤ect of ! on the optimality conditions
(24)-(28): in order to assess the impact on (24)-(28) the direct e¤ect of a larger ! has to
weighted against its indirect pro-competitive e¤ect.
By imposing an additive innovation gain, it is found that most e¢ cient rms are those that
innovate. This is illustrated in Figure 3.1 that shows the optimal prots for non-innovators
(solid line) and innovators (dashed line) against marginal cost.
Prots start at their maximum for the most e¢ cient rms. Because the e¢ ciency gain
is additive and directly proportional to quantity, the most e¢ cient rms that produce the
largest quantity are those that choose to innovate: this applies for the cost range over which
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the dashed line is above the solid line, to the left of the intersection. As the initial marginal
cost draw rises, the prot from innovating is progressively lower; for costs to the right of the
intersection rms opt not to innovate.
Figure 3.1: Optimal Prot Functions for Innovators and Non-Innovators50
Marginal Cost
Profit
Non Innovators
Innovators
c
CDCI
Parameter values: L = 1000,  = 0:7, ! = 0:7, cm = 40, fE = 900, fI = 400,  = 0:5
Industry Equilibrium
The industry equilibrium had to be solved for in order to simulate Figure 3.1.
The timeline of the model is as follows. Before entering, rms evaluate the value of the
entry cost fE against the value of expected prots that can be made over their entire lifetime:
since I do not allow rms to exit in period 1, rms evaluate expected prots over both time
periods. In addition, a rm considers that in the second period the industry will be populated
by some rms whose e¢ ciency will increase thanks to the investment in innovation.
As long as expected prots exceed fE , rms will continue to enter, but since entry is
unrestricted, in the long run expected prots are going to be driven to zero. This is the
monopolistic competition result that allows to determine the exit marginal cost threshold cD
on the cost distribution.
Upon entry, rms randomly draw a marginal cost from the cost distribution G(c): rms
whose marginal cost is above the exit cost cuto¤ cD exit immediately, otherwise they produce
remaining in the industry for two periods.
50The parameters were chosen in order to satisfy the various conditions in the model, other than respecting
the theoretical assumptions.
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I need to clarify that innovation is not subject to uncertainty in this model, except for
the initial cost draw: once a marginal cost lower than the innovation threshold cI is drawn,
rms know immediately whether they will optimally innovate in the second period, or not.
Integration of rmsprots over the cost distribution G(c) yields expected prots, i.e. an
average prot weighted by the probability of drawing a certain marginal cost c at birth. This
allows to write down the free entry condition (FEC):
Z cI
1
(ci)

INN dG(c) +
Z cD
cI
(ci)

NI dG(c) = fE (34)
Integrating (34) over two segments of the distribution G(c) (between 1 and cI for innova-
tors, between to cI to cD for non innovators) and substituting in the boundaries of integration
the expressions for the relevant cuto¤s leads to the identication of the maximum marginal
cost that allows rms to produce in the long run in the industry: the parameterized cD:
However, it needs to be claried that the introduction of the innovation cuto¤ cI makes it
impossible to solve expression (34) for a generic Pareto distribution with shape parameter
k, since I obtain terms to the power of k (e.g.

cD +
!
2   fI 2!L
k
) whose expansion is not
nite. Hence I assume a specic value for the k . This parameter is an inverse measure of the
dispersion of the Pareto distribution, where higher values of k imply that more cost draws
are concentrated around cm, the upper bound51. Del Gatto, Mion and Ottaviano (2006) esti-
mated that a value of 2 for this parameter characterizes the distribution of a set of industries
using broad EU data. Therefore I choose52 a value of k = 2. The solution of the integral
for expected prots in terms of cD leads to a complex 4th degree polynomial equation. In
the Appendix to this Chapter I report the solved integral, whose solution in terms of cD was
calculated with the help of a software53: this latter expression is however extremely complex
and too lenghty to be reported in the thesis. For this reason, I opted for obtaining a numerical
solution for cD by exploiting the parameters indicated in the gures.
The second condition that denes the equilibrium of this industry is the number of pro-
ducers surviving in the long run. Since cD =
+N p
N+ , the entry cost cuto¤ cD determines the
number of rms N :
N =
2

  cD
cD   c (35)
51A value of 1 implies a uniform distribution of rms.
52 I also solved the equilibrium for a higher value of k : increasing k shifts mass of the productivity distribution
towards the upper bound cm; increasing the high-cost rms in the industry. This implies a higher level of
competition (lower cD) since the industry features more rms operating with a similar level of e¢ ciency,
although this more competitive environment is populated by rms whose productivity is, on average, lower.
If k !1 the distribution becomes degenerate.
53Scientic Workplace.
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where c represents the average cost of surviving rms.
Liquidity Constraints
A vast literature on the nancing of innovation, discusses a variety of reasons why in-
vestments in innovative activities are di¢ cult to nance with external nancial resources
(Bougheas et al., 2003; Czarnitzki and Hottenrott, 2011). The overall riskiness of projects,
the lack of collateral in physical property, together with the higher degree of informational
asymmetries between rm managers and lenders, make borrowing to nance innovation di¢ -
cult and internal nancial resources essential. These considerations motivate my decision to
introduce a further friction in the access to innovation.
I model a liquidity constraint a¤ecting innovation decisions, based on the assumption that
a fraction of the xed innovation cost needs to be nanced with internal resources, while the
rest can be borrowed externally54. Firms must therefore rely on their own existing liquidity,
generated by selling on the domestic market, in order to innovate55.
The liquidity constraint is formalised in the following way: rms face liquidity constraints
to access innovation. To cover the fraction of the xed innovation cost that cannot be
borrowed externally, rms can pledge prots obtained by selling on the domestic market in
the rst period; hence:
(ci)

t1 > fI ; (36)
where  denotes the fraction of fI that needs to nanced internally. The remaining fraction
(1   ) can be borrowed externally from a perfectly competitive nancial market56. Recall
that this nancial market is available only to producers; consumers income is determined
by the single unit of labour supplied (inelastically), whose value is pinned down to unity57:
allowing consumers to access an external capital market would add complexity to the model,
but in directions not requested by the research questions under examination in this chapter.
The existence of this liquidity constraint creates a wedge between the constrained and
unconstrained prot functions of innovators, represented by the innovation prot of those
rms that could have protably innovated in the absence of the constraint, but are prevented
54 I am aware that in my context nancing for innovation should be easier than it is in reality, since there
is no uncertainty embedded in the innovative process. Nonetheless, introducing liquidity constraint allows me
to model the e¤ects of a sudden reduction in external liquidity for innovation (one of the consequences of the
nancial crisis of 2008-09) and to explore the impact of this shock on participation in exporting.
55A similar assumption has been exploited by Chaney (2013) and Manova (2013), but applied to accessing
foreign markets: both innovation and exporting are activities that embed higher risks compared to supplying
the domestic market.
56This amount can be borrowed either interest free or at a positive interest rate. From the modelling point
of view there is no di¤erence, since the interest rate would just inate the innovation cost and not change any
of the qualitative implications of the model.
57This derives from the assumption of the cost of production of the numerarire good, set equal to one.
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from doing so because they do not accrue enough prots in the rst period (Figure 3.2).
Whether rms are constrained depends on the relative magnitude of the xed innovation
cost, the fraction  that needs to be met internally, the innovation gain ! and market char-
acteristics a¤ecting rmsperformance (i.e. market size and product di¤erentiation). More
formally, a cost cut-o¤ corresponding to the marginal cost draw that would allow a rm to
generate a prot of exactly fI in the rst period can be derived:
(ci)

t1 = fI ! ~c = cD   2
r
fI

L
(37)
~c denotes therefore the cost cuto¤ separating constrained and unconstrained innovators.
Firms whose marginal cost is lower than ~c make prots exceeding fI in the rst period
and are therefore able to invest in innovation. There exist liquidity constrained rms if:
cI > ~c (38)
For (38) to hold it can be shown that:
fI <
L!2
4

2 + 2
p
( + 1) + 1

(39)
For a given innovation cost, it will be more likely that rms are going to be liquidity
constrained in markets that are larger (L), in presence of a higher innovation gain (!) or a
higher fraction of the xed cost that needs to be nanced internally (). A higher degree of
product di¤erentiation () will instead have the opposite e¤ect due to the lower competition
that a higher  implies.
The e¤ects of market size, the innovation gain and product di¤erentiation work in the
same way as for condition (33): higher L, higher ! and lower  imply a higher degree of
competition, i.e. a lower cD; which compresses the range of the cost distribution over which
rms produce without investing in innovation. However, the larger is , the larger the share
of rms that could have innovated in a frictionless nancial market but are impeded from
investing in innovation.
Imposing a liquidity constraint implies a revision of the closed economy Free Entry Con-
dition. If the constraint is binding, i.e. cI > ~c; there is a group of rms whose marginal
cost lies between ~c and cI : these rms could have protably innovated in the absence of the
nancial frictions, but are forced to produce with the e¢ ciency they were assigned at birth
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because they do not generate su¢ cient liquidity internally. The FEC (34) becomes:
Z ~c
1
(ci)

INN dG(c) +
Z cD
~c
(ci)

NI dG(c) = fE (40)
Solving (40) allows me to pin down the new exit cuto¤ cD and ~c; the cuto¤ separating
innovators from non-innovators. In the latter group there are both liquidity constrained rms
and producers whose e¢ ciency would have not been high enough to innovate even if nancial
markets were perfect. Figure 3.2 illustrates this equilibrium.
Moving from high to low marginal costs along the x-axis, Figure 3.2 shows how as marginal
costs decrease, rms pass from being Non Innovators to Innovators. Between the dotted
vertical lines, representing cI and ~c, respectively, producers are e¢ cient enough to invest in
innovation, but fall short of internal liquidity. The constraint creates a wedge represented
by a prot loss for "missed-innovators" and shows how nancial markets imperfections can
be detrimental to innovation, preventing rms to access it even if they would be productive
enough to sustain the cost associated with the technology upgrade.
Figure 3.2: Optimal Prot Functions for Innovators and Non-Innovators under liquidity constraints.
Marginal Cost
Profit
Non Innovators
Innovators
Constrained
Firms
CDCIC~
Parameter values: L = 1000,  = 0:7, ! = 0:7, cm = 40, fE = 900, fI = 400,  = 0:5
A further implication of the introduction of the liquidity constraint is how it a¤ects the
degree of competition in the market. In gure 3.2 I overlay, on the black solid prot function
for non-innovators, the prot function for non-innovatos derived in Figure 3.1, i.e. of a market
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with no liquidity constraints for innovators. This is shown with the the dotted line lying above
the black solid line.
Figure 3.3 shows more in detail this result58: the introduction of the liquidity constraint
reduces the overall degree of competitive pressure in the market.
In Figure 3.3 we can observe that, without constraint, rms make a lower prot at any
given marginal cost level. Furthermore, the x-axis intercept of the unconstrained prot
function lies to the left relative to the intercept in the market with constraint: this directly
represents the di¤erence in cD between the two cases. Taken together, Figures 3.2 and 3.3
show that imperfections in nancial markets result in a reduced range of the cost distribution
over which rms can access innovation and a corresponding lower degree of competition.
Relatively less e¢ cient rms (those whose productivity is in between the two x-axis intercepts
of the two prot functions) manage to survive in a market that is characterized by larger,
markups prices and higher average marginal costs.
Figure 3.3: Optimal Prot Functions for Innovators with and without liquidity constraints
Marginal Cost
Profit
Profits no-constraint
Profits with constraint
Parameter values: L = 1000,  = 0:7, ! = 0:7, cm = 40, fE = 900, fI = 400,  = 0:5
3.2.2 Open Economy
In the second period (t2) over which this model works, besides innovating rms can also
decide to access a foreign market.
58Of course the prot function for innovators is also a¤ected by the introduction of the constraint, but since
the cuto¤ summarising the competitive envirnoment cD is represented by the x-axis intercept of the prot
function for non-innovators, I decided to only show the latter one.
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I assume that markets are segmented. I assume, furthermore, a two country world where,
for simplicity, the domestic (d) and foreign (f) market share the same preferences: this implies
that the two markets share the same demand function (15).
In this framework, the innovation decision is taken jointly to the export decision, and
rms paying the xed innovation cost fI to adopt the more e¢ cient technology are able to
use that same technology for the production of export goods.
Export costs are modelled as variable per unit trade cost  , such that in order for x units
to arrive at destination, x units have to be shipped, with  > 1 (standard iceberg costs
formulation).
Initially the conditions for optimal quantity, price and prot are derived for any pair of
countries; later I will impose the assumption that the countries are identical to facilitate the
derivation of the long run free entry condition in the open economy.
Ranking of Cuto¤s
The possibility to export gives rise to four categories of rms: domestic producers non-
innovators, domestic producers innovators, exporters non-innovators and exporters innova-
tors. Although in the real world all four categories do co-exist, this model can only have three
categories in equilibrium: the payment of a cost for engaging in innovation and the variable
cost associated with exporting, sorts the rms either along ranking A:
(A): Domestic Producer ! Domestic Producer Innovator ! Exporter Innovator
or along this ranking B:
(B): Domestic Producer ! Exporter Non-Innovator ! Exporter Innovator
Put di¤erently, in a market of prot maximising rms that work at their optimum, a rm
will sort itself into either innovation or exporting, whichever becomes a¤ordable rst. Since
both innovation and exporting are costly activities, the selection will depend on productivity.
The least productive rms keep their drawn e¢ ciency and produce only for the domestic
market; in the middle range of the productivity distribution rms nd it optimal to either
innovate or export, depending on the relative magnitude of the costs to access these activites.
Only the most e¢ cient rms that generate su¢ cient prots can also access the relatively more
expensive operation, sorting themselves into both innovation and exporting. It is impossible
for two rms with the same productivity to decide di¤erently about innovation and exporting,
so either ranking A or ranking B prevails.
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From a modelling point of view, which of the two rankings prevails depends on assump-
tions about the relative magnitude of the variable exporting cost  , the xed innovation cost
fI , market size L and the degree of product di¤erentiation : These assumumptions need to
be guided by the data in this case. The empirical test of the ranking, in section 3:3 of this
Chapter, supports ranking A. In Chapter 4, the regressions testing the average di¤erence in
rmsmarkup across groups of producers reveal that Exporters-Innovators charge the highest
markups, followed by rms that only export without innovating; innovators that never export
rank third and charge markups that are are marginally higher (although not signicantly so)
than domestic producers that do not innovate. Since markups (27) are a positive function
of rms productivity (lower marginal costs - higher markup), the ranking of markups in
Chapter 4 also supports ranking A.
Both the ranking and the markups test therefore suggest that the marginal innovation
decision is happening at a lower productivity level than the exporting decision: this implies
the cost cuto¤ ranking that I assume for the rest of this work:
cD > cI > cX ; (41)
where cX is the cost cut-o¤ separating domestic producers from exporters59. This implies
that no rm decides to export without having decided to innovate as well, because if relatively
less e¢ cient rms can innovate but cannot export, all exporters will have already sorted
themselves into innovation.
It needs to be added that if condition (39) holds, there are going to be liquidity constrained
rms that could protably innovate but are prevented from doing so because they do not
generate enough liquidity internally. This means that the liquidity cuto¤ ~c; while being lower
than the innovation cuto¤ cI ; has to be higher than the exporting cuto¤ cX ; so to allow for
the existence of Domestic Producers Innovators: if ~c were lower than both cI and cX , there
would be only two categories of rms in equilibrium: Domestic Producers and Exporters-
Innovators, with some of the latter being liquidity constrained. Hence the ordering in (41)
needs to be amended in this way:
cD > cI > ~c > cX (42)
Open Economy Optimality Conditions
The presence of a per-unit iceberg export cost induces selection into exporting. This is
59The determination of this cuto¤ is going to be exposed in the section below.
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represented by the fact that the unit cost for a rm with cost draw c is c for the domestic
market and c for the export market. Alternatively, the entry cost-cuto¤ in the foreign
market for an exporter cxD; can be written as:
cxD =
cF

; (43)
where cF denotes the entry cost cuto¤ for the domestic producers in the foreign market.
From (43) it is evident that, being  > 1, it is harder for an exporter to survive in the foreign
market, compared to a domestic producer. In what follows I express the optimal quantity,
price and prots for an exporter in terms of the cost cuto¤ faced by domestic producers in
the foreign markert, cF :
Recall that in this framework, given the cuto¤ ordering assumption (42), the marginal
exporter is an innovator. This implies that, once a rm sustained the investment to upgrade
its e¢ ciency, it will use the upgraded technology to produce for the foreign market. Futher-
more, no rm will ever export and not also produce for its domestic market60: this implies
that each rms prot can be separated into portions earned from domestic sales and export
sales, by accounting for the innovation overhead production cost in domestic prot, if the
marginal exporter is an innovator61. Writing down the prot function i = (pi   ci)qi; by
use of equations (15), (16) and (18) and considering the surcharge represented by the ice-
berg cost, the optimal quantity q(ci)
f
X;INN;t2
, optimal price p(ci)
f
X;INN;t2
and optimal prot
(ci)
f
X;INN;t2
obtained by an exporter in the foreign country62 can be written as:
q(ci)
f
X;INN;t2
=
Lf
2
(cF   ci + !) (44)
p(ci)
f
X;INN;t2
=
1
2
(cF + ci   !) (45)
(ci)
f
X;INN;t2
=
Lf
4
(cF   ci + !)2 (46)
Finally, the total prot accrued by an exporter selling on both the domestic and foreign
market in the second period is going to be:
(ci)

X;INN;t2 = (ci)
d
INN;t2 +(ci)
f
X;INN;t2
=
L
4
(cD ci+!)2 + L
f
4
(cF  ci +!)2 fI (47)
60A rm would strictly earn higher prots by also producing for its domestic market. As will be evident
below, the variable prot on the domestic market L
4
(cD   ci + !) is always positive and the xed innovation
cost fI has already been incurred.
61Concerning this, my modelling structure is similar to Melitz (2003).
62The superscript f denotes the foreign country.
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Operating over the two periods over which this model works, the total prot accrued by
an exporter over its lifetime is:
(ci)

X;INN = (ci)

t1 + (ci)

X;INN;t2 (48)
For simplicity, I now assume further that the home and the foreign country are identical:
so cD = cF and L = Lf . This does not alter the predictions of the model, but facilitates
getting simpler and more interpretable solutions, mostly for the Free Entry Condition.
I explained the cost cuto¤ rankings in terms of the threshold separating domestic pro-
ducers from exporters, cX: This cuto¤ is identied setting:
(ci)

INN = (ci)

X;INN ! cX =
1

(cD + !) (49)
The expression for the export cuto¤ (49) shows immediately that cX < cD if innovation
is absent (! = 0).
Assuming ranking (42) best describes the sorting of rms into innovation and exporting,
it needs to be shown that:
cX < ~c (50)
This holds if:
fI <
L
42
[cD(1  ) + !]2 (51)
It follows from condition (51) that given a certain innovation cost fI ; the higher the share
of it that has to be nanced o¤ prots accrued in the rst period (), the more likely for
exporters to be liquidity constrained as well, as far as their innovation choice is concerned.
A higher  thus makes it more likely for condition (51) to be violated, which in turn implies
an equilibrium where rms sort themselves into innovation at a productivity level which is
higher compared to that required to access exporting, contradicting ranking (42).
Higher variable trade costs () have the opposite e¤ect. A higher barrier to access the
foreign market makes it of course more di¢ cult to enter exporting, making it more likely
for condition (51) to be satised, given fI : The e¤ect of a higher  can be explored by
di¤erentiating the right hand side of (51) with respect to  :
@
@

L
42
[cD(1  ) + !]2

=  L (cD + ')
23
(cD   cD + !) (52)
The assumptions that  > 1 and 0 < ! < 1; provided cD(   1) > !; ensure that the
expression in (52) is positive, which conrms the e¤ect of iceberg transport costs on (51).
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Concerning the remaining parameters, a higher L, a higher ! and a lower , make it easier
for condition (51) to be satised. The larger the innovation gain, the lower the productivity
level at which rms optimally invest in innovation; whereas in larger markets (L) and in
markets where varieties are less di¤erentiated (lower ) competition is "tougher", making it
harder for any rm to access exporting.
Finally, whatever a¤ects cD indirectly, reinforces condition (51) if cD increases, i.e. com-
petition becomes less "tough": inspecting the expressions denining ~c (37) and cX (49) reveals
that an increase in cD induces both cuto¤s to increase, but the e¤ect is stronger on ~c:
@~c
@cD
= 1 >
@cX
@cD
=
1

(53)
Therefore, as competition changes, the movement in ~c is more than proportionate com-
pared to cX ; with the cuto¤s moving closer together as competition increases, and further
apart when competition decreases.
Summing up, provided the conditions necessary for cD > cI > ~c > cX to hold ((33),
(39) and (51)) are all satised, then in the second period rms sort themselves into the three
categories of Domestic Producers, Domestic Producers Innovators and Exporters Innovators.
Figure 3.4: Optimal Prot Functions in Open Economy.
Marginal Cost
Profit
Non Innovators
Innovators
Constrained
Firms
Exporters
CX C~ CI
Parameter values: L = 1000,  = 0:7, ! = 0:7, cm = 40, fE = 900, fI = 400,  = 0:2; t = 1:14
Figure 3.4 shows how producers sort themselves in the open economy equilibrium, with
the three dotted vertical lines representing respectively, from left to right, cX , ~c and cI : As
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in Figure 3.2 and 3.3, the x-axis intercept of the prot function for non-innovator represents
cD:
Industry Equilibrium in the Open Economy with Liquidity Constrained Innova-
tion
To close the model it is necessary to derive the open economy free entry condition, the
equilibrium condition in an economy where rms can both innovate and export.
If entry is unrestricted in both countries, rms choose a production location before en-
try and pay the sunk entry cost: in the rst period rms discover their productivity, decide
whether to produce or exit immediately, and accrue prots by selling on the domestic market.
In the second period rms make decisions about innovation and exporting: both activities
are costly, hence only the most e¢ cient producers engage in these activities, along the pro-
ductivity path described above. For innovation there is the further limitation, consisting of
having to nance a xed cost for which borrowing is constrained: only rms that accrued
enough prots in the rst period are able to access innovation. As there are no entry barriers,
rms enter while there are positive expected prots to be made: in the long run this will
drive expected prots to zero and pin down the maximum marginal cost that allows rms to
operate in the market (cD); which summarizes the toughness of the competitive environment.
Exploiting the fact that rms operate and obtain prots over two periods (t1 and t2), and
that cD > cI > ~c > cX > 1 , but that, de facto, there are no rms innovating in the cost
range cI  ~c, expected prots can be written as:Z cX
1
(ci)

X;INN dG(c) +
Z ~c
cX
(ci)

INN dG(c) +
Z cD
~c
(ci)

NI dG(c) = fE (54)
Equating (54) to the sunk cost fE and solving for cD pins down the long run competitive
equilibrium on which all the conditions derived in this section depend on. Similarly to the
closed economy equilibrium, I report the solution to (54) in the Appendix to this Chapter,
although the full analytical solution in terms of the exit cuto¤ cD could not be reported in this
thesis because of its complexity. In the following sections I will therefore exploit numerical
solutions to the open economy exit cost-cuto¤ cD.
The second equilibrium condition is the number of surviving rms. In an open economy
the number of sellers in one country is comprised of domestic producers and exporters from
the foreign country. Melitz-Ottaviano (2008) show that the distribution of costs c of domestic
producers matches the distribution of delivered costs c of foreign producers, over the support
given by the Pareto distribution with cD as its upper bound. Because of this, also in the open
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economy the number of producers derives from the fact that the exit cuto¤ cD corresponds to
the cost draw that gives zero prots, since cD = pmax and which summarizes the toughness
of the competitive environment.
Impact of International Trade
Before analysing the impact of a nancial shock on an economy populated by innovators
and exporters, I briey analyse the impact of international trade. This can be done by
comparing the simulated equilibria in the closed and the open economy.
Exposure to international trade produces the well known re-destribution e¤ects originally
described by Melitz (2003), whereby market shares are reallocated from the least to the most
productive rms, while simultaneously the least productive ones exit.
This is evident in Figure 3.5, that simulates the prot functions of rms in the various
categories and constrasts the Closed Economy (C.E., darker line) and Open Economy (O.E.,
lighter line) optimal conditions (of which I only show the outer contour).
Figure 3.5: Impact of international trade on Innovators and Non-Innovators
Marginal Cost
Profit
Non Innovators
Innovators
Constrained
Firms
C.E.
C.E.
C.E.
Non Innovators
O.E.
Constrained
Firms
O.E.
Innovators
O.E.
Parameter values: L = 1000,  = 0:7, ! = 0:7, cm = 40, fE = 900, fI = 400,  = 0:5; t = 1:14
Moving from autarky to a simple two-country world with identical economies increases
the overall degree of competitive pressure, shown by the lower x-axis intercept for the O.E.
contour: all the rms whose marginal cost falls between the two x-axis intercepts are forced
to leave the market because of the "tougher" competitive environment: this corresponds
to the so-called selection-e¤ect of international trade The same applies to the symmetric
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foreign economy. Figure 3.5 focuses on the e¤ects of trade at the bottom of the productivity
distribution63. In addition to the market shares reallocation due to the exit of the least
productive rms, it is evident that at any given marginal cost, the prot of the producers
shown in Figure 3.5 is lower in the open economy: these are rms whose market shares
are lower as a consequence of import competition, that is therefore responsible for a further
reallocation of market shares to rms that now export to the foreign market. There is indeed
a corresponding gain for the most productive rms at the top of the productivity distribution
(not shown), that expand their sales and prots in the open economy: this corresponds to
the so-called pro-competitive e¤ect of international trade.
These redistribution e¤ects imply that the economy, overall, is populated by rms that
are on average larger, more productive and make more prots64; however, due to the pro-
competitive e¤ect of trade, these rms charge lower prices and markups.
Overall, not suprisingly, the e¤ects of the impact of trade in this model are identical to
those of a trade liberalization between symmetrical countries in Melitz-Ottaviano (2008).
3.2.3 A Shock to the Liquidity Constraint
Having described the open economy equilibrium of an industry with heterogeneous rms
where the presence of liquidity constraints prevents a set of rms from accessing innovation,
I now explore how this equilibrium changes in the event of a shock that causes the liquidity
constraint to become more binding.
An important point of analysis of this model lies in the identication of the e¤ects of a
nancial crisis, which can be seen as a shock to the possibility to access innovation: in the
crisis of 2008-2009, the tightening of the money market prompted banks to reduce the amount
of liquidity available to rms (Campello et al., 2010), and more so for the riskier activities
undertaken by innovative rms. In the model this corresponds to an increase in the share of
the innovation cost that needs to be nanced internally (), drawing on the prots made in
period t1, before deciding to upgrade technology.
To study how a tightening of liquidity constraints a¤ects this industry, the cuto¤s de-
termining selection into exporting (cX), innovation (~c and cI) and domestic production (cD)
need to be di¤erentiated with respect to :
@~c
@
=
@cD
@
@~c
@cD
 

fI
L
 1
2
(55)
63Given the parameter chosen for the simultation, I cannot show the e¤ects on the entire cost distribution.
64This follows directly from the results of the original Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) work.
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As reected in (55), a change in  has a direct e¤ect on the liquidity constraint cuto¤ ~c,
together with an indirect e¤ect arising from the change in the overall degree of competition,
represented by the entry threshold cD, which in turn a¤ects ~c: The exporting and the inno-
vation cuto¤s cX and cI are instead a¤ected only indirectly, through the change in cD. In
order to analyse the overall impact of a shock to  on this economy, also the direct e¤ect of
 on cD has therefore to be evaluated.
Due to the elaborated form of the free entry conditions (40) and (54) in this model, both
in the closed and in the open economy, the solution of the entry threshold cD is extremely
complex. By parameterizing the cost distribution G(c) assuming a Pareto distribution of the
form G(c) = (c=cm)2 bounded within [1; cm], an analytical solution was found; however, be-
cause of its length and complexity it is not reported here. For the closed economy equilibrium
condition (40) I obtained a full analytical solution; whereas for the even more complicated
open economy equilibrium I xed some of the parameters in order to get a solution for cD: I
did, however, obtain a solution of cD in terms of , so as to be able to perform an analysis of
the shock.
As a consequence of the di¢ culties in obtaining a manageable analytical solution for cD,
it follows that direct di¤erentiation of cD with respect to  proves too complex for this to be
reported here: similarly to the solutions to the free entry conditions, the derivative @cD=@
can be calculated but is too lengthy to be included in this chapter.
For these reasons, to analyse the impact of a change in the liquidity constraint ; I
performed a numerical simulation exercise.
After obtaining the solutions to (40) and (54), I simulated the values of the derivatives
of interest within the range of values that  can take in this model, to infer the direction of
movements of the cuto¤s and the reallocation of producers across the various categories as a
consequence of this.
Shock to the Entry Cuto¤ cD
The impact of a change in the liquidity constraint on innovation and exporting works
through a change in the degree of competition in the market, cD. Table 3.1 shows the results
of the numerical simulation. The choice of the parameters was guided by the theoretical
assumptions about the various elements of the model, other than making sure these values
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satisfy jointly the conditions for which the model yields an industry populated by Domestic
Producers, Innovators and Exporters-Innovators.
The rst result shown in Table 3.1 is the range of values that  can take in order to satisfy
condition (39), which is necessary for the liquidity constraint to be binding. With an assumed
xed cost of 400, together with the values of the remaining parameters,  needs to exceed
a value of approximately 18% for the market to have rms that are liquidity constrained.
The maximum value that  can take is 1; larger values are mathematically possible in this
model but not economically meaningful65. This range of values for  is where I conne the
evaluation of the free entry conditions.
Moving the constraint from its minimum to its maximum, results in an increase in cD,
both in the closed and in the open economy, i.e. lowers the overall degree of competition. This
implication is going to be crucial for the main result of this paper66. The least e¢ cient rms
that could not protably have survived before the shock, now obtain some market shares and
produce. This also implies that exit rates are lower (the pre-entry probability of survival is
higher), average prices p and markups are higher, but that average productivity 1=c in the
economy falls.
Table 3.1: Simulation of the impact of a change in  on the entry cuto¤ cD
 values for condition (39) to hold: if fI= 400 ! 0:181 <  < 1
Solution to FEC: cD  = 0:181  = 1
Closed Economy 10:321 10:324
Open Economy 9: 625 9: 636
@cD=@  = 0:181  = 1
Closed Economy 5: 38 10 6 5: 34 10 3
Open Economy 1: 57 10 2 1: 15 10 2
Note: Other parameter values: L = 1000;  = 0:7; ! = 0:7; cm= 40; fE= 900; t = 1:14
The numerical solutions of cD show also the impact of international trade on competition:
regarless the value of ; moving from autarky to costly trade (since  is still assumed to larger
than 1) increases the degree of competition, i.e. lowers cD, conrming the main result of
Melitz-Ottaviano (2008) in my framework.
Di¤erentiating the solution to the free entry condition with respect to  re-states that
an increase in the share of liquidity that rms need to provide internally in order to access
65 If  were larger than 1, it would mean that rms needed to accrue more than 100% of the innovation
cost fI in the rst period in order to be able to access innovation in the second period.  = 1; harsh but not
impossible, implies that it is impossible to borrow to nance an investment in innovation.
66Figure 3.3 already presented this result graphically, while Table 3.1 makes it now more explicit.
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innovation results in competition being less "tough": at both the minimum and the maximum
value that  can take, the slope cD with respect to  is positive. This results holds both in
the closed and in the open economy. Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.7, in the Appendix, conrm
this result once again, showing the the slope of the free entry condition with respect to  is
positive througout the range of  values that satisfy condition (39) in the model.
To understand fully what is driving the e¤ect of a tighter liquidity constraint on compe-
tition I turn now to the derivation of the e¤ects of  on the other cuto¤s separating the three
categories of producers.
Shock to the Liquidity Constraint Cuto¤ ~c
A tightening in the liquidity constraint (higher ) corresponds to a reduction in the liquidity
constraint cuto¤ ~c for relatively less e¢ cient producers. However, as discussed in section
3:2:3, ~c is subject to both a direct and an indirect change as a consequence of an increase in
: Evaluating the derivative of ~c with respect to ; it is easy to see that the direct e¤ect is
negative:
@~c
@
=  

fI
L
 1
2
(58)
The direct e¤ect (58) makes ~c in Figure 3.4 move leftward, implying a higher productivity
threshold to access innovation. On the other hand, the indirect e¤ect of  on ~c is positive:
this works through the impact of  on the entry cost cuto¤ cD, which has been shown in
the previous section to be positive. The resulting impact of  on ~c is therefore a combined
outcome of the direct and the indirect e¤ects, that partially o¤set each other. To show which
e¤ect dominates, I proceed again by simulating the e¤ect of a tightening in the liquidity
constraint on the value of the ~c cuto¤, over the range of values that  can take in this model.
Table 3.2: Simulation of the impact of a change in  on the liquidity constraint cuto¤ ~c
 values for condition (39) to hold: if fI= 400 ! 0:181 <  < 1
Value of ~c  = 0:181  = 1
Closed Economy 9: 872 9: 267
Open Economy 9: 153 8: 578
@~c=@  = 0:181  = 1
Closed Economy  1: 247  0:523
Open Economy  1: 231  0:518
Note: Other parameter values: L = 1000;  = 0:7; ! = 0:7; cm= 40; fE= 900; t = 1:14
Table 3.2 shows that the value of ~c in both the closed and the open economy is, rst of
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all, lower than the exit threshold cD (in Table 3.1), as expected for values of  that range
between 0.181 and 1 (i.e. ensuring condition (39) holds). Additionally, the e¤ect of trade is
again visible through the reduction in the value of ~c when comparing the closed to the open
economy scenario.
Importantly, increasing the value of  reduces ~c: this means that the direct e¤ect of the
increase in  dominates the indirect e¤ect working through the reduction in competition
(increase in cD). As expected, if the liquidity constraint becomes more binding, innovative
activity is reduced, despite the fact that the overall degree of competition decreases.
This e¤ect works similarly to an increase in import competition in the original Melitz-
Ottaviano (2008) model: product market competition is a¤ected by the reduction in the
quantity produced by a range of producers those that are no longer able to access innovation
- and higher industry wide average prices p. Given that market size is xed, market shares
are going to be redistributed from these rms to the less e¢ cient ones. As a result of the
shock, average productivity in the industry falls and the reduction in competitive pressure
allows rms to charge higher prices and markups. Notice, however, that those rms whose
e¢ ciency is high enough for them not to be subject to the tighter post-shock constraint
obtain some of the market share lost by the rms hit by the shock: rms at the top of the
productivity distribution make higher prots and charge higher markups compared to the
pre-shock equilibrium.
In Table 3.2, di¤erentiation of ~c with respect to  is more than a mere restatement of
the result that increasing  reduces ~c as a consequence of the direct e¤ect of  dominating
the indirect e¤ect of lower competition. It is to be seen from (58) that the negative direct
e¤ect decreases as  increases. This is why it is key to show that even when  reaches its
maximum value, the slope of ~c with respect to  is still negative, although lower in absolute
terms. Figures 3.8 and 3.9 in Appendix show that the e¤ect of  on ~c is negative throughout
all values that  can take, provided condition (39) holds.
To conclude the analysis of a tightening in liquidity constraints on innovation, the uncon-
strained innovation cuto¤ cI would move in the opposite direction to ~c, i.e. unconstrained in-
novation would become more accessible to relatively less e¢ cient producers. This is explained
by the fact that the e¤ect on cI works entirely through the change in the entry threshold cD.
However, the positive impact on cI remains entirely hypothetical, because it derives from a
more binding liquidity constraint to access innovation, which reduces competition precisely
because it reduces access to innovation in the rst place.
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Shock to Exporting
The analysis of the impact of a change in  on the exporting cuto¤ is relevant and at the
same time straightforward. Regardless of whether the exporting cuto¤ cX lies to the left
(for which condition (51) needs to hold) or to the right of ~c in Figure 3.4, an increase in 
would unambiguously a¤ect cX positively. Tighter liquidity constraints for innovation a¤ect
the exporting decision only indirectly, through the change in competition represented by the
movement of the entry cost cuto¤ cD: section 3:3:1 showed that the entry threshold increases,
allowing relatively less e¢ cient rms to survive in the market. A similar e¤ect occurs at a
higher range of the productivity distribution: the e¢ ciency threshold separating exporters
and non-exporters becomes more accessible. As a consequence, some relatively less e¢ cient
non-exporters manage to overcome the entry barrier represented by the exporting costs and
sell in the foreign market.
Table 3.3 repeats for cX the simulation performed for cD and ~c; showing how the value of
the exporting cuto¤ increases with the value of : Similarly, the slope of cX with respect to
 is positive throughout the values of  that ensure the liquidity constraint is binding.
As mentioned above, the relative positions of ~c and cX are irrelevant for the result concern-
ing participation to exporting: regardless of whether the marginal exporter is an innovator
(as assumed in this work) or a non-innovator, the anti-competitive e¤ect that arises from a
reduction in innovative activity has positive repurcussions on rms that are close (but be-
low) to the exporting threshold. These latter rms are able to overcome the variable costs
associated with exporting if the shock to innovation is symmetric across trading partners.
Firms will also obtain higher markups by selling in an industry whose degree of competitive
pressure is reduced.
Table 3.3: Simulation of the impact of a change in  on the exporting cuto¤ cX :
Value of cX  = 0:181  = 1
Open Economy 9:057 9:067
@cX=@  = 0:181  = 1
Open Economy 1: 38 10 2 1:01 10 2
Note: Other parameter values: L = 1000;  = 0:7; ! = 0:7; cm= 40; fE= 900; t = 1:14
Main Results of Simulation
In this section I summarise the results of the simulation exercise, into the main proposition
of the model, which is tested empirically Chapter 4 of this thesis.
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Provided conditions (39) and (51) hold, this model describes an industry where, in equilib-
rium, domestic producers, innovators and exporters-innovators coexist. In order to model the
impact of a sudden reduction in external liquidity for innovation, which was one of the e¤ects
of the nancial crisis of 2008-2010 (Lee et al., 2015), I simulated the e¤ects of a tightening in
the liquidity constraint which innovative rms are subject to. Making liquidity tighter has
three main e¤ects in the model:
First, innovation becomes more selective, since the range of the productivity distribution
over which rms can access innovation is reduced in favour of the most e¢ cient producers.
This is a consequence of the increase in the fraction of the innovation costs that needs to
be nanced out of internal liquidity and is shown by a reduction in the liquidity constraint
cuto¤ ~c that moves to the left with respect to its pre-shock position (Figure 3.4B below).
Second, the reduction in innovative activity lowers the industry wide degree of competitive
pressure. Firms that could have innovated in the absence of the shock are now forced to
produce with the e¢ ciency they were assigned at birth and therefore produce a lower quantity
of their varieties. This results in a reduction in the average productivity in the industry
(1=c), together with an increase in average prices p and markups ; thanks to the lower
price elasticity of demand arising from the shock. This anti-competitive e¤ect is peculiar to
the this model that nests the Melitz-Ottaviano (2008) framework. The competition e¤ects,
in fact, arises as a consequence of the linear demand specication: Melitz-Ottaviano (2008)
show that this latter leads to a price elasticity of demand i which is a function of the entry
cost cuto¤ cD:
i =

@qi
@pi
pi
qi

=

cD
pi
  1
 1
(59)
The higher cD induces therefore a lower i: this is what allows all surviving producers to
charge higher markups.
Third, entry into exporting is made more accessible relative to the pre-shock environment.
This is a direct consequence of the reduction in competitive pressure which lowers i and
allows rms to charge higher markups. Exporting is subject to costs that make it a selective
activity, but if the shock to innovation is symmetric across trading partners (implying that
the e¤ects to cD in both countries are proportional - symmetrical in my case of identical
countries) some rms that were above the pre-shock export entry cuto¤ cX nd themselves
below the post-shock cX and will start selling abroad.
This is the key result emerging from the analysis carried out in this chapter: there is
an interlinkage between innovation and international trade, working through the change in
competition. Positive innovation outcomes have been positively associated by the literature
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with the propensity to export (Cassiman et al., 2010; Becker and Egger, 2013), but my
framework suggest that also another type of relation might exist: entry into exporting could
be facilitated also by a negative shock to innovation which is symmetric between trading
partners, thanks to the reduction in the toughness of comepetition both in the domestic and
in the foreign market. From an empirical point of view this anti-competitive shock results
in higher markups, extra resources that rms potentially use to sustain the costs associated
with exporting.
Importantly, the model of Bustos (2011), which is the closest to mine in the literature67,
does not yield the same prediction from a shock to innovation. As her model is based on the
Melitz (2003) framework, which implies constant markups, there cannot be any competitive
e¤ects arising from a shock to innovative activity, i.e., no movement in cD and cX :
Proposition 1 summarises these three results, of which gure 3.4B shows a graphical
simulation.
Proposition 1 Provided conditions (33) and (39) hold, in an industry populated by domestic
producers, liquidity constrained innovators and innovators-exporters, a tightening of liquidity
constraints for innovation (36) makes access to innovation more selective. This reduces the
degree of competitive pressure which, in turn, results in a lower entry threshold into the export
market and higher average markups and prices charged by all surviving producers.
Figure 3.4B shows the simultanenous e¤ect on the two main cuto¤s68 and the three cate-
gories of producers resulting from an increase in : The exporting cuto¤ cX moves righwards,
with respect to its pre-shock positions allowing relatively less e¢ cient domestic producers
(innovators) to enter exporting. The liquidity constraint cuto¤ ~c moves instead leftwards, in-
creasing the e¢ ciency thereshold that is needed to access innovation: this results in a larger
range of the productivity distribution over which rms are liquidity constrained.
It is also evident that the reduction in innovative activity lowers prots for the constrained
rms, whereas prots appear higher for rms that manage to access innovation and exporting
after the shock69: this corresponds to the reallocation of market shares. Note, it was not
possible to show graphically the e¤ect of  on cD in Figure 3.4B (it is on the far right of the
simulated graph), because the scale of the picture needed to be reduced to allow it to show
the other cuto¤ movements.
67Bustos (2011) also features supply side gains from costly innovation in a monopolistic competition het-
erogenous rms trade model.
68The pre-shock cuto¤s are represented by the dotted vertical lines, the post-shock cuto¤s by the dashed
vertical lines. Notation wise, I label the post-shock liquidity constraint and exporting cuto¤s with, respectively,
~c0 and c0X
69The higher prot for post-shock innovators is barely visible in Figure 3.4B, because of the scale and the
parameters exploited in the simulation.
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Figure 3.4B: Impact of tighter liquidity constraint for innovators.
Marginal Cost
Profit
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Liquidity Constrained PS
Exporters PS
<<---------->>
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Parameter values: L = 1000,  = 0:7, ! = 0:7, cm = 40, fE = 900, fI = 400,
1 = 0:2; 2 = 0:28; t = 1:14
Figure 3.4B pushes forward an additional result of this work: the e¤ect of the tightening
in liquidity a¤ects mostly rms in the middle range of the productivity distribution, both for
innovation and exporting. In Chapter 4 of this thesis, dedicated to an empirical examination
of the main predictions of the model, I expressely separate the e¤ect of the shock across
quartiles of the rm size and productivity distribution.
An important note is due here: the qualitative impact of a shock to  on the various
cuto¤s is robust to the assumption made above about the cuto¤ ranking (42). The choice of
the ordering, cD > cI > ~c > cX , implies that the marginal innovator is less productive than
the marginal exporter, and is guided by empirical results of section 3:3 below and Chapter 4,
where I exploit Slovenian rm level data. In case a di¤erent assumption were made, such that
the marginal innovator were more productive than the marginal exporter70, the model would
have produced the same qualitative implications from a change in : innovation becomes
harder to access and, through the reduction in the industry wide level of competition, the
exporting cost threshold cX becomes more accessible. I show in the Appendix how the
expressions for the cuto¤s and the free entry condition would change.
70Bustos (2011) made this assumption in her paper, where she uses Argentinian rm level data.
74
However, di¤erent rankings might yield di¤erent quantitative implications due to initial
relative position of the cuto¤s and the direction of their movement. In the scenario assumed
in this paper, with cD > cI > ~c > cX , following an increase in  the liquidity cuto¤ and
the exporting cuto¤ move towards each other, and depending on the size of the shock they
might end up in a di¤erent relative position, i.e. cD > cI > cX > ~c. This still implies that
innovation and exporting become, respectively, less and more accessible, but in this scenario
there would be no longer domestic innovators, because the constraint is binding up to a point
where only exporters are able to overcome it. The economy would nally be composed of
domestic producers, exporters non innovators, and exporters innovators.
3.3 Test of cuto¤ ranking - condition (41)
Before concluding this chapter, I provide an empirical test the sorting pattern of rms into
exporting and innovation assumed in the model.
For this task I exploit rms characteristics within 2-digit NACE industries pre- and
post- shock: this allows me to infer the direction of movement of the cuto¤s separating the
categories of rms, as induced by the shock. The shortage of external liquidity causes the
innovation cuto¤ to move up the productivity distribution making access to innovation harder
and lower competitive pressure arises from the reduction in innovative activity. This, in turn,
indirectly facilatates entry into exporting: this happens at the bottom of the exporting
distribution.
Data
I exploit the Slovenian Community Innovation Surveys (CIS) carried out biannually by the
Statistical O¢ ce of the Republic of Slovenia (SORS) matched with the rm balance sheet
data collected by the Agency of the Republic of Slovenia for Public Legal Records and Related
Services (AJPES) and custom level data collected by the Custom Authorities. These are the
same data used for the analyses in Chapter 2 and 4, for which an overview is provided in the
Introduction to this thesis.
The dimension of the nal sample was dictated by the CIS surveys, which cover about
2,200 rms in each survey. I dened a rm as an exporter in a certain year if the rm was
seen as exporting in at least one month over the year; while I dened a rm as an innovator
when the rm replied positively to at least one of the questions asking whether, over the
years covered by the survey, the rm introduced a new product or service, a new process, an
organisational innovation or a marketing innovation.
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3.3.1 The ranking
In the model I assumed that the decision to enter exporting happens at a productivity level
which is higher than that at which rms decide to innovate, in other words, that the marginal
innovator is less productive than the marginal exporter, and that underlying productivity dif-
ferences across rms produce a sorting of rms into these three groups: the low productivity
rms only serve the domestic market without innovating, the middle group innovates with-
out exporting, and the most productive rms decide to both export and to upgrade their
technology by investing in innovation.
To test this ranking assumption I follow the approach of Bustos (2011) and examine the
ex-ante/ex-post characteristics of rms in the three categories.
In order to have a balanced panel of rms for the test and because of the timing of
the nancial crisis and the time span covered by the surveys, I restricted the sample, in
this phase of the analysis, to the 2008 and the 2010 surveys. The nancial storm hit the
European banking sector in October 2008, while the following recession bit hardest in 2009.
Additionally, the surveys contain information on the innovative behaviour of rms during
the preceding three years71. For these reasons I considered the 2008 survey as covering the
pre-shock period and the 2010 survey for the post-shock period.
To make the reading lighter, in this Section I will refer to the liquidity constraint cuto¤ ~c
as the innovation cuto¤, given that the position and movement of unconstrained innovation
cuto¤ cI are irrelevant of the liquidity constraint is binding.
Figure 3.10 illustrates the pre- and post-shock cuto¤ positions. The shock makes the
innovation cuto¤ move leftwards, making access to innovation harder; the exporting cuto¤
moves rightwards due to the reduced degree of comepetition spurring entry into exporting.
Figure 3.10: Cuto¤ ranking before and after a liquidity tightening.
ExitInnovationExporting
Domestic firmsInnovators onlyExp - Inn
Pre-shock - 2008
ExitInnovationExporting
Post-shock - 2010
Domestic firmsInnovators onlyExp - Inn
NEVER EXP.NEW EXP.CONT.  EXP.
71For example, the 2008 survey asks rms whether they introduced new products or services over the last
three years (2006-2008) and reports gures for innovation expenditure for the survey year.
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A convenient approach is to divide rms into three mutually exclusive categories of ex-
porters (never exporters72, new exporters73 and continuing exporters74) and measure their
innovation intensity within 2-digit NACE industries. I expect that in 2008 and 2010 new
exporters and continuing exporters are more technologically intensive than never exporters.
Analysing the change from 2008 to 2010, new and continuing exporters should report a change
in innovation intensity which is larger with respect to never exporters, since rms that are
a¤ected by the shock to innovation should fall in the never exporter category. Between new-
and continuing exporters there should instead be no di¤erential change in innovation intensity
between 2008 and 201075. To check these propositions, I ran specication (60):
ln(Inn:_Int:)ij = 0 + 1New_Expij + 2Cont_Expij + 3Stop_Expij + j + "ij , (60)
where Inn:_Int denotes the ratio of innovation expenditure over the number of employees,
New_Exp., Cont:Exp. and Stop_Exp. denote three binary variables taking value 1 if the
rm belongs to those categories, j denotes a set of 2-digit industry xed e¤ects; i and j
index rms and sectors, respectively.
Table 3.4: Ranking test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2008 2010 Change 2008 2010 Change
Base cat. Never Exporters Base cat. Continuing Exporters
Continuing exporters 0.957*** 0.869*** 0.648***
(5.66) (5.64) (4.32)
New exporters 0.132 0.115 0.0092 -0.824*** -0.754*** -0.638**
(0.62) (1.03) (0.08) (-4.15) (-4.67) (-3.43)
Never exporters -0.957*** -0.869*** -0.648***
(5.66) (5.64) (4.32)
N 1308 1308 994 1308 1308 994
Note: t statistic in parentheses; standard errors clustered at the sector level;
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 3.4 conrms the ranking assumption before the shock (columns 1 and 4), even
though the result that new exporters are more innovation intensive than never exporter is
not statistically signicant. After the shock (in 2010), as expected, never exporters and new
exporters are less technologically intensive than continuing exporters (column 5). Lastly,
72Firms that do not export in both 2008 and 2010: 395 rms.
73Firms that export in 2010 but were not exporting in 2008: 70 rms.
74Firms that export in both 2008 and 2010: 763 rms
75Notice that only the direction of the movement of the cuto¤s can be predicted, the magnitude of the
movement cannot be anticipated. This is an important observation because with this ranking of rms the
shock would cause the cuto¤s to move towards each other: the cuto¤s could end up maintaining their relative
positions, or else changing them with the innovation cuto¤ overtaking the exporting cuto¤. This would
cause di¤erent conclusions because new exporters could end up being not more innovation intensive and not
upgrading their technology faster than never exporter after the shock.
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columns (3) and (6) show that never exporters and new exporters were hit harder by the
shock compared to continuing exporters and slowed down their innovation intensity with
respect to top category: this goes in direction of a shock to innovation a¤ecting mainly rms
in the middle range of the productivity distribution. Note that new exporters were expected
to upgrade their technology faster than never exporters: this might not show in the data
because, since the cuto¤s move towards each-other, the exporting cuto¤ could have moved
rightwards substantially, overtaking the innovation cuto¤. In this case the group of new
exporters would be made up of some pre-shock non-innovator, hence presenting on average
a change in innovation intensity which is not di¤erent compared to never exporters. This
might also explain why I nd new exporters slowing down their innovation intensity relative
to continuing exporters, rather than showing no change: among the new exporters there
might be rms that stopped innovating rather than continuing to innovate, hence causing the
result above.
Note that this cuto¤ ranking is the opposite of Bustos (2011), who assumes that the
marginal exporter is less productive than the marginal innovator. To reassure that Bustos
ranking does not hold for Slovenian rms, I inspect what the shock to liquidity for innova-
tion would cause in case I reversed my ranking assumption. The innovation and exporting
cuto¤s would still move in the direction predicted by the model (rightwards and leftwards,
respectively), but starting from opposite relative positions. While most of the predictions for
continuing-, new- and never-exporters would be the same as in Table 3.4, the prediction that
continuing exporters upgrade their technology faster than never exporters would be reversed.
If Bustosranking held in the Slovenian case, the rms hit by the shock to innovation would
be in the continuing exporter category, and not in the never exporter category76: this would
show as a negative coe¢ cient for continuing exporters in column (3), or a positive one for
never exporters in column (6). Since this is strongly rejected by the data, I consider the
results in Table 3.4 as evidence in favour of the ranking assumption (41) of my model.
A second and simpler test can be performed by focusing on a cross section of data (2008)
and dividing rms into four categories: rms that neither export nor innovate (526 rms),
rms that only innovate without exporting (384 rms), rms that only export without in-
novating (498 rms) and rms engaging in both activities (890 rms). Since the ranking is
based on productivity of rms at birth I regressed two productivity measures on these mutu-
ally exclusive categories of rms to check whether the ordering assumed above is consistent
with rmsaverage productivity across the four categories. The di¤erence between rms only
76Never exporters would not innovate either before or after the shock.
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innovating without exporting and rms only exporting without innovating (excluded category
in Table 3.5) is key, because this is indicative of which activity rms engage in rst as we
move from a lower to a higher range in the productivity distribution.
Table 3.5: Ranking test - Second Strategy
(1) (2)
TFP77 Value added
No_Inn-No_Exp 0.00546 -0.235***
(0.07) (-5.60)
Only Inn -0.0624 -0.139*
(-0.53) (-2.48)
Both Inn_Exp 0.0269 0.0743*
(0.65) (2.52)
N 2272 2244
Note: t statistic in parentheses; standard errors clustered
at the sector level;* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The coe¢ cient on the only innovationdummy is negative for both measures, but sig-
nicant only for the value added equation. This is indicative of the innovation decision
happening at a productivity level which is lower than that at which rms start exporting,
thus providing further support to the ranking choice.
3.4 Conclusion
I this chapter I developed a monopolistically competitive heterogeneous rm model with
endogenous markups and liquidity constraints for innovation, to study the e¤ects of a re-
duction in innovative activity on participation in exporting. The main contributions consist
of introducing liquidity constraints into a heterogenous rms trade model with endogenous
markups that studies jointly the decisions to export and to innovate; in addition to showing
that a negative shock to innovation, which is symmetric across trading partners, can have an
indirect positive e¤ect on the propensity to export through the decrease in product-market
competition.
The model is based on the work of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and adds e¢ ciency-
enhancing innovation on the supply side of the model: this is an activity that rms can
access by sustaining a xed cost. Liquidity constaints for innovation are modelled assuming
that rms can borrow externally only a fraction of the xed innovation cost, while they must
pledge internal liquidity for the remaining fraction. This liquidity constraint interacts with
e¢ ciency heterogeneity: producers will in fact be able to overcome the constraint depending
on their productivity at birth. If the fraction of the xed innovation cost that needs to be
77TFP is computed as the residual of a log-linearized three factor Cobb-Douglas production function with
capital, labour and material inputs
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bourne out of internal funds is high enough, the equilibrium will feature a set of rms that
would be able to innovate in a world of perfect nancial markets, but are prevented from doing
so. A rst set of results shows that liquidity constraints produce anti-competitive e¤ects: in
an industry with liquidity constraints inducing a sub-optimal level of innovation rms are,
on average, less productive, charge higher prices and higher markups relative to an industry
with no liquidity constraints.
Exposure to international trade in a two-country world with symmetrical economies pro-
duces the same qualitative results as the original Melitz-Ottaviano (2008) model. Both the
so-called selection e¤ect and the competitive e¤ect of trade are present. Integrating the
domestic with the foreign economy through costly trade increases the "toughness" of com-
petition, inducing the least e¢ cient rms to exit (selection e¤ect) and resulting in a market
featuring higher average productivity, lower prices and lower markups (pro-competitive ef-
fect). Market shares will be redistributed from the less e¢ cient rms (exiters and surviving
domestic producers) to the more e¢ cient rms (exporters).
The model then attempts to show the e¤ects of a feature of the nancial crisis of 2008-
09: a tightening in liquidity constraints for innovative rms. It is shown that, if liquidity
becomes tighter, the anti-competitive e¤ects arising from innovation being below its optimal
level are reinforced. Access to innovation becomes more selective, restricting the range of the
productivity distribution over which rms will be able to enhance their e¢ ciency. In turn,
the reduction in the industry wide degree of competition results in more accessible threshold
to enter the domestic and the export market. This latter is a consequence of the shock to
innovation being symmetric across the trading partners. The model also predicts that the
negative impact on innovation and the positive impact on exporting a¤ect rms in the middle
range of the productivity distribution.
The theoretical predictions arising from a tightening in external liquidity for innovation
are taken the the data and tested in the Chapter 4 of this thesis.
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4 From Innovation to Exporting in Times of Crisis: Evidence
from Slovenia
4.1 Introduction
The crisis of 2008 was a nancial shock of historic proportions with severe impacts on real
decisions made by rms. Access to external nance became signicantly more di¢ cult due
to credit rationing (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010), a higher cost of borrowing (Campello
et al., 2011) and di¢ culties in initiating a new credit line (Campello et al., 2010). The
inability of rms to borrow externally led to reductions in employment, the postponement
and cancellation of investment projects and various reductions in spending, with the biggest
cuts being reported on technology expenditure78. The survey of Campello et al. (2010) shows
how this latter phenomenon a¤ected both private and public rms across various size classes,
especially in Europe and the US79.
The main aim of this chapter is to study the impact of the 2008 crisis from a particular
angle. I examine the e¤ect of the reduction in external nance during the 2008 crisis on
rmsinnovation activity, and estimate how this shock indirectly a¤ected rmsexport par-
ticipation. I therefore contribute to the literature on the nexus between international trade
and innovation, exploring in a novel way how innovation can impact export participation.
Furthermore, I also add more broadly to the literature on the nancing of innovation, and
the e¤ects of 2008 nancial crisis on innovation in particular.
The empirical analysis is theoretically motivated and guided by the heterogeneous rms
trade model, based on the work of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), which constitutes the third
chapter of this thesis. In the model, a symmetric80 reduction in external liquidity available
for innovation reduces the number of rms undertaking this activity, resulting in a reduc-
tion in average productivity as well as a fall in the industry-wide degree of product market
competition. This latter e¤ect induces relatively easier access in the export market81.
In this chapter I take the propositions of the model to the data. I use Slovenian rm level
data matched with innovation surveys and custom level trade data and nd that in sectors
characterized by higher (external) liquidity needs for innovation, rms experienced a larger fall
in the probability of innovating and a larger increase in the probability of exporting, relative
78Relative to capital expenditures, marketing expenditures, dividend payments and salaries for employees.
79Relative to Asian rms.
80An asymmetric shock to innovation has not been explored theoretically. This would possibly have di¤erent
implications for exporting relative to a symmetric shock, due to the degree of competitive pressure changing
di¤erently across the two countries. I leave the examination of these e¤ects to additional work that can be
undertaken in the future.
81 In the theoretical model this is represented by a lower productivity threshold to access exporting.
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to sectors characterized by lower (external) liquidity needs for innovation. Additionally, rms
markups are found to have increased by more in sectors where the reduction in the probability
of innovating was larger.
The nancial literature has explored the impact of nancial shocks and the reduction in
banking activity on the real economy. Banking crises hinder real activity (Kroszner et al.,
2007; DellAriccia et al., 2008) through the reduction in the provision of credit and liquidity
to rms during time of distress. In the 2008 crisis, CFOs of nancially constrained rms
reported having experienced credit rationing, higher costs of borrowing and to have bypassed
attractive investment opportunities due to di¢ culties in raising external nance. Credit
conditions led constrained rms to cut investment and to burn through their liquid assets
(mostly cash reserves) to bu¤er against the credit supply shock (Campello et al., 2010).
Lending standards tightened dramatically over the two years between 2008 and 2009: in
Slovenia, the spike in the net percentage of banks reporting tightening terms and conditions
was higher than the EU average, as illustrated in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Net percentage of banks reporting tightening lending standards, Slovenia 2007-2012.
A reduction in bank nance can be particularly harmful for those rms that generally
face higher than average di¢ culties in raising external nance, the innovative rms. It is well
known that innovative projects, inherently riskier and often backed by intangible assets rather
than physical property, tend to be nanced primarily by internal nancial resources (Hall and
Lerner 2010). External nancing constraints are in fact responsible for the procyclicality of
R&D spending (Ouyang 2011), which tends to fall in periods of contraction because of the
inability of rms to obtain funding by banks when internal liquidity is short82.
82The opportunity cost of R&D is lower in downturns and this should make R&D investment countercyclical
(Davis and Haltiwanger 1990, Aghion and Saint-Paul 1998). Nonetheless, in the data innovation and R&D
are found to be procyclical. Liquidity constraints reconcile this nding with the opportunity cost hypothesis
Aghion et al. (2008).
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Importantly, Ayyagari et al. (2007) nd that the externally nanced proportion of a
rms innovation expenditure is positively associated with rmsinnovation. Conditional on
the availability of internal nancial resources, therefore, innovation in rms that depend more
heavily on external nancing to sustain their innovation spending, might be more vulnerable
to a credit crunch: one of the further aims of this work is to test this proposition in the
context of the Great Recession.
Early research on external nance and innovation points against the role of banks in
nancing innovation83, in favour of equity nance (Brown et al., 2009). Although there
is evidence consistent with the importance of public equity markets to nance innovation
(Acharya and Xu, 2013)84, there is a growing consensus that bank nance is an important
source of capital, even for innovative rms. During the Great Depression of 1930s, the drop
in availability of external bank nance impacted the rate of innovation (Nanda and Nicholas,
2014); while more recently, it is shown that banks nance and monitor innovative projects.
Patents are often used as collateral for loans and the credit received seems to directly nance
research (Chava et al. 2013; Mann 2015); external bank nance is an important source of
start-up capital (Robb and Robinson, 2014) and, nally, the US banking deregulation over
the 1980s had a measurable positive impact on innovation, especially in small private rms
that depend more on bank nance for capital than publicly-traded rms (Chava et al., 2013;
Cornaggia et al., 2013). Exploring how the exogenous reduction in banking nance during
the crisis of 2008 impacted rmsinnovation activity appears, therefore, to be of the utmost
interest.
There is already some evidence on the e¤ects of the 2008 crisis on innovation. The
largest cuts by rms as a consequence of the inability to borrow were on innovation spend-
ing (Campello et al., 2010); rms without public nancial support reduced their innovation
spending by more, up to abandoning innovation projects altogether85 (Paunov, 2012); and
from a survey of EU rms (OECD, 2012) it emerges that obtaining external nance for in-
novation was the most pressing problem for 20% of rms. Importantly, Lee et al. (2015)
specically study access to nance for innovative SMEs in the crisis, detecting that the more
severe absolute credit rationing that innovative rm experience in general worsened signif-
icantly in the crisis. This chapter adds to this literature, exploring how the probability of
successful innovation by Slovenian rms was a¤ected by the nancial crisis, depending on the
relative dependence of a sector on external liquidity for innovation, a measure of vulnerability
83Hall and Lerner (2010) extensively discuss this literature.
84They nd that publicly-traded rms in industries that are more dependent on external nance generate
more patents of higher quality and novelty relative to privately held rms.
8525% of the sample of Latin American rms surveyed.
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to be hit by a sudden and exogenous reduction in external banking nance.
The contribution of my work extends then to the indirect impact that the negative shock
to innovation had on rmsparticipation to exporting, through the change in product market
competition.
Innovation has been associated both positively and negatively with competition, with
causality running from innovation to competition, and vice-versa. In the theoretical model
presented in the third chapter of this thesis, innovation is positively linked to competition:
the reduction in innovative activity reduces average productivity and at the same time relaxes
competitive pressure, allowing rms to increase markups. On the other hand, higher levels
of innovation could raise entry barriers (Sutton 2006), reducing competition. Besides testing
the sign of this relationship, the empirical analysis in this chapter considers that causality
might run also in the opposite direction86.
If the shock to innovation reduces competitive pressure and allows rms to charge higher
markups, some relatively less e¢ cient domestic producers may now manage to overcome the
costs associated with exporting. This is a novel angle from which the innovation-trade nexus
is being explored, which adds to the growing literature exploring the interlinkages between
trade and innovation. The impact of international trade on innovation has been studied un-
der various aspects: trade liberalization positively a¤ects rm innovation through tougher
competition (Teshima 2010; Impullitti and Licandro, 2013), higher revenues for exporters
(Bustos, 2011) and access to a larger market (Treer and Lileeva, 2010). Innovation can also
be stimulated by higher import competition (Denicolo and Zanchettin, 2009), which in turn is
observed to lead to quality upgrading (Fernandez and Paunov, 2013), more patenting, invest-
ment in IT and higher TFP (Bloom et al., 2015). The reverse e¤ect on the other hand, i.e.
the e¤ect of product and process innovation on trade, is less well explored. The long-standing
debate about what confers a competitive advantage to exporters and importers, is far from
being settled. Firm productivity is typically modelled as a random draw, exogenous to the
rm; however, once one accounts for innovation, rm characteristics and export participa-
tion become endogenized, potentially allowing rms to overcome the barriers associated with
participation to the export market. In favour of this argument are Cassiman et al., (2010),
Ganotakis and Love (2011) and Becker and Egger (2013), all nding that product innovation
86Higher competition might increase prot margins for rms closer to the technological frontier and induce
more innovation, aimed at escaping competition(Blundell et al., 1998). On the other hand, in sectors where
innovations are made by laggard rms with low prots, competition could reduce incentives to innovate: this
is the Schumpeterian approach, which predicts a negative relation between the two variables. Aghion et
al., (2005) reconcile the two approaches detecting an inverted-U shape relation: as competition increases,
innovation rst increases then decreases, because at low levels of competition the escape competitione¤ect
is likely to dominate the Schumpeterian e¤ect, with the opposite being true at higher levels of competition.
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is a key factor in raising rms propensity to export. My chapter speaks to this literature
from a new perspective: entry into exporting could be facilitated also by a negative shock
to innovation which is symmetric between trading partners, thanks to the reduction in the
toughness of comepetition both in the domestic and in the foreign market. From an empirical
point of view this anti-competitive shock results in higher markups, extra resources that can
be used to sustain the costs associated with the exporting.
The remaining parts of this chapter are organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the
data used in the empirical analysis. Section 4.3 describes the main measures and Section 4.4
explains the estimation strategy. Section 4.5 briey provides some descriptive statistics con-
cerning the sample of Slovenian rms under consideration in this work. Section 4.6 presents
the results. Section 4.7 exposes some futher results and robustness checks and Section 4.8
concludes.
4.2 Data
Four rm level data sources are used in the analysis: the Community Innovation Surveys
(CIS) carried out biannually by the Statistical O¢ ce of the Republic of Slovenia (SURS ),
the rm balance sheet data collected by the Agency of the Republic of Slovenia for Pub-
lic Legal Records and Related Services (AJPES ), the custom trade data recorded by the
Slovenian Customs Administration (CARS ) and the rm balance-sheet information available
in Compustat87. Compustat is a rm level data source which can be accessed on the Whar-
ton Research Databases Services (WRDS) data portal, containing detailed balance sheet and
income statement data on about 24,000 listed North American companies. Compustat is a
widely exploited dataset in the literature, most prominently by Rajan and Zingales (1998),
among many others.
The Slovenian data can be matched by use of unique rm identiers, while the match
with the US data was performed at the 4-digit sector level, by matching the European NACE
rev.2 4-digit classication of activities with the US NAICS 2007 6-digit classication88. All
four data sources span from 2000 to 2012.
All monetary variables are deated by use of the available price indexes: for the Slovenian
87A more detailed explanation of the three Slovenian dataset was provided in the introduction to the thesis.
88This match was performed by use of the concordance table produced by Eurostat and some personal
elaboration needed because the match between EU and US sectors is not univocal one-to-one. With the
intention of preserving the structure of the NACE classication I matched more than one NACE sector to the
same NAICS sector when this correspondence was found. In cases where more than one NAICS sector was
seen to correspond to the same NACE sector, I decided to match the NAICS sector with the largest amount
of sales. In any case, this adjusment was necessary only for handful of 6-digit NAICS sectors. Furtheremore,
being the analysis in this paper carried out a the 2-digit industry level, this correction has no impact on the
results.
85
data I used the 2-digit PPI series produced by SORS for the 28 manufacturing sectors and
the CPI for the remaining 47 sectors. The US data are deated by using the PPI series
produced by the U.S. Bureau of Labour Statistics.
The dimension of the nal sample was dictated by the samples surveyed in the CIS:
these data are collected through a combination of a stratied sample for rms between 10-49
employees and a census survey for bigger rms, covering about 2,200 rms in each survey.
The nal sample used in the estimation includes 6154 rms over seven surveys89. However,
due to the nature of the sampling strategy, the panel dimension is jeopardised: only 3,593
rms appear in more than one survey. Out of these, 2,373 rms innovated at least once and
2,654 exported at least once. I dene a rm as an exporter in a certain year if the rm was
seen as exporting in at least one month over the year; while I dene a rm as an innovator
when the rm replied positively to at least one of the questions in the CIS asking whether,
over the years covered by the survey, the rm introduced a new product or service, a new
process, an organisational innovation or a marketing innovation.
4.3 Empirical Methodology
The aim of the empirical analysis is to exploit the context of the 2008-2009 nancial crisis to
examine how a negative shock to the innovative activity performed by rms can indirectly
a¤ect participation to exporting, through a change in product market competition, which I
measure by estimating the markups charged by producers.
The arguably exogenous 2008-2009 nancial shock was transmitted to the real activity
of rms through a severe reduction in the availability in external banking nance. The
perspective of my analysis necessitates therefore isolating the impact of the credit crunch on
innovation, in order to then be able to assess whether this particular aspect of the nancial
crisis had an indirect impact on rmsmarkups and participation to exporting.
Before proceeding to the exposition of the estimation strategy, I present the main variables
exploited in the analysis.
4.3.1 Shock to innovation
Examining and identifying correctly the specic e¤ect of the crisis on the nancing of inno-
vation, requires an exogenous and observable source of variation across rms in their access
to external nance, to be exploited in estimation.
Unfortunately, in standard rm balance sheet data there is neither direct information on
89CIS3, Statistical Report on Innovation Activity 2002, CIS4, CIS2006, CIS2008, CIS2010, CIS2012.
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the working capital that rms use to nance operations of di¤erent kinds, nor it is possible to
observe directly the amount of credit specic for innovation. Furthermore, direct measures of
overall credit provided by the banking sector are only approximable by the stock of short term
liabilities in a given year. Finally, even if a proxy for credit obtained by rms were constructed
from balance sheet data, this would be simultaneously determined with the innovative status
of the rm, causing estimates of the e¤ect of the credit crunch on innovation to be inconsistent.
Firms that intend to innovate are more likely to hit a nancing constraint than rms that
do not even try (Hajivassiliou and Savignac, 2007) and this gives rise to a reverse causality
issue.
The endogenous link between innovation and nancial constraints is well documented in
the literature and has been recently dealt with either by use of credit indexes (Czarnitzki and
Hottenrott, 2011), particular survey designs to identify constrained rms (Hottenrott and Pe-
ters, 2012), or by use of instrumental variables (Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer, 2013). A more
indirect approach consists of exploiting sectoral variation in external nancial dependence, in
a di¤erence-in-di¤erence setting. The most widely used measure of dependence on external
nance is the ratio introduced by Rajan and Zingales (1998). Given that the Rajan-Zingales
measure is arguably an exogenous and stable characteristic of di¤erent sectors, mostly jus-
tied on technological grounds, it has been widely applied to various contexts in order to
overcome the simultaneous determination of credit and nancial variables on one side, and
the type of activity performed by rms on the other, e.g. production (Kroszner et al., 2007),
exporting (Iacovone and Zavacka, 2009) and, more recently, also innovation (Acharya and
Xu, 2013).
I had two options for identifying the shock in my context, i.e. the e¤ect of the reduction
in banking nance on innovation. I could either attempt to instrument the credit crunch of
2008-09, by exploiting Slovenian rmsbalance sheet variables (e.g. overdues, collateral); or
else I could identify the e¤ect of the crisis indirectly, by relying on an exogenous sectoral
source of cross-sectional variation in a before-after crisis (di¤erence-in di¤erence) setting.
I avoided the direct instrumentation of the shock in my context, because I could only
approach the instrumentation of credit constraints in general, and not of constraints specic
to innovation. I therefore base my identication strategy on the di¤erential impact of the
crisis across sectors di¤ering along the dimension of their need of external nance, making
this sectoral dependence specic to innovation. The Rajan-Zingales ratio, in fact, proxying
the structural dependence on external nance, is not well suited to my context because it is
not specic to innovation and is meant to capture the long-run requirement of external funds
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as a source of physical capital, rather than the short run vulnerability to a nancial shock.
For these two reasons I propose an alternative measure, inspired by the work of Raddatz
(2006), meant to capture the sectorsexternal liquidity need for innovation expenditure: the
ratio of innovation expenditure over revenue.
I follow the approach of Raddatz (2006) and compute a measure of external liquidity needs
for innovation using data of US rms taken from Compustat90. This strategy borrows from
Rajan and Zingales (1998) the assumption that sectors di¤er structurally from each other
in terms of their liquidity needs due to technological factors, and that these di¤erences
persist across countries and time. The innovation expenditure over revenue ratio is computed
at the rm level and then averaged over all years available in the data, up to the crisis, in
order to obtain a time constant measure. The mean91 ratio of each sector is then taken as a
measure of external liquidity needs for innovation expenditure.
This variable is a standard ratio used in the innovation literature to measure innovation
intensity, however it can be reinterpreted as the fraction of innovation expenditure that can
be nanced with ongoing revenue. Firstly, it is useful to isolate the shock imparted by the
crisis directly on the nancing of innovation, being the measure specic to innovation expen-
diture. Furthermore the denominator, revenue, is the rst source of liquidity for innovative
rms: innovation is nanced mainly with internal funds, because of the higher information
asymmetry and riskiness embedded in this activity compared to more standard production
processes. A higher innovation expenditure over revenue ratio shows that a smaller fraction
of innovation expenditure can be nanced by ongoing revenue, therefore proxying the degree
of dependence on external nance to sustain innovative activity, i.e. a higher ratio indicating
a higher dependence. In other words, a higher ratio can signal the vulnerability of being hit
by a reduction in external liquidity provided by the banking sector. Due to the sudden nature
of the 2008 crisis, the need of external liquidity of an industry for its innovation expenditure
is a better determinant of the vulnerability to such a short-run nancial shock, compared to
the original Rajan-Zingales measure.
For all these reasons, the ratio of innovation expenditure over revenue (to which I hence-
forth refer to as liquidity needs, LN) suits this particular analysis well. It is doubtless that in
the nancial crisis and subsequent recession rms su¤ered also from a shock to their internal
90Data of all US rms available in Compustat were used, over all years from 2000 to 2007. The original
sample for this variable included 6380 rms (and 31,538 rm-year observations), but I dropped 0.9% of them to
eliminate some very large outliers. The nal Compustat sample includes therefore 6362 rms (31,323 rm-year
observations).
91 If the median is exploited, instead of the mean, results are extremely similar. See Tables 4.13 and 4.14 in
Appendix.
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liquidity, but, after controlling for the use of internal nancial resources92, the structural
LN ratio constitutes an exogenous source of variation proxying the degree of exposure to a
sudden reduction in the provision of external banking nance93.
Lastly, the identier of the crisis years needs a brief explanation. The nancial crisis hit
in the last quarter of 2008 with most of the impact on the European banking sector at the
beginning of October 2008, while the following recession bit hardest in 2009. Firmssales
and prots in Slovenia increased in 2008 from 2007, but fell hard in 2009 and 2010, starting
to recover only in 2011. Considering this timing, since each biannual CIS survey contains
information on the innovative behaviour of rms during the preceding years, I considered the
2010 survey as the one covering the crisis years.
The shock to innovation is therefore identied in a di¤erence-in-di¤erence setting, where
the LN ratio is interacted with a binary variable taking value 1 for years covered by the 2010
CIS survey.
4.3.2 Shock to competition and exporting
The second aim of this work is to examine whether participation in exporting was facilitated
by the impact of the crisis on innovation.
The theoretical Proposition 1 in chapter 2 argues that a reduction in external liquidity
for innovation makes access to innovation more selective, thereby reducing the degree of
competitive pressure which, in turn, results in a lower entry threshold into the export market.
As a consequence, in this empirical framework, I expect innovation to have been harmed by
more in sectors characterised by higher LN for innovation, relative to sectors characterized
by lower LN. In addition, I expect entry into exporting to have been facilitated by more in
sectors where innovation was harmed by more, because the channel linking innovation and
exporting, competition, was a¤ected by more. From an empirical point of view, I expect
rmsmarkups to have increased by more in sectors where innovative activity was reduced
by more by the lack of external banking nance, such that rms found it relatively easier to
overcome the cost associated with exporting. I identify the shock on exporting using the same
di¤erence-in-di¤erence setting exploited to identify the shock to innovation, but I expect the
coe¢ cient on the LN ratio in the crisis years to take a sign which is opposite with respect to
92Proxied by the change in cash stocks and the level of cash ow.
93 It is di¢ cult to interpret the LN ratio di¤erently in my context. Sectors characterized by higher liquidity
needs (or sectors with higher innovation intensity, in the economics of innovation terminology) are found in
the data to be the more technologically advanced sectors, with the pharmaceutical industry topping the LN
measure and the retail and transport sectors found at the bottom. I would indeed expect the highly innovative
industries to be more exposed to a sudden reduction in external liquidity and to therefore report a larger loss
in innovative output, relative to sectors whose innovativeness is lower. I will provide a further assessment of
the interpretation of the LN measure after exposing the estimation results.
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that for innovation.
The positive e¤ect on entry into exporting, stemming from the negative impact on in-
novation, should be mediated by a reduction in competitive pressure, which lead rms to
increase markups. I therefore also estimate the e¤ect of the shock on markups, again using
the di¤erence-in di¤erence approach through which I test how the crisis a¤ected innova-
tion and exporting. Afterwards, I show that the relatively positive impact of the crisis on
exporting vanishes, or is at least dampened, when conditioning on rmsmarket power.
To estimate markups I implement the recent methodology of De Loecker and Warzynski
(2012), henceforth DLW. The advantage of the DLW method is that it allows me to obtain
time-varying rm specic markups, without the need to specify how producers compete in
the product market.
The DLW procedure relies on the mild assumption that rms are cost-minimizing and
combines output elasticities of variable inputs to their revenue shares in order to estimate
price-cost ratios. Let the a production function take the form:
Qit = Qit (Kit;Lit) 
it , (61)
where Q denotes value added produced, K denotes physical capital, L denotes labour,

it = exp(!it) where !it denotes a Hicks-neutral productivity term. The Lagrangian associ-
ated with the cost minimization is:
it = Qit (Kit;Lit; it) = P
L
it  Lit + rit Kit + it (Qit  Qit (Kit;Lit; !it)) ; (62)
where it is the marginal cost of production, as @=@Qit = it: Treating labour as a
variable input, its rst order condition is:
@
@Lit
= PLit   it
@Qit
@Lit
= 0 (63)
Multiplying through by Lit=Qit and dening the markup it as the price-marginal cost frac-
tion it = Pit=it, the rst order condition can be rearranged such that:
it =
Lit
Lit
; (64)
where Lit denotes the output elasticity of labour and 
L
it denotes the share of the expendi-
ture on labour in total sales, Lit =
PLitLit
PitQit
: The basic insight of the DLW procedure is that the
output elasticity of a variable factor of production is equal to its expenditure share in total
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revenue only when price equals marginal cost of production. Under any form of imperfect
competition, a markup will drive a wedge between the inputs revenue share and its output
elasticity.
The share of labour costs in sales Lit is easily observable in the data. The output elasticity
of labour Lit is instead derived from the estimation of a trans-log production function, based
on the Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2006) approach, henceforth (ACF). More details about
the estimation procedure94 are provided in subsection 4:4.
4.4 Estimation strategy
The methodology exploited in this work is intended to test Proposition 1 of the theoretical
framework that constitutes the second chapter of this thesis. A reduction in external nancing
of innovation reduces innovative activity and, through the reduction in competitive pressure
arising from the shock to innovation, allows an easier entry into exporting. There is therefore
a threefold task to be accomplished. First, to assess the impact of the reduction in external
nance during the 2008 crisis on innovation. Second, to estimate the e¤ect of this particular
shock on rmsmarkups and on exporting. Third, since the shock under examination should
a¤ect exporting only through the change in competition, to show that conditioning on rms
markup dampens the e¤ect on exporting. Finally, the theoretical model predicts that the
shock should a¤ect rms in the middle range of the productivity distribution: I therefore
repeat the estimations unpacking the impact of the crisis on innovation and exporting over
quartiles of the rmsproductivity distribution.
4.4.1 Innovation
To assess the impact of the reduction in external nance on innovation specication (65) is
estimated:
Innit = 0 + 1Innit 1; + 2LNj + 3Crisist + 4LNj  Crisist (65)
+
X
n
nIFit +
X
r
rXit 1 + i + jt + &t + "it
The dependent variable is a binary indicator taking value 1 if the rm reports to have
introduced a new product, process, marketing or organizational innovation over the time
94Since both DLW and I apply the procedure to estimate markups with Slovenian rm level data, I decided
to follow their approach in the specication of the production function and the cost-minimization problem
and to therefore use labour as the variable input in production. However, the DLW procedure can be applied
to any input that one considers variable (e.g. materials or electricity, in a gross-output rather than a value-
added setting). Importantly, one needs also to condition on the use of dynamic inputs that can be subject to
adjustment costs (in my setting capital), as implied by the cost-minimization.
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span covered by the CIS survey. LNj denotes the external liquidity needs variable, which is
the sectoral time invariant ratio of innovation expenditure over revenue calculated for each
2-digit NACE sector j: Crisis is a dummy taking value 1 in 2010 and value 0 in 2000,
2002, 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2012. IFit denotes cash-ow and the change in cash-stock,
variables controlling for the use of internal nancial resources. The change in cash-stock is
an especially important control: due to the high costs of adjusting R&D spending, rms
aggressively bu¤er innovation from transitory volatility in internally generated cash ow and
lack of external nance (Brown et al., 2012). To correctly identify the e¤ect of the reduction
in external banking nance on innovation it is therefore imperative to control for the change
in the reserves of liquidity that rms use to shield innovation from shocks of the kind under
examination. Xit 1 denotes a vector of other rm level controls95. i, &t and jt denote,
respectively, a full set of rm xed e¤ects, time dummies and 2-digit industry-time trends.
Finally, to account for the persitence of innovation, I estimate specication (65) in a dynamic
panel setting, adding the rst lag of the dependent variable to the empirical model.
The focus is on 4, which is expected to take a negative sign: in sectors characterized by
higher external liquidity needs for innovation expenditure, the sudden reduction in external
liquidity provided by the banking sector should have reduced the probability of innovating
by more, relative to sectors characterized by lower external liquidity needs for innovation
expenditure.
4.4.2 Exporting
To assess how this particular nancial shock a¤ected rmsparticipation to exporting I esti-
mate specication (66):
Expit = 0 + 1Expit 1; + 2LNj + 3Crisist + 4LNj  Crisist (66)
+
X
n
nIFit +
X
r
rXit 1 + i + jt + &t + "it
The dependent variable is a binary indicator taking the value 1 if the rm exported at
least once during a year. As explained in section 3.2.2, for exporting I exploit the same
di¤erence-in-di¤erence strategy as in specication (65). The rationale is that, since I expect
the nancial shock to have harmed innovation more in sectors with higher LN, it is precisely
in those sectors that entry into exporting should have been facilitated by more. I expect
95The controls are employment, capital intensity, and a binary indicator taking value 1 if the rm is in
receipt of public funding for innovation. These variables are lagged by one year in estimation to reduce reverse
causality concerns.
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therefore 4 to take a positive sign in the regressions where the probability of exporting is
on the left hand side.
4.4.3 Markups
The theoretical model in Chapter 3 predicts that a negative shock to the nancing on inno-
vation results in lower competitive pressure and higher rmsmarkups. This is the channel
leading to a relatively easier possibility to access the export market. To assess how markups
were a¤ected by the shock to innovation, I exploit again the di¤erence-in-di¤erence strategy
of specication (65). Since the nancial crisis is expected to have harmed innovation by more
in sectors characterized by higher LN, markups are expected to have increased by more in
those sectors. To test this rationale I estimate specication (67):
it = 0 + 1LNj + 2Crisist + 3LNj  Crisist (67)
+4Kintit 1 + 5Emplit 1 + i + jt + &t + "it
The dependent variable is the value of rmsmarkup estimated by exploiting the DLW
procedure: this corresponds to the ratio of the output elasticity of labour over the revenue
share of labour costs (64). While the revenue share Lit is observable in the data, I need to
estimate the output elasticity of labour Lit:
The production function that I take to the data, and that I estimate separately for
each 2-digit NACE industry, is a log-transformation of (61). I adopt a value-added translog
production function of this form:
yit = llit + kkit + lll
2
it + kkk
2
it + lklkit + !it + it; (68)
where the lower cases represent the natural logarithms of the variables. Value-added is
dened as output net of material inputs, capital is proxied with the value of xed assets,
labor with the number of employees. Value added, capital and material inputs are expressed
in constant Euros. I estimate a translog production function rather than a Cobb-Douglas
specication, because the latter would restrict the input elasticities to be constant across rms
in the same sector, implying that all the within-industry variance of markups is explained
by the variance of revenue shares across rms. The translog, on the other side, allows me
to have rm and time specic markups, because inputselasticities depend also on the level
of the inputs used by each rm: in this case the variation of markups depends on both the
heterogeneity of output elasticities and the variability of revenue shares. From (68), the
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output elasticity of labour I need to compute markups is given by:
Lit = ^l + 2^lllit + ^lkkit (69)
In order to obtain consistent estimates of ^l; ^ll and ^lk, I need to control for unobserved
productivity shocks potentially correlated with inputschoices. To deal with this well-known
simultaneity problem I rely on a material input demand function (70) to proxy for produc-
tivity (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003). The material demand proxy that I exploit includes a
vector zit of additional state variables that can potentially a¤ect the optimal input demand.
mit = mt (kit;!it; zit) (70)
This means that I allow the input coe¢ cients to vary by exporters and innovators, since
the zit vector includes the exporting and the innovation status, other than time and 4-digit
NACE xed e¤ects. The advantage of accounting for the variables in zit in the estimation
routine, is that I do not have to take a stand on the exact underlying model of competition
in each industry. The inverse function ht(:) of (70), !it = ht(kit;mit; zit) is then used as the
productivity proxy in estimation.
For the estimation of the production function (68) I follow the two-stage ACF approach.
In the rst stage I run:
yit = t(kit; lit;mit; zit) + it; (71)
where I obtain an estimate of ^it, expected output
96.
Given my choice of using a translog function, ^it = llit +kkit +lll
2
it +kkk
2
it +lklk+
ht(kit;mit; zit). The rm specic proxy for productivity ht(:) enters as a third order polyno-
mial, including full interactions with the state variables in zit.
In the second stage I retrieve the production function coe¢ cients needed to compute the
output elasticity (69). The identication of these coe¢ cients relies on the law of motion of
96 Ideally I would need a measure of physical output on the left hand side of (68), rather than deated
revenue, becasue the latter might reect price di¤erences across rms within an industry. However, unobserved
price variation that is uncorrelated with input choices (and therefore picked up in it) is explicitly eliminated
when computing markups, since the empirical counterpart of Lit =
PLitLit
PitQit
used to calculate (64) is ^Lit =
PLitLit
exp(^it)
:This correction allows me to eliminate any variation in Lit not related to variables impacting input
demand (kit; lit;mit; zit), including input prices and other market characteristics. Additionally the use of the
productivity proxy ht(:) controls for price variation correlated with variation in productivity. Finally, DLW
show that when relying on revenue data, only the level of markups is potentially a¤ected, but not how markups
change over time. This is reassuring for my analysis, since I focus on changes in markups, rather than their
level.
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productivity, given by (72):
!it = t (!it 1; Expt 1;Innt 1) + it (72)
In (72) I allow for the potential of past exporting and innovation to a¤ect rmspro-
ductivity. De Loecker (2007, 2013) showed that there are important gains from learning by
exporting and accounting for the possibility of this happening appears crucial in my context.
!it can be computed after the rst stage, using !it = ^it  llit + kkit + lll2it + kkk2it +
lklk: By regressing !it on its lag, one can recover it, the innovation in productivity unforseen
by the rm and that is uncorrelated with inputschoice: endogenising past exporting and
innovation in (72) allows me to obtain an innovation in productivity it uncorrelated with
rmspast innovation or exporting behaviour.
By following ACF and DLW, I use the GMM approach and exploit the following moment
conditions to identify l; k; ll; kk and lk:
E(itlit 1) = 0
E(itkit) = 0
E(itl
2
it 1) = 0 (73)
E(itk
2
it) = 0
E(itll 1k) = 0
The moments in (73) imply that capital is assumed to be decided a period ahead and is
therefore uncorrelated with innovations in productivity; labour is instead expected to react
to current productivity shocks and needs to be instrumented by its rst lag.
Note that the markups constructed by use of (64) are estimates, since they depend on the
estimated production function coe¢ cients. Using estimated coe¢ cients introduces a source
of uncertainty in the markup estimates. I account for the measurement error in this variable
when I estimate (some of) the reduced form regressions exploiting specication (67) and when
condition for markups in specication (66), by bootstrapping over the entire procedure. I
execute the following steps in sequence: 1) estimate the production function, 2) recover the
input coe¢ cients, 3) calculate markups, and 4) project markups on the shock imparted by the
reduction in external liquidity for innovation. I then repeat this procedure 100 times, using
bootstrapped (with replacement) samples that keep the sample size equal to the original
sample size. This allows me to compute the bootstrapped standard error on some of the
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coe¢ cients97 in the Results section.
4.5 Descriptive Statistics
Before presenting the results of the analysis, I briey report some descriptive statistic about
the measures exploited in estimation. The main regressor, the LN ratio of innovation expen-
diture over revenue is calculated for each 2-digit NACE sector by using data of all US rms
available in Compustat, over all years from 2000 to 2007. Once merged on the Slovenian
data, this ratio varies over 76 industries ranging from a minimum of zero (Nace sector 49
- Land transport) to a max of 4.62 (Nace sector 21 - Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical
products and pharmaceutical preparations).
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics- chapter 3
Obs Mean Std. Min Max
Liquidity Needs (rm level) 31,323 0.99 5.51 0 100
Liquidity Needs (sectoral level) 76 0.45 0.85 0 4.62
Markup I (no zit, no endogenous exp. and inn.) 10,158 1.12 1.17 -29.3 36.1
Markup II (zit, no endogenous exp. and inn.) 10,127 1.26 1.27 -25.3 17.5
Markup III (zit, endogenous exp. and inn.) 10,127 1.27 1.34 -25.5 15.6
Employees 12,895 122.3 356.47 0 8899
Capital Intensity 12,775 616.8 1825.6 0 56798
Cash Stock 12,748 0.040 0.081 0 4.66
Cash Flow 12,799 0.054 0.084 0 0.98
Source: SORS and authors calculations.
I report statistics about three di¤erent markup variables, computed with the DLWmethod-
ology: in Markup I I include neither additional state variables in the productivity proxy (70)
nor the impact of past exporting and innovation in the law of motion of producitivity; in
Markup II I add the exporting and the innovation status in the material demand function
and, nally, in Markup III I account for both the the impact of the state variables in (70)
and the endogeneity of exporting and innovation. The mean values are highly comparable
with those in DLW.
The remaining controls are standard variables representing the number of employees, cap-
ital intensity (xed tangible assets per employee), cash stock from balance sheet data and cash
ow (sum of income before extraordinary items, innovation expenditure and depreciation).
Cash-stock and cash-ow are scaled by beginning of periods value of total assets.
97This procedure is computationally very intensive and becasue of real time constraints when carrying out
the data analysis at the Statistical O¢ ce in Ljubljana, I had to limit the bootstrap procedure to a few selected
regressions and to not more than 100 repetitions.
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4.5.1 Markups, Export and Innovation Status
Given that I estimated rm specic markups, I can simply relate them to a rms export or
innovation status in a regression framework, to explore whether there are systematic di¤er-
ences across groups of producers. I create four mutually exclusive categories of producers,
depending on rms exporting and innovation status98 and then estimate the percentage
di¤erence in markups between them. This is the specication99 taken to the data:
lnit = 0 + 1ExpInnit + 2OnlyExpit + 3OnlyInnit +
X
r
rfit + it; (74)
where it is the rm specic markup estimated with the DLW procedure, corresponding
to Markup III in Table 4.1. ExpInnit is a dummy denoting rms that are both exporting and
innovating over a year, OnlyExpit denotes rms that export but do not innovate, OnlyInnit
denotes rms that innovate but do not export. I control for labour and capital intensity to
capture di¤erences in size and factor use and add a full set of industry-time interactions.
These latter controls are collected in the vector fit: The  coe¢ cients cannot be considered
causal, but are intended to test whether, on average, markups di¤er across the four categories
of producers.
Table 4.2: Markups, Export and Innovation Status
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Boot. SE
Exp. Inn. 0.050*** 0.049*** 0.012* 0.050***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.007) (0.012)
Only Exp. 0.038*** 0.036*** 0.038***
(0.008) (0.011) (0.013)
Only Inn. 0.001 -0.036*** 0.001
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
No Exp. No Inn. -0.001 -0.038***
(0.010) (0.008)
Cons. 0.960*** 0.961*** 0.994*** 0.960***
(0.010) (0.001) (0.011) (0.011)
N 11637 11637 11637 11637
Note: Robust standard error in parenthesis, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Specication (74) tests directly an implication of the theroretical model of Chapter 3,
based on Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). In the model markups are a positive function of the
distance between a rms marginal cost from the the industry exit cost-cuto¤, i.e., the higher
a rms productivity (the lower its marginal cost), the higher its markup. From this follows
98The four categories are: neither innovator nor exporter, only innovator, only exporter, innovator-exporter.
99This is the same specication by which De Loecker and Warzinsky (2012) test for the mean di¤erence in
makups between exporters and non-exporters.
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that rms performing both exporting and innovation should charge the highest markups and
rms producing only for the domestic market without innovating should charge the low-
est markups. Between these extremes, the productivity ranking assumption was that the
marginal innovator is less productive than the marginal exporter: this implies that rms per-
forming only innovation without exporting should charge a markup which is lower compared
to rms that only export, without innovating. This result would conrm the assumption
about the ranking of producers made in Chapter 2.
The results in Table 4.2 conrm the theoretical models prediction about rmsmarkups.
Firms that both export and innovate report the highest price-cost margins. In the middle
range of the producitivity distribution, exporters that do not innovate are found to charge,
on average, higher markups than innovators that do not export. This suggests that rms
select into exporting at a productivity level which is higher compared to the level at which
rms start innovating, conrming the producitivity ranking assumption. Finally, rms that
neither export nor innovate are found to charge the lowest markups, although the di¤erence
with the group of only innovators is small and not statistically signicant.
4.6 Results
In this section I present the estimates of the impact of the 2008-09 nancial crisis on rms
innovation, markups and participation to exporting.
4.6.1 Impact on Innovation
Table 4.3 reports the results from estimating specication (65). The dynamic-panel setting
applied to the data at hand, with a short time dimension (at most 7 surveys) relative to
number of cross-sectional units, requires me to instrument the lagged dependent variable
Innit 1 to circumvent the correlation of this regressor with the residual of the model (Nickell
bias). For this purpose I apply the Arellano-Bond methodology in a GMM setting, exploiting
further lags of the dependent variable to instrument Innit 1:
A GMM procedure applied to a dynamic-panel o¤ers a variety of estimation options to
the researcher. In order to justify the choice about the estimator made in this work, in Table
4.3 I compare results from a pooled-OLS model (POLS), a xed-e¤ects within estimator (FE)
and a system-GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998). In the last two columns (7 and
8) I report the system-GMM result where the forward-orthogonal transformation (instead
of rst-di¤erencing) suggested by Areallano and Bover (1995) is performed on the data100.
100This is particularly useful when the panel under examination is unbalanced.
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For all the GMM estimators I perform the Windmeijer correction to obtain robust standard
errors in small samples.
The coe¢ cient on the lagged dependent variable is indicative of the correct specication
of the GMM models. Both the POLS and the FE estimators are biased, but they can
be taken as, respectively, an upper and a lower bound estimate of the lagged dependent
variable. Bond and Windmeijer (2001) suggest, in fact, that the GMM estimate should lie
in between the POLS and the FE ones. This "rule-of-thumb" applies neatly in my context:
the INNt 1 coe¢ cient takes values of opposite sign in the POLS and FE model, while the
Syst-GMM model, in columns (5)-(8) is well behaved101 and, especially in the specications
where I control for cash-ow and the change in cash stocks, I obtain a lagged dependent
variable coe¢ cient lying between the POLS and the FE, even though close to the upper
bound. This implies that for the main results in this work I am going to consider the system
GMM as the preferred estimator102. The option of exploiting a di¤erence-GMM estimator
(Arellano and Bond, 1991), in place of the system-GMM, has also been considered, but after
careful inspection of the initial results a choice in favour of the system-GMM has been made
instead103.
The system GMM jointly estimates specication (65) in di¤erences and in levels, using
lagged levels as instruments for the regression in di¤erences and lagged di¤erences as instru-
ments for the regressions in levels104. I rely on lagged levels dated from t  3 to t  6 for the
regression in di¤erences and lagged di¤erences dated t   2 for the regression in levels. The
reason for taking as instruments lags starting at t   3 (and not t   2) is that the Arellano-
Bond test for serial autocorrelation rejects the null of no rst-order serial correlation in the
residuals, given a p-value < 5% for the Arellano-Bond test of second-order serial correlation
in the di¤erences of estimated residuals (AR(2)). This implies that the t  2 lag is correlated
101This is visible from the lagged dependent variable coe¢ cient and the p-values for the Hansen-J test
statistic, whose range indicate that the instruments are valid and not a¤ected by a weak instrumentation
issue.
102 In the GMM regressions, besides the lagged dependent variabel INNt 1, I treat as endogenous the cash-
ow variables and the change in cash stock. These regressors are instrumented with lags dated from t-3
onwards.
103Several reasons lead me to prefer the system-GMM over the di¤erence-GMM. Bond and Windmeijer (2001)
suggest that the di¤erence-GMM estimates can be downward biased becasue of weak instrumentation, and
that inspection of the Hansen-J test results can be indicative of this issue. In my context, I obtained p-values
for the Hansen-J test close to unity, a signal of weakness of the di¤erence-GMM, which cannot therefore be
regarded as reliable for my results. Furthermore the lagged dependent variable coe¢ cient for the di¤erence-
GMM is below the FE estimate: again this is a signal of a downward bias due to weak instrumentation, and
a system GMM estimator is to be preferred instead. Finally, and importantly, it is to be claried that the
main coe¢ cient of interest (the LN*Crisis interaction) is not a¤ected by the choice between di¤erence- or
system-GMM, with the main result of this work being upheld regarless the choice about the estimator.
104Estimating the model in both di¤erences and levels addresses the weak instrument problem arising from
using lagged-levels of persistent explanatory variables as instruments for the regression in di¤erences (Blundell
and Bond, 1998). However, a strong assumption of this approach is that changes in the instrumental variables
are uncorrelated with the xed e¤ects.
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with the residual and is invalid as an instrument. To assess instrument validity I report the
Hansen J-test of the null that the over-identifying restrictions are valid: here I always fail to
reject the null, conrming the validity of the instrumentation procedure.
The main result standing out in Table 4.3 is the negative impact of the nancial crisis on
the probability of innovating, for rms in sectors characterised by higher liquidity needs for
innovation, relative to rms in sectors characterized by lower liquidity needs. The reduction
in the availability of external banking nance during the 2008-09 crisis hurt innovation by
more in sectors that are structurally more exposed to the risk of being hit by this kind of
shock. The negative coe¢ cient on the LN*Crisis interaction is also surprisingly stable across
the various estimators and, importantly, robust to controlling for the use of internal nancial
resources.
Table 4.3: Impact of Financial Crisis on Innovation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
POLS Within-FE GMM
Syst-GMM
First-Di¤ Orth. trans.
INNt 1 0.392*** 0.385*** -0.096*** -0.109*** 0.435*** 0.284** 0.414*** 0.273**
(0.024) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.156) (0.116) (0.158) (0.112)
LN*Crisis -0.058** -0.057** -0.047*** -0.042** -0.048** -0.048** -0.059*** -0.060***
(0.017) (0.024) (0.014) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.020)
Cash-Flow 0.017*** 0.014*** 0.008 0.008
(0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.008)
Cash-Flowt 1 0.036 0.098* 0.476 0.551*
(0.042) (0.057) (0.311) (0.288)
MCash-Stock -0.00006 -0.00002 -0.00042*** -0.00043***
(0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00015) (0.0001)
Firm FE no no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Ind. Trends. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 7290 7211 7290 7211 7290 7211 7290 7211
Hansen-J test (p) 0.261 0.519 0.271 0.569
AR(2) test (p) 0.019 0.0245 0.024 0.026
AR(3) test (p) 0.940 0.990 0.906 0.963
N GMM Instr. 95 127 95 127
Note: Robust S.E. clustered at sector level in parenthesis, + p<0.20, p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Concerning these latter variables, the change in cash-stock takes the expected negative
sign - a reduction in reserves of cash is positively related to innovation (Brown et al., 2012) -
and is statistically signicant; the cash ow variable instead appears positive and signicant
(as expected) only on its rst lag, failing to show any e¤ect when observed contemporaneously
with innovation. Importantly, controlling for the use of internal nancial resources leaves the
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negative impact of the nancial crisis virtually unchanged. In terms of economic signicance,
nally, the crisis e¤ect is also sizeable: based on the estimate in column (6), the crisis reduced
the the probability of innovating by 2.7 percentage points (-0.048 * 0.562) for rms in an
industry at the 80th percentile (0.576) of the LN distribution, compared rms in an industry
at the 20th percentile (0.014). When the orthogonal transformation is performed on the data
(column 10), this impact rises to 3.4 percentage points (-0.060 * 0.562).
4.6.2 Impact on Exporting
Table 4.4 reports the results from estimating specication (66).
Table 4.4: Impact of Financial Crisis on Exporting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
POLS Within-FE GMM
Syst-GMM
First-Di¤ Orth. trans.
EXPt 1 0.654*** 0.653*** -0.018 -0.026 0.491** 0.612*** 0.480** 0.492**
(0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.24) (0.131) (0.242) (0.228)
LN*Crisis 0.065*** 0.064*** 0.035*** 0.038*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.060*** 0.060***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
Cash-Flow 0.001 0.012 -0.005 0.001
(0.001) (0.016) (0.006) (0.001)
Cash-Flowt 1 -0.021 -0.065** -0.092 -0.045
(0.058) (0.030) (0.190) (0.059)
MCash-Stock -0.00029*** -0.00001 -0.00017* -0.000025*
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.0001) (0.000014)
Firm FE no no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Ind. Trends. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 7290 7211 7290 7211 7290 7211 7290 7211
Hansen-J test (p) 0.408 0.492 0.438 0.469
AR(2) test (p) 0.031 0.008 0.035 0.020
AR(3) test (p) 0.269 0.210 0.281 0.124
N GMM Instr. 96 128 96 128
Note: Robust S.E. clustered at sector level in parenthesis, + p<0.20, p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
One of the main contributions of this chapter is to explore whether the negative shock
to innovation imparted by the nancial crisis had an indirect e¤ect on rmsparticipation to
exporting. This hypothesis is tested by exploiting the same di¤-in-di¤ setting of specication
(65), following the rationale that the crisis should have increased the probability of exporting
precisely in those sectors where the probability of innovating was reduced, in relatively terms.
The channel is the change in product market competition, that I test by estimating rms
markups.
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The results in Table 4.4 conrm the choice about the system-GMM estimator made above.
The coe¢ cient on INNt 1 shows a high degree of persistence for exporting and, similarly to
innovation, the estimates of the di¤erence GMM model lie below the within-FE estimator,
supporting the choice of exploiting the system GMM estimator in this application. I apply
the same lag structure used for the innovation regressions to the regressions for exporting,
given the results of the AR(2) test for error autocorrelation.
The coe¢ cient on the LN*crisis interaction strongly conrms the hypothesized indirect
impact of the shock to innovation on exporting, across sectors showing di¤erent external
liquidity needs for innovation expenditure. In sectors characterized by higher LN, the shock
increased the probability of exporting, relative to sectors characterized by lower LN. This
indirectly shows that the crisis had a di¤erential impact across sectors and that where the
probability of innovating was reduced, the probability of exporting was increased, in relative
terms. Similarly to Table 4.3, the estimated coe¢ cient varies only a little across the various
estimators, conferring a good degree of robustness to this nding. The variables proxying
the use of internal nancial resources fail to show a statistically singicant impact on the
probability of exporting, except for the change in cash-stock. However, it is noticeable that
these latter controls do not a¤ect size and signicance of the main e¤ect under examination.
Finally, in terms of economic magnitude, based on the estimate in column (6) the crisis
increased the probability of exporting by 3.5 percentage points (0.062 * 0.562) for rms in an
industry at the 80th percentile (0.576) of the LN distribution, compared rms in an industry
at the 20th percentile.
4.6.3 Impact on Markups
The relatively higher probability of exporting, estimated for rms in sectors characterized by
higher LN for innovation as a consequence of the nancial crisis, should be due to the impact
of the negative shock to innovation on rmsmarkups. The increase in price-cost margins,
arising from the reduction in innovative activity, facilitates entry into exporting for some
domestic-producers that otherwise wouldnt have been able to overcome the entry barrier.
Table 4.5 reports the results from estimating specication (67). In columns (1)-(3) and (7)
the dependent variable is rmsmarkup in levels (where Markup I, Markup II and Markup
III correspond to the three specications for markups explained in Table 4.1), whereas in
columns (4)-(6) and (8) the natural log of the markup is exploited.
In sectors characterized by higher LN for innovation, I estimate an increase in rms
markups in the crisis, relative to sectors characterized by lower LN for innovation. Focusing
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on the specications exploiting Markup III, I estimate an average increase of 1.3% (0.023
* 0.526) in price-cost margins for rms in an industry at the 80th percentile of the LN
distribution, compared to rms in an industry at the 20th percentile (alternatively, I estimate
an increase of 2.3 percentage points (0.044*0.526), with the level of markups on the LHS).
Boostrapping standard errors, to attempt a correction of the measurement error introduced
during the estimation of the LHS variable, leaves this result unchanged.
Table 4.5: Impact of Financial Crisis on Markups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Within-FE
Dep. Var. Markup I Markup II Markup III ln(Markup I) ln(Markup II) ln(Markup III) Markup III ln(Markup III)
Bootstrapped SE
LN*Crisis 0.066** 0.085* 0.044* 0.010+ 0.019* 0.023** 0.044 0.023*
(0.025) (0.047) (0.025) (0.007) (0.011) (0.010) (0.027) (0.012)
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Ind. Trends. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 7010 7009 7009 6964 6929 6933 7009 6033
Note: Robust S.E. clustered at the sector level in parenthesis, + p<0.20, p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
The result in Table 4.5 represents an additional novel contribution of this work, since to
the best of my knowledge, no work so far has estimated the e¤ect of the 2008-09 nancial
crisis on rms markups. It appears therefore that in sectors where innovative activity was
relatively more a¤ected by the reduction in external banking nance, there was an overall
decrease in the degree of product-market competition that allowed producers to increase their
markups.
4.6.4 Disentangling the reduction in nancing and the competition e¤ects
According to the theoretical framework guiding the empirical analysis in this chapter, a
reduction in competitive pressure (shown by an increase in markups) should benet both
innovators and exporters: easier competition allowing a larger margin between prices and
costs facilitates the investment in innovation and entry into exporting. Especially those
rms whose productivity is close to the pre-shock cost-cuto¤s separating innovators/non-
innovators and exporters/non-exporters could have now gathered the resources allowing them
to access innovation or, for the most producitive rms, exporting. The prediction of the
theoretical model, however, is that the reduction in external nance for innovation results
in less innovative activity, because the negative impact of the reduction in extenal nance
dominates the positive impact of the reduction in competition. For exporters on the other
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hand, becasue there is no direct consequence from the reduction in the nancing of innovation,
the only e¤ect at work is the increase in markups, which should result in an unmbiguously
positive impact on the probability of exporting.
Table 4.6: Disentangling the reduction in nancing and the competition e¤ects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Innovation Exporting
Boot. SE Boot. SE
INNt 1 0.260* 0.229* 0.579*** 0.444*** 0.229*
(0.148) (0.118) (0.110) (0.089) (0.129)
EXPt 1 0.569*** 0.529*** 0.420** 0.329 0.529***
(0.219) (0.198) (0.210) (0.210) (0.239)
LN*Crisis -0.051*** -0.052*** -0.053*** -0.054*** -0.052* 0.039+ 0.038+ -0.019 0.005 0.038+
(0.020) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.043) (0.034) (0.029)
Markup III 0.036+ 0.036+ 0.036+ 0.393** 0.369** 0.369**
(0.028) (0.028) (0.024) (0.155) (0.144) (0.164)
Ln(Markup III) 0.306 0.264+ 3.465* 2.589*
(0.210) (0.192) (1.880) (1.385)
Cash-Flow 0.007 0.009 0.007 -0.001 -0.044** -0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.001) (0.018) (0.004)
Cash-Flowt 1 -0.078 0.021 -0.078 -0.116 0.064 -0.116
(0.065) (0.029) (0.075) (0.265) (0.068) (0.297)
MCash-Stock -0.00107 -0.00107** -0.00107+ 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001
(0.00065) (0.00054) (0.00080) (0.00001) (0.00002) (0.0001)
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Ind. Trends. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 7009 6984 6933 6908 6984 7009 6984 6966 6941 6984
Hansen-J test (p) 0.662 0.719 0.732 0.764 0.601 0.632 0.619 0.687
AR(2) test (p) 0.101 0.120 0.0019 0.0048 0.0144 0.0153 0.0634 0.110
AR(3) test (p) 0.741 0.725 0.626 0.645 0.436 0.283 0.121 0.526
N GMM Instr. 92 124 91 123 124 94 126 93 125 126
Note: Robust S.E. clustered at the sector level in parenthesis, + p<0.20, p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
In Table 4.6 I attempt to disentangle the e¤ect of the change in competition from that
of the reduction in external banking nance. In Table 4.3 and 4.4 in fact, the coe¢ cient
on the LN*Crisis variable, negative for innovation and positive for exporting, includes both
the impacts of the reduction in nancing for innovation and the reduction in competition.
Controlling explicitly for markups in specication (65) and (66) allows me to unpack and
separate these e¤ects. Given that a relatively higher markup is benecial for both innovators
and exporters, this exercise should show that the negative coe¢ cient on LN*Crisis for inno-
vation increases in size and remains signicant, whereas the positive coe¢ cient on exporting
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should vanish or, at least, be somewhat attenuated. The markup should instead enter with
a positive coe¢ cient in both cases. The results in Table 4.6 are largely supportive of the
theoretical predictions.
In columns (1)-(5), controlling for rmsmarkups generates a slightly stronger negative
impact of the crisis on innovation, for rms in sectors characterized by higher LN relative
to sectors characterized by lower LN. The increase in size of the LN*Crisis interaction is
admittedly very modest, but in line with the expectation that the change in rmsmarkups
partially o¤sets the negative shock imparted by the reduction in nancing for innovation.
The Markup III variable takes a positive coe¢ cient, both when used in levels and in logs,
although its statistical signicance is only very marginal (10% < p value <15-20%).
In columns (6)-(10) I test the proposition that the relatively better exporing perfomance
for rms in sectors characterized by higher LN should have been mediated by the increase
in rmsmarkups. Table 4.6 shows indeed that separating out the e¤ect of the markup on
exporting, reduces both size and signicance of the LN*Crisis variable, as expected. This
supports the rationale that the relatively easier access to the export market, detected in
sectors relatively more a¤ected by the shock to innovation, was channelled by a reduction in
the degree of product market competition. This nding is conrmed both when controlling
for the level of markups, or for the natural log of this variable105.
Finally, a word of caution is needed concerning the possible endogeneity of the markup
variable exploited in table 4.6 (and tables 4.7, 4.8, 4.9, 4.10 below). Exporters charge higher
markups compared to domestic rms (as evident from Table 4.2), with this raising the concern
that Markup III could be simultaneously determined with the dependent variable106. In table
4.6 I do not to treat Markup III as an endogenous regressor (i.e. I did not instrument Markup
III with its past values), both in the innovation and in the exporting regressions. On one
hand, I try to mitigate some of the reverse causality concerns when calculating the Markup
105As mentioned in section 4.3.1, interpreting the e¤ect estimated on the LN ratio di¤erently from what done
in this work is di¢ cult. Innovators in sectors characterized by higher LN were more exposed to the sudden
reduction in external liquidity that characterized the 2008-10 crisis, as shown in Table 4.3. The indirect e¤ect
of this shock on exporting, estimated in Table 4.4, has been argued to have worked through a reduction in
the degree of product market competition, as the theoretical proposition of Chapter 3 states. Alternative
channels linking a negative shock to innovation, arising from a liquidity tightening, to a relatively better
export performance, are hard to rationalize. A possibility could be that, being exporting a source of revenues
that rms can reinvest in innovation (as argued by Bustos, 2011), innovators that were hit relatively harder
by the nancial shock could have made an e¤ort to gather extra-liquidity from exporting. Therefore, in higher
LN sectors the shock to innovation could have lead to a relatively higher probability to export, becasue of
rms attempt to exploit the export market to compensate for the lack of liquidity received by the banking
sector. However, the 2008-09 years were not a favourable period for exporting, as the Trade Collapse shows.
Therefore, besides the fact of having a strong theoretical reason to push forward the competition channel as
a link between innovation and exporting, I doubt that the alternative explanation provided here could have
been at work in the 2008-09 crisis.
106Possibly the same concern could apply in the regressions for innovators, although these rms were not
found to charge higher markups compared to domestic producers in Table 4.2.
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III variable: in its construction, I directly allow for exporters and innovators to produce
under a di¤erent technology by including a rms export and innovation status as an input
in the production function107, other than allowing the law of motion of productivity (72) to
depend on the past exporting and innovation status of a rm, thereby taking into account
the potential learning-by-exporing or productivity enhancing e¤ects of innovation that could
determine rmsmarkups108. On the other hand, however, it is arguable that a simulataneity
bias might still arise when exploiting the contemporaneous Markup III variable, expecially
when the probability of exporting is on the left hand side.
For this reason I also report the results from estimating the specications in Table 4.6
where I instrument Markup III with lags dated t  3 onward109. These results are presented
in Table 4.6B in the Appendix and show that the main nding of this section is upheld. The
e¤ect of the nancial crisis on innovation is well dened by the coe¢ cient on the LN*Crisis
interaction, although the instrumentation of the markup causes the coe¢ cient of this control
to shink in size and to lose statistical signicance. Noticeably, relative to Table 4.6, in Table
4.6B the variables proxying for the use of internal nancial resources are more in line with
the expected e¤ect: the lagged cash ow presents a large and positive coe¢ cient, while the
change in cash stock is negative and strongly signicant. For exporting, the important result
is that I again nd that controlling for markups attenuates the impact of the LN ratio, with
this latter coe¢ cients shrinking in size and losing signicance. Unfortunately, similarly to
the regressions for innovation, the instrumentation of Markup III results in a loss of size and
signicance of this variable, especially when used in level. A possible explanation for the loss
in signicance of the markup lies in the fact that there is measurement error in this variable:
when I attempt the instrumentation with its past values, the measurement error prevents
this variable from maintaining its e¤ect110. This certainly is a caveat arising in my context
and is a shortcoming arising from the attempt to address the simultaneous determination of
a rmsexport status and its market power.
107This controls for the impact of being an innovator and/or and exporter in determining the optimal input
demand and therefore, indirectly, for the type of competition faced by rms in an industry (De Loecker and
Warzynski, 2012)
108De Loecker and Warzinsky (2012) show that when endogeneising the export status, particularly in the
law of motion of productivity, reduces the estimated di¤erence between markups charged by exporters and
non-exporters.
109Considering my procedure to estimate Markup III, together with the fact that rm xed e¤ects are present
in all regressions, lagged markups should present an acceptable degree of exogeneity from the export status.
110Unfortunately this is a shortcoming of the DLW procedure for the estimation of markups. Notice, for
instance, from table 4.1, that even though Markup III is positive on average, it varies from negative to positive
values. The negative values are due to the estimated output elasticities of labour for some of the rms, which
turn out negative: this is true for only a minority of producers, but it is a signal that the estimation procedure
by which markups are obtained introduces some noise in the variable, which is then picked up in the GMM
instrumentation procedure.
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4.7 Further Results and Robustness Checks
The results in section 4.6 largely, although indirectly, corroborate the theoretical predictions
of the model in Chapter 3: a reduction in the availability of external liquidity for innovation
results in a relatively lower probability of innovation but, through the reduction in product
market competition, in a relatively easier access to exporting. In this section I provide further
tests to support the ndings of this work.
4.7.1 Additional Controls
Tables 4.7 and 4.8 show the results from adding a set of selected controls to specication (65)
and (66), that allow me to test a few additional hypotheses.
In the introduction I reported a rich literature studying the nexus between innovation and
exporting, with works exploring both directions of causality: from exporting to innovation
(e.g. Bustos, 2011; Treer and Lileeva, 2010) and from innovation to exporting (e.g. Becker
and Egger, 2013). In light of this literature, not conditioning for the past exporting or
innovation status of a rm could raise concerns of omitted variable bias, in case some of the
regressors were correlated with these activities.
Furthermore, adding a lagged exporting and innovation dummy to, respectively, the in-
novation and exporting regressions, can shed further light on their reciprocal determination.
Finally, in the dynamic-panel GMM setting I can instrument EXPt 1 and INNt 1 with the
second (and further) lags of these regressors, avoiding the Nickell bias.
From the inspection of Table 4.7 it is evident that past exporting is strongly correlated
with current innovation; similarly, past innovation is positively associated with current ex-
porting (Table 4.8). In columns (2) of the these tables I also control for contemporaneous
innovation and exporting and again a positive association is detected, although signicantly
so only for the exporting regressions.
In column (3) of Table 4.7 I test the hypothesis that past investment in R&D could a¤ect
the probability of innovation. R&D is an activity subject to high adjustment costs, that rms
try to avoid by bu¤ering against liquidity shortages. Additionally, investment in innovation
might take a few years to materialize. This leads to the hypothesis that high levels of R&D
spending in the past might determine a higher probability to innovate, despite the sudden
nancial shock experienced by rms in 2008.
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Table 4.7: Further hypothesis - Impact on Innovation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Innovation
Without Markup Adding Markup
INNt 1 0.364*** 0.387*** 0.218* 0.356*** 0.298*** 0.206** 0.367*** 0.248*** 0.255***
(0.142) (0.139) (0.124) (0.119) (0.102) (0.093) (0.088) (0.095) (0.075)
LN*Crisis -0.042** -0.060*** -0.047* -0.042** -0.033* -0.046** -0.047*** -0.029+ -0.034
(0.020) (0.022) (0.024) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020)
EXPt 1 0.387* 0.243* 0.171 0.304*** 0.209** 0.231* 0.177*
(0.204) (0.129) (0.119) (0.128) (0.098) (0.134) (0.092)
EXPt 0.231
(0.187)
R&Dt 2 0.323*** 0.319*** 0.381** 0.367***
(0.123) (0.113) (0.111) (0.105)
Markup III 0.031 0.031
(0.028) (0.028)
Ln(Markup III) 0.355 0.346*
(0.217) (0.217)
Cash-Flow -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003* 0.003* 0.002** 0.002*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Cash-Flowt 1 -0.034** -0.029** -0.025+ 0.006 -0.003 -0.013+ -0.020**
(0.065) (0.014) (0.018) (0.023) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009)
MCash-Stock -0.00050** -0.00092** -0.00081** -0.00096*** -0.00092*** -0.00100*** -0.00093***
(0.00024) (0.00046) (0.00035) (0.00034) (0.00031) (0.000190) (0.00018)
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Ind. Trends yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 7290 7290 3701 6933 3701 7009 6908 3600 3576
Hansen-J test (p) 0.302 0.697 0.403 0.551 0.541 0.592 0.597 0.524 0.552
AR(2) test (p) 0.023 0.016 0.073 0.009 0.024 0.0144 0.003 0.043 0.051
AR(3) test (p) 0.849 0.999 0.245 0.888 0.314 0.436 0.615 0.568 0.527
N GMM Instr. 108 113 117 140 130 137 136 128 128
Note: Robust S.E. clustered at the sector level in parenthesis, + p<0.20, p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
This rationale is strongly conrmed in Table 4.7: R&Dt 2, which being the CIS surveys
biannual (as is my time dimension) refers to expenditure in R&D performed four to six years
before the nancial crisis, is very strongly and positively associated with a higher probability
of innovation during the 2008-2010 period. Taking two lags for this regressors causes a marked
reduction in sample size, but nonetheless the coe¢ cient on R&Dt 2 is identied very precisely.
It is to be noticed that conditioning on past R&D spending does not a¤ect the coe¢ cient
on LN*Crisis; only when taking into account jointly the e¤ect of past exporting and past
R&D expenditure on innovation (column 5), is the size of the main coe¢ cient somewhat
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reduced. Finally, the probability of exporting, in Table 4.8, is not found to be associated
with past R&D spending, but the main positive e¤ect imparted by the nancial crisis on
sectors with higher LN is robust to adding this control.
Table 4.8: Further hypothesis - Impact on Exporting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Exporting
No Markup Adding Markup
EXPt 1 0.543*** 0.580*** 0.551*** 0.531*** 0.583*** 0514** 0.258 0.764*** 0.476
(0.170) (0.167) (0.190) (0.165) (0.145) (0.201) (0.257) (0.191) (0.249)
LN*Crisis 0.066** 0.072*** 0.061*** 0.065*** 0.069*** 0.038+ 0.013 0.094** 0.091**
(0.014) (0.017) (0.021) (0.019) (0.022) (0.017) (0.032) (0.043) (0.042)
INNt 1 0.202** 0.206** 0.170*** 0.121* 0.434*** 0.197 0.187
(0.204) (0.088) (0.119) (0.064) (0.164) (0.191) (0.123)
INNt 0.180**
(0.077)
R&Dt 2 0.027 -0.073 1.146 0.296
(0.060) (0.113) (1.293) (1.392)
Markup III 0.365*** -0.027**
(0.145) (0.013)
Ln(Markup III) 2.624** 0.889+
(1.323) (0.620)
Cash-Flow 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0001 -0.034** -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.014) (0.003) (0.005)
Cash-Flowt 1 -0.071 -0.160** -0.161** -0.136** -0.224** -0.084 -0.183
(0.064) (0.014) (0.076) (0.062) (0.109) (0.144) (0.145)
MCash-Stock 0.000004 -0.000001+ 0.00001 0.00001 0.000001 0.00001 -0.00004*
(0.000018) (0.000001) (0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002)
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Ind. Trends. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 7290 7290 3701 7211 3701 6984 6941 3600 3576
Hansen-J test (p) 0.553 0.562 0.498 0.531 0.445 0.743 0.797 0.864 0.811
AR(2) test (p) 0.009 0.016 0.117 0.008 0.114 0.016 0.066 0.113 0.130
AR(3) test (p) 0.249 0.190 0.280 0.209 0.256 0.293 0.689 0.286 0.773
N GMM Instr. 110 116 118 137 127 134 133 133 133
Note: Robust S.E. clustered at the sector level in parenthesis, + p<0.20, p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
In columns (6)-(9) of both Tables 4.7 and 4.8 I attempt again to disentangle the e¤ect of
the reduction in external banking nance from the increase in rmsmarkups in determining
the likelihood of introducing a new product or process and entering into exporting. For
innovation, controlling for rmsmarkups does not a¤ect the results about the impact of
past exporting and past R&D spending reported in columns (1)-(5), other than leaving the
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main coe¢ cient on the LN*Crisis interaction substantially una¤ected. Similar results are
found when intrumenting Markup III with its past values, as shown in columns (1)-(4) of
Table 4.7B in Appendix. For exporting (in Table 4.8), on the other hand, conditioning on
rmsmarkups yields the expected outcome, but only in column (6) and (7): here rms
price-cost margins appear as a signicantly large determinant of the probability of exporting,
and to also absorb most of the impact of the LN*Crisis variable.
Where the estimation is carried out on a smaller sample (columns 8 and 9) due to con-
trolling for R&D spending two periods (4 to 6 years) ahead of the shock, the coe¢ cient of
the Markup variable is smaller and, in one case, even enters with the wrong sign. This result
suggests a potential caveat to the earlier conclusions, becasue the result that the shock to
innovation a¤ected entry into exporting only through the change in rmsmarkups is not
entirely upheld. However, considering that the sample size drops by about 50%, and that
the lagged R&D variable that causes the change is not strictly relevant to the probability of
exporting (recall that I already control for the past innovation status), I relegate the missed
results in columns (8) and (9) to a relatively minor concern. Finally, columns (5)-(8) in Table
4.7B in Appendix show that when addressing the endogeneity of markups by instrumenting
it with its lags, leads to conclusions that di¤er only marginally from what reported here, with
the caveat of the loss in signicance of the Markup III variable.
4.7.2 E¤ects by Quartile of the Firm Size and Productivity Distributions
The results about the impact of the nancial crisis of 2008 on innovation, markups and
exporting presented in Section 4.6 and 4.7 concern the overall e¤ect of the shock on the
entire distribution of rms in my sample. However, the theoretical model of Chapter 3 is
more specic about which rms are a¤ected by the shock and predicts a negative impact
on innovation and a positive impact on exporting in the middle range of rmsproductivity
distribution, with the extremes of the distribution not being a¤ected. More precisely, the
prediction is that the reduction in external liquidity for innovation induces the interruption
of innovation e¤orts for rms that were above the innovation thereshold before the crisis but
below it afterwards; on the other side, entry into exporting is induced for rms that were
below the exporting threshold before the crisis but above it afterwards.
In order to test this prediction I ranked rms according to their size and their productivity
and estimated the impact of the nancial shock on each quartile of the rm distributions.
This approach is very similar to Bustos (2011), so, to facilitate a comparison with her
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results I rst use the proxy for initial productivity exploited in her work111, to which I to refer
to as the Bustossize distribution. In addition to Bustosmeasure, I also rank rms according
to their productivity computed with the ACF procedure, including my amendments to the
material demand proxy (70) and the law of motion of productivity (72) explained in section
4.4.3. As a robustness check, I also present results exploiting the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)
(LP) productivity estimator.
I need to clarify that Bustosmeasure is a proxy for relative size, i.e. size of a rm relative
to its industry average and that when exploiting the ACF and LP productivity estimates,
I present results for both the relative and absolute ranking of rms. In other words, to
construct the quartiles, I exploit both the value of a rms productivity relative to its 2-digit
industry average (relative productivity), and the absolute value of a rms productivity with
respect to all other rms in the estimation sample (absolute productivity). The more suitable
measure in my application is the relative productivity of a rm with respect to its industry
average, but given that many sectors are populated by only a very small number of rms,
some of the results appear more robust when exploiting the ranking that depends on the
absolute productivity112.
To unpack the shock over quartiles, I estimate the following equation:
Innit = 0 + 1Innit 1; +
4X
d=1
d1

LNj Qdi

+
4X
d=1
d2

Crisist Qdi

+
4X
d=1
d3

LNj  Crisist Qdi

+
4X
d=1
d4Q
d
i +
X
n
nIFit (75)
+
X
r
rXit 1 + i + jt + &t + "it;
where d indexes each of the four quartiles of the size or the productivity distribution, and
Qdi denotes a dummy taking value 1 when rm i belongs to quartile d. I assigned rms to
the quartiles according to their relative or absolute productivity in 2008 (before the shock).
Similarly to the method followed in section 4:6:4, I tried to disentangle the e¤ect of the
change in competition from that of the reduction in availability of external banking nance.
111This is the rm size in terms of (log) employment relative to the two-digit industry average.
112 It needs to be specied also that the choice of ranking rms depending on their relative or absolute
productivity only a¤ects the assignment of rms to a particular quartile of the productivity distribution. The
estimation of productivity iself, both with the ACF and the LP procedure, has been carried out separately by
2-digit NACE industries.
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This was done by running specication (76):
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To estimate the shock on exporting, I ran the same specications as in (75) and (76),
replacing the left hand side variable and the rst regressor with the dummy identifying the
export- and lagged export- status.
Estimation results are presented in Table 4.9 for innovation and Table 4.10 for export-
ing113. Columns (1)-(5) report the results from estimating specication (75) on Bustossize
distribution, the ACF and LP productivity distribution where rms are ranked depending on
their relative productivity (ACF-r and LP-r) and the ACF and LP distributions where rms
are ranked depending on their absolute productivity (ACF-a and LP-a).
The coe¢ cients on the LN*Crisis interactions clearly point in direction of a stronger
negative impact on innovation for rms in the middle range of the size and productivity
distributions: this nding is consistent across all specications and the two types of ranking
exploited. It is the coe¢ cient on the second or third quintile resulting to be the largest and
the most signicant one, conming also this prediction of the theoretical model.
Interestingly this results holds regardless of whether rms are ranked depending on their
relative or their absolute productivity. For the ACF distribution, the relative productivity
ranking shows neatly that the impact of the nancial crisis was on the third quintile of the
distribution, whereas when ranking rms depending on their absolute productivity the shock
seems to a¤ect both rms in the second and in the fourth quartile, but with a larger coe¢ cient
for the less productive rms. For the LP productivity distribution, it is the relative ranking
that appears to produce the less clear-cut results: in column (3) the crisis produces an e¤ect
which is spread over the rst and second quartile (although stronger on the second), while in
column (5) the negative coe¢ cient on the second quartile is clearly much larger and signicant
compared to the remaining ones.
113Here I report only one regression for each distribution and type of ranking. I opted for showing the
more complete specication where all the variables controlling for the use of internal nancial resources are
included. Adding also past exporting (innovation) to the innovation (exporting) regressions and past values
of investment in R&D leaves all results unchanged.
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Table 4.9: E¤ects by Quartile of the Firm Size and Productivity Distribution - Innovation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Innovation
Bustos ACF-r LP-r ACF-a LP-a Bustos ACF-r LP-r ACF-a LP-a
INNt 1 0.223* 0.349*** 0.381** 0.353***0.377*** 0.219** 0.345*** 0.350***0.350***0.342***
(0.123) (0.121) (0.119) (0.120) (0.123) (0.099) (0.102) (0.098) (0.102) (0.101)
LN*Crisis* 1st Q -0.019 -0.018 -0.051** -0.013 -0.038 -0.031 -0.018 -0.051** -0.020 -0.026
(0.044) (0.030) (0.022) (0.019) (0.026) (0.042) (0.030) (0.023) (0.020) (0.030)
LN*Crisis* 2nd Q -0.143*** -0.023 -0.078**-0.127* -0.187* -0.156*** -0.020 -0.075* -0.122* -0.206**
(0.037) (0.026) (0.039) (0.065) (0.105) (0.039) (0.026) (0.043) (0.072) (0.098)
LN*Crisis* 3rd Q -0.035 -0.139***0.008 -0.014 0.057 -0.035 -0.140***0.009 -0.010 0.033
(0.039) (0.035) (0.032) (0.010) (0.082) (0.039) (0.037) (0.030) (0.020) (0.087)
LN*Crisis* 4th Q -0.034 -0.079 -0.064+ -0.103** -0.077 -0.029 -0.075+ -0.062+ -0.102** -0.088
(0.023) (0.051) (0.047) (0.041) (0.082) (0.024) (0.054) (0.048) (0.047) (0.082)
Ln(Mar. III)* 1st Q 0.098 0.174** 0.157 0.160* 0.214*
(0.089) (0.074) (0.104) (0.088) (0.125)
Ln(Mar. III)* 2nd Q 0.142* 0.108 0.213** 0.157 0.157
(0.076) (0.106) (0.086) (0.106) (0.099)
Ln(Mar. III)* 3rd Q 0.163* 0.081 0.074 0.113 0.115
(0.084) (0.101) (0.130) (0.150) (0.103)
Ln(Mar. III)* 4th Q -0.037 0.110*** 0.104***0.047* 0.125***
(0.035) (0.041) (0.036) (0.027) (0.048)
IF controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Ind. Trends yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 7211 7211 7211 7211 7211 6906 6906 6906 6906 6906
Hansen-J test (p) 0.618 0.746 0.580 0.691 0.604 0.771 0.797 0.864 0.673 0.756
AR(2) test (p) 0.096 0.013 0.009 0.011 0.011 0.054 0.007 0.007 0.055 0.008
AR(3) test (p) 0.926 0.997 0.908 0.964 0.944 0.799 0.727 0.656 0.760 0.672
N GMM Instr. 136 135 135 132 135 135 134 134 131 134
Note: Robust S.E. clustered at the sector level in parenthesis, + p<0.20, p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
In columns (6)-(10) I condition also on rms markups, to observe whether separating
the role of the change in competition from that of the reduction in external nancing yields
di¤erent results. The coe¢ cients on the markups interactions are all positive, except in one
case, and mostly also statistically signicant. It cannot be said that rmsmarkups neatly
show their e¤ect on innovation for rms in the second and third quartile of the distributions,
however, for three out of the ve distributions controlling for the price-cost margin makes
the coe¢ cient on the LN*Crisis increase, as expected, although only very marginally. The
coe¢ cients in columns (6)-(10) in Table 4.9 can be compared with those in columns (1)-(5)
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in Table 4.9B in Appendix, where I instrument the markup variables with their lags. The
main nding of this section is conrmed also when addressing the potential simultaneity bias
between innovation and price-cost margins, since the coe¢ cients on the LN*Crisis variable
show neatly the impact of the nancial crisis on innovation, whereas the markups show a
positive and (often) signicant association with the innovation status. Overall, it can be
concluded that the impact of the nancial crisis on innovation appears very well dened and
concentrated on rms in the middle range of the size and productivity distributions.
Table 4.10: E¤ects by Quartile of the Firm Size and Productivity Distribution - Exporting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Exporting
Bustos ACF-r LP-r ACF-a LP-a Bustos ACF-r LP-r ACF-a LP-a
EXPt 1 0.526** 0.558*** 0.547** 0.536*** 0.592*** 0.546** 0.704*** 0.702*** 0.620*** 0.760***
(0.221) (0.201) (0.212) (0.215) (0.170) (0.191) (0.189) (0.164) (0.213) (0.181)
LN*Crisis* 1st Q 0.059* 0.018 0.055*** 0.010* 0.074* 0.044+ -0.007 0.063* -0.014 0.077
(0.030) (0.030) (0.013) (0.006) (0.044) (0.034) (0.030) (0.037) (0.024) (0.061)
LN*Crisis* 2nd Q 0.028 0.085*** 0.101* 0.027 0.168* 0.003 0.090 0.087 -0.104+ 0.070
(0.029) (0.018) (0.052) (0.035) (0.087) (0.033) (0.026) (0.092) (0.076) (0.116)
LN*Crisis* 3rd Q 0.111*** 0.121*** 0.046* 0.097*** 0.046 0.107+ 0.104 -0.024 0.074+ -0.053
(0.026) (0.037) (0.024) (0.011) (0.050) (0.081) (0.083) (0.030) (0.057) (0.087)
LN*Crisis* 4th Q 0.054** 0.085*** 0.082** 0.098*** 0.028+ 0.036 0.085 0.092+ 0.082* -0.012
(0.021) (0.031) (0.037) (0.031) (0.082) (0.030) (0.055) (0.071) (0.049) (0.038)
Ln(Mar. III)* 1st Q 0.022 -0.002 0.038 0.038 0.090+
(0.042) (0.073) (0.051) (0.035) (0.069)
Ln(Mar. III)* 2nd Q 0.176* -0.018 0.630 0.199*** 0.119
(0.090) (0.098) (0.932) (0.065) (0.076)
Ln(Mar. III)* 3rd Q 1.118+ 0.049 0.107 0.103* 0.118
(0.852) (0.095) (0.110) (0.053) (0.075)
Ln(Mar. III)* 4th Q 0.084 -0.025 0.071 1.225 0.972
(0.088) (0.698) (0.073) (1.110) (0.921)
IF controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Ind. Trends yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 7211 7211 7211 7211 7211 6941 6941 6941 6941 6941
Hansen-J test (p) 0.276 0.259 0.385 0.261 0.479 0.521 0.495 0.497 0.346 0.479
AR(2) test (p) 0.013 0.006 0.008 0.009 0.006 0.008 0.002 0.001 0.015 0.005
AR(3) test (p) 0.199 0.177 0.181 0.166 0.218 0.356 0.208 0.249 0.175 0.218
N GMM Instr. 138 134 134 138 137 137 133 133 137 136
Note: Robust S.E. clustered at the sector level in parenthesis, + p<0.20, p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 4.10 reports the results from estimating specications (75) and (76) for exporting.
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Looking at columns (1)-(5), what emerges is that the nancial shock impacted the probability
of exporting mostly for rms in the third quintile of the rm size and productivity distribu-
tions. For the ACF distributions, the e¤ect of the crisis appears strong also for rms in the
fourth quartile, especially when ranking rms depending on their absolute productivity (in
column (4) the coe¢ cients on the third and fourth quartile are almost identical, although
more precisely estimated on the third). For the LP distributions the most a¤ected rms
appear to be in the second quartile: this shows very neatly in column (5).
For exporting, columns (6)-(10) acquire more importance than for innovation, because
the positive coe¢ cients estimated in columns (1)-(5) should be due to the e¤ect of the crisis
through rmsmarkups: controlling for the latter, no direct impact should emerge on the
LN*Crisis interactions. Overall, across the various distributions, it is noticeable how con-
ditioning on markups makes the statistical signicance of the coe¢ cients on all LN*Crisis
variables almost vanish: this applies to all quartiles, including those where the e¤ect of the
crisis was estimated to be less strong.
The size of the coe¢ cients is also reduced, as expected, but in some cases not by a large
amount. The markup variables show a positive association with the probability of exporting,
but signicantly so only for the Bustos, the ACF-a and LP-a distributions: it is in fact evident
how these are the regressions where the size and signicance of the LN*Crisis coe¢ cients are
reduced by most.
On the whole Table 4.10 and 4.9B conrm the prediction that the shock hit mostly
rms in the middle range of the productivity distribution. Importantly, the nding that the
reduction in external nance for innovation positively a¤ected exporting through a reduction
in competitive pressure is fairly robust when estimating these e¤ects on each quartile of the
rm productivity distribution.
Similarly to what done for the innovation regressions, also for exporting the coe¢ cients
in columns (6)-(10) can be compared with their counterparts in Table 4.9B in Appendix:
instrumenting the Markup III variables produces results that are very similar, if not stronger,
to what discussed here. After controlling for rmsmarket power, the direct e¤ect of the
shock to innovation on exporting is signicantly reduced, across the various distributions.
The markup variables, instead, take a positive coe¢ cient in most of the specications and
quartiles, as expected114.
114Notice that when I disaggregate the e¤ect of the shock on quartiles of the rms size and productivity
distribution, I do not encounter the shortcoming from the instrumentation of markups that I reported above
when estimating the e¤ect of the crisis on the entire distribution of producers.
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4.7.3 A Placebo Test
This section presents the results from running a simple falsication test. In order to conrm
that the impacts on innovation, exporting and markups detected in this work are peculiar
to the crisis of the period 2008-2010, I ran specications (65), (66) and (67) by changing the
timing of the crisis. Table 4.11 and 4.12 show the estimation results.
Table 4.11: Placebo Tests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Crisis 2010 Crisis 2012 Crisis 2008 Crisis 2006 Crisis 2004 Crisis 2002 Crisis 2000
Innovation
INNt 1 0.284** 0.276** 0.300** 0.281** 0.278** 0.281** 0.279**
(0.116) (0.119) (0.137) (0.117) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118)
LN*Crisis -0.048** 0.103*** 0.024 0.038 0.034 0.0079 0.027
(0.021) (0.027) (0.042) (0.049) (0.045) (0.056) (0.020)
IF Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 7211 7211 7211 7211 7211 7211 7211
Hansen-J test (p) 0.519 0.623 0.598 0.644 0.627 0.639 0.611
AR(2) test (p) 0.025 0.027 0.023 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.0279
AR(3) test (p) 0.990 0.993 0.871 0.998 0.999 0.995 0.998
N GMM Instr. 127 127 127 127 127 127 127
Exporting
EXPt 1 0.612*** 0.613*** 0.610*** 0.603*** 0.605*** 0.608*** 0.614***
(0.132) (0.131) (0.131) (0.132) (0.131) (0.131) (0.130)
LN*Crisis 0.062*** -0.088*** -0.151*** -0.042 0.057* -0.067*** 0.014
(0.016) (0.018) (0.039) (0.035) (0.030) (0.026) (0.012)
IF Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 7211 7211 7211 7211 7211 7211 7211
Hansen-J test (p) 0.492 0.490 0.493 0.487 0.498 0.502 0.491
AR(2) test (p) 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.008
AR(3) test (p) 0.210 0.207 0.220 0.219 0.210 0.213 0.217
N GMM Instr. 128 128 128 128 128 128 128
Markup
LN*Crisis 0.023** -0.039 -0.039*** -0.061 -0.008 0.077 -0.027
(0.010) (0.025) (0.013) (0.051) (0.014) (0.062) (0.024)
N 6933 6933 6933 6933 6933 6933 6933
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Ind. Trends yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Note: Robust S.E. clustered at the sector level in parenthesis, + p<0.20, p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
In Table 4.11 I report only the coe¢ cient on the LN*Crisis interaction, which is the
main regressor of interest, and the coe¢ cient on the lagged dependent variable that reassures
about the correct specication of the various models. Column (1) in Table 4.11 reports the
same regression coe¢ cient as shown in column (6) in Table 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5, for innovation,
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exporting and markups, respectively. This is the main model estimated with system-GMM
and where all controls are added, including the variables proxying for the use of internal
nancial resources (IF controls). The coe¢ cient in column (1) can be taken as a benchmark
and compared to the other columns where exactly the same specication is estimated, with
the di¤erence that the crisis dummy takes value 1 each time in a di¤erent year. All regressions
in Table 4.11 include the common set of controls specied at the bottom of the table, i.e.
rm FE, 2-digit industry time trends, time dummies and lagged rm level controls115.
Starting from the panel for innovation, it is evident that the relatively lower probability of
innovation estimated for rms in sectors characterized by higher LN relative to rms in sectors
characterized by lower LN is strictly peculiar to the nancial crisis of 2008-10. This specic
e¤ect is identied only over these years and can, therefore, be ascribed to the reduction in
external liquidity for innovation caused by the credit crunch that characterized the crisis.
The coe¢ cient for 2012 takes exactly the opposite sign and is strongly signicant, hinting at
a rebound in the probability of innovation in higher LN sectors estimated for the after-crisis
period. Before the nancial crisis instead, there appears to be no e¤ect at all.
Repeating this exercise for exporting shows similar results, although with less precision.
In 2008-10 I nd a higher probability to export in sectors characterized by higher LN, relative
to lower LN sectors. Both before and after the crisis, in 2008 and 2012, the e¤ect appears to be
the opposite: interestingly these coe¢ cients of opposite sign are matched by the corresponding
coe¢ cients for markups and innovation, which also take the opposite sign compared to column
1 (at least in 2012). It therefore is tempting to infer that around the crisis years the relation
between innovation, exporting and markups that I describe in this work could have applied
in both directions.
For exporting, 2004 shows a coe¢ cient which is similar to that in 2010, but I do not have
enough elements to explain what could have driven this result.
Inspecting the panel for the markups regressions in Table 4.11, besides the two years
surrounding the nancial crisis during which rmsprice-cost margin are estimated to have
fallen more in sectors characterized by higher LN, no other year shows a signicant e¤ect.
Table 4.12 shows a placebo test which is similar in spirit to that of Table 4.11. I attempt
to detect whether in o¤-crisis years there are e¤ects on innovation, exporting and markups
similar to those detected during the crisis. For Table 4.12 I ran a specication similar to
(65), (66) and (67), where the sectoral LN ratio is interacted not with the crisis dummy, but
115These latter ones di¤er slighly across the regression for innovation (capital intensity, employment, dummy
identifying rms in receipt of public funding for innovation), exporting (capital intensity and employment)
and markups (capital stock and employment).
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with all the other dummies identifying each time period in the data. This produces a setting
where every year can be considered a "shock", with respect to 2008-10 (which acts like an
excluded base category). In other words, Table 4.12 can be seen as a negative of the main
result in Tables 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5.
Table 4.12: Placebo test- 2
(1) (2) (3)
Innovation Exporting Markup
INNt 1 0.295***
(0.097)
EXPt 1 0.681***
(0.126)
LN * Crisis 2012 0.072*** 0.020 -0.015*
(0.026) (0.124) (0.008)
LN * Crisis 2008 0.009 -0.127 -0.056***
(0.028) (0.116) (0.015)
LN * Crisis 2006 0.100 -0.232 -0.086*
(0.066) (0.229) (0.045)
LN * Crisis 2004 0.125 -0.244 -0.038***
(0.083) (0.315) (0.013)
LN * Crisis 2002 0.107 -0.402 -0.006
(0.088) (0.448) (0.034)
LN * Crisis 2000 0.094 -0.026 -0.013
(0.066) (0.295) (0.071)
IF controls yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes
Ind. Trends yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes
Firm controls yes yes yes
N 7211 7211 6933
Hansen-J test (p) 0.273 0.143
AR(2) test (p) 0.028 0.009
AR(3) test (p) 0.995 0.220
N GMM Instr. 129 130
Note: Robust S.E. clustered at the sector level in parenthesis,
+ p<0.20, p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
From column (1) it is evident that in every time period, with respect to 2008-10, rms in
sectors characterized by higher LN saw a higher probability of innovating, relative to lower
LN sectors. The e¤ect is almost null for the period immediately before the crisis (LN* 2008
crisis), but rather large in years further away from the crisis, or immediately afterwards.
For exporting, in column (2), in all the o¤-crisis time periods there is a large and negative
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coe¢ cient (albeit not signicant), except for 2012. This suggests rms in higher LN sectors
could have experienced a lower probability of exporting, relative to the period covered by the
crisis. Finally, in the third column I estimate a lower markup for rms in higher LN sectors
relative to lower LN sectors in every period, with respect to the 2008-10 crisis.
Taken together, the results of Table 4.12 indeed appear as a negative image of the main
results presented in section 4.5, which, interpreted along with the estimates in Table 4.11,
conrm that the impacts on innovation, exporting and rmsmarkup under study in this
work can safely be considered an exclusive consequence of the nancial crisis of 2008-10.
4.8 Conclusion
This chapter addresses the impact of the 2008-10 nancial crisis on rmsinnovation, export-
ing and markups by analysing matched rm level balance-sheet and innovation survey data
for Slovenia.
This chapter is dedicated to testing empirically the main propositions of the theoretical
framework that constitutes the third chapter of this thesis. The main contribution consists
of the observation of the nexus between international trade and innovation from a new angle.
Product and process innovation have been found by the litearature to be associated with a
higher propensity to export. My works explores a particular setting, in which participation
in exporting could be facilited also by a negative shock that impedes rmsinnovation. A
reduction in external liquidity for innovation can, in fact, lead rms to drop projects or slow
down innovative activity, resulting in an overall lower innovation output. This can in turn
a¤ect positively rmsparticipation in the export market, if the shock to innovation reduces
the degree of competitive pressure and allows rms to charge higher markups that can be
exploited to sustain the costs associated with exporting.
The empirical analysis makes use of the nancial crisis of 2008-10 as a setting to test
these hypotheses and largely conrms them. In a di¤erence in di¤erence estimation procedure
inspired by the methodology of Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Raddaz (2006), I nd that
in sectors characterized by higher external liquidity needs for innovation expenditure rms
reported a lower probability of innovation in the crisis, relative to sectors characterized by
lower external liquidity needs. It is precisely in these sectors (the higher liquidity needs ones)
that I estimate an increase in rmsmarkups and in the probability of exporting, in relative
terms.
To conrm the proposition that the positive impact on exporting arising from the nancial
shock is mediated by the increase in rmsprice-cost margin, I disentangle the impact of
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the innovation shock from that of markups. I estimate time varying rm specic markups
by applying the recent methodology of De Loecker and Warzinsky (2012) and show that
conditioning on this variable in the main regressions reduces both size and signicance of the
e¤ect of the reduction in external liquidity for innovation on exporting.
An important set of results arises from estimating the impact of the reduction in nance
for innovation over quartiles of the rms size and productivity distributions. I nd that
the shock hit mostly rms in the middle range of the distributions, both for innovation and
exporting, thereby conrming another prediction of the theoretical model.
In conclusion, besides adding to the literatures on the nancing of innovation and on the
e¤ect of the 2008-10 crisis, this work sheds further light on the long-studied interdependence
between rm level innovation and exporting, suggesting that markups can act as a channel
in transmitting a shock to the former to the latter of these two activity performed by rms.
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5 Conclusion
The research in this thesis is dedicated to the study of the repercussions of the nancial crisis
of 2008-09 on various dymensions of rmsactivities.
I directed the focus of my analysis on the behaviour of those rms that constitute the
most productive fringe among the producers within an economy, traders and innovators.
The motivation is that the events of 2008-09 constituted a shock of historic proportions for
importers and exporters worldwide and for rms engaged in innovative activities. The nature
of the crisis, a nancial crisis of unprecedented depth since the Great Depression of 1930s,
spurred me to gather a deeper understanding of the strategies pursued by rms to cope with
the challenges raised by the imperfections of nancial markets.
The three main parts in which this thesis is divided, concentrate the attention on peculiar
aspects that characterized the response of rms to the crisis and aim to contribute the the
growing literatures triggered by this event.
In the Chapter 2 I explore the product dimension of the Trade Collapse exploiting
Slovenian custom and rm balance data, adding to the literature studying the dramatic
and sudden reduction in international trade (-30% between September 2008 and January
2009), particularly severe for exchanges among OECD economies. The main contribution of
this chapter consists of the identication of a new source of heterogeneity in the response of
trade ows to the shock. The share of imported intermediates in rmscosts was identied
as a catalyst of the trade collapse, because imports of higher cost-share (CS) inputs fell more
than proportionately compared to imports of lower cost-share inputs in the downturn, and
rebounded by more in the recovery. This larger responsiveness, in both sub-periods of the
event, suggests a deeper trough of the collapse for transactions involving higher CS inputs.
I advance a theoretical mechanism to explain this result: trade of higher CS products could
have been more sensitive to the demand collapse because of larger inventory adjustments. In
an inventory management model where rms minimize the cost of holding inventory, I show
how storage costs lead rms to order a lower quantity of higher CS items (and to re-order
them more frequently) and to then operate larger adjustments when demand is disrupted,
relative to lower CS products.
In this chapter I also examine the role of Intra-Firm trade during the crisis. On average,
shipment between a¢ liated rms (IF trade) did not perform di¤erently relative to shipments
between una¢ liated rms (AL trade). Despite this, IF trade could have acted as an acceler-
ating factor for transactions involving higher CS products. The lower degree of uncertainty
and the more rapid communication characterizing business relations between parties related
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by ownership rights, could lead to a more e¤ective management of inventory stocks both
in good and in bad times: the size of the inventory bu¤er is likely to be smaller, but the
reaction in case the stock needs to be downsized could be larger, in proportional terms (with
this responsiveness being even bigger for high CS products). This hypothesis could explain
the larger adjustment measured in both the downturn and the recovery for imports of higher
CS products when involving related parties, relative to AL trade. The reaction of IF trade
di¤ered from AL trade also with respect to trade margins: the share of intensive margin
relative to extensive margin adjustments was seen to be larger for IF trade, possibly due to
the ease of adjustment of o¤shoring (IF) relative to outsourcing (AL) agreements.
Chapter 3 and 4 are dedicated to the exploration of the impacts of the 2008-09 nancial
crisis on rmsinnovation activity and its indirect e¤ects on participation in exporting. The
main aim of these chapters is to explore the interconnection between innovation and exporting
from a novel perspective: a negative shock to innovation, which is symmetric across trading
partners, can induce anti-competitve e¤ects and, through these, facilitate entry into export-
ing. This is a new angle from which the nexus between trade and innovation is observed,
which adds to a literature that so far concentrated on the positive relation between these
two activities. To address this reserach question and to guide the empirical work of Chapter
4, in Chapter 3 I develop a monopolistically competitive heterogeneous rm model with en-
dogenous markups and liquidity constraints for innovation. The model allows me to isolate
the relation running from a reduction in innovative activity, as a consequence of a tightening
in external liquidity for innovation, to a relatively easier participation in exporting, working
through a reduction in the industry-wide degree of competitive pressure. Chapter 4 then
exploits the nancial crisis of 2008-09 as a setting to test the propositions of the theoretical
model.
In addition to the novelty of the reserach question which adds to the literatures on the
innovation-trade nexus and the impacts of the 2008 nancial crisis, Chapter 3 makes also
a theoretical contribution, consisting of the introduction of liquidity constraints into a het-
erogenous rms trade model with endogenous markups that studies jointly the decisions to
export and to innovate. The model is based on Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and adds costly
e¢ ciency-enhancing innovation on the supply side of the original framework. Liquidity con-
staints for innovation are modelled assuming that rms can borrow externally only a fraction
of the innovation cost, while they must pledge internal liquidity for the remaining fraction:
if the latter fraction is high enough, the equilibrium will feature a set of rms that would be
able to innovate in a world of perfect nancial markets, but are prevented from doing so. A
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rst result is that liquidity constraints produce anti-competitive e¤ects: in an industry where
potential innovators are liquidity constrained rms are, on average, less productive, charge
higher prices and higher markups relative to an industry with no liquidity constraints. Inte-
grating the domestic with the foreign economy through costly trade increases the "toughness"
of competition, as in the original Melitz-Ottaviano (2008) model: the least e¢ cient rms exit
(selection e¤ect) and the surviving producers feature higher average productivity, lower prices
and lower markups (pro-competitive e¤ect).
The model then shows that a tightening in liquidity constraints for innovative rms re-
inforces the anti-competitive e¤ects arising from innovation being below its optimal level.
Access to innovation becomes more selective, but, in turn, the reduction in the industry wide
degree of competition results in a more accessible threshold to enter the domestic and the
export market. This latter is also a consequence of the shock to innovation being symmetric
across the trading partners. The model also predicts that the negative impact on innovation
and the positive impact on exporting a¤ect rms in the middle range of the productivity
distribution.
These theoretical predictions are taken to the data and tested in the Chapter 4 of this
thesis, by analysing matched rm level balance-sheet and innovation survey data for Slovenia.
In this chapter I nd evidence in support of the proposition that participation in exporting
could be facilited by a negative shock that impedes rmsinnovation. In a di¤-in-di¤ estima-
tion strategy inspired by the methodology of Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Raddaz (2006), I
nd that in sectors characterized by higher external liquidity needs for innovation expenditure
rms reported a lower probability of innovation in the crisis, relative to sectors characterized
by lower external liquidity needs. It is precisely in these sectors (the higher liquidity needs
ones) that I estimate an increase in rmsmarkups, conrming the anti-competitive e¤ects
of the shock to innovation, and in the probability of exporting, in relative terms.
I estimate time varying rm specic markups by applying the recent methodology of
De Loecker and Warzinsky (2012) and furthermore show that conditioning on this variable
attenuates the e¤ect of the reduction in external liquidity for innovation on exporting, thereby
providing support to the rationale that the relatively better export perfomance induced by
the innovation shock was mediated by the reduction in product market competition.
Lastly, I show that the shock hit mostly rms in the middle range of the rmssize and
producitivity distributions, both for innovation and exporting, thereby conrming another
prediction of the theoretical model.
In conclusion, my thesis shows that there might subtantial perverse e¤ects arising from
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imperfections in nancial markets. Events like the crisis of 2008-2009, suddently hitting deli-
cate and inherently risky activities such as international trade and investment in innovation,
can result in losses in competition and average productivity (Chapters 3 and 4) or severely
disrupt operations of rms, inducing them to resort to specic strategies to cope with shock
(e.g. adjusting imports of higher CS inputs by more than imports of lower CS inputs, possibly
becasue of di¤erential inventory adjustments - Chapter 2). I have also attemped to shed light
on the long-studied interdependence between rm level innovation and exporting, showing
how markups can act as a channel in transmitting a shock to the former to the latter of these
two activity performed by rms.
The research in these areas is far from complete, but even by narrowing down the focus
of the study on the peculiar issues that I considered in this thesis, there is considerable space
(and scope) for further work to be undertaken.
Concerning Chapter 2, a deeper sectoral characterization of the unequal trade adjustment
across products that I estimate, appears an obvious extension of my ndings, also in light of
the di¤erential involvement in global value chains across rms. Unfortunately, lack of inven-
tory data at the product level impedes a direct test of the inventory adjustment hypothesis
that I raise in Chapter 2, but the result that product cost-share appears as the relevant mar-
gin of intervention by rms when attempting to downsize activity and trade in a recessionary
environment calls for a deeper investigation on the causes of this behaviour.
In Chapter 3 I propose a simple model to explore how a shock to innovation can indirectly
stimulate entry into exporting, and cast the analysis in a two-country world with symmetrical
economies experiencing the same shock. An immediate extension of this approach would be to
explore the e¤ect of an asymmetric shock to liquidity for innovation, examining how the loss
of innovative output in one country a¤ects international trade between the two economies.
Additionally, also relaxing the symmetric countries assumption could potentially lead to
di¤erent results, depending on which economy experiences the shock to innovation. It is
to be considered, however, that even in the simpler framework that I propose in Chapter
3, numerical simulation was necessary to derive the equilibrium condition: increasing the
complexity of the model further, might lead to an even less tractable structure.
With respect to the empirical application of the models prediction, the crisis of 2008-09
lent itself as a "laboratory" for the analysis I perfomed in Chapter 4, and it does not appear
easy to imagine an alternative setting in which to explore the outcomes of a sudden, exogenous
shock to innovation. A change in scal regimes applying to innovators, or, possibly, a sudden
event a¤ecting the industrys labour market skill pool, could work as external sources of
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variation to be explored in a setting where innovation and exporting are studied jointly. In
particular this latter scenario attracts my interests for future research: the inteplay between
international trade and innovation could be altered by an exogenous shock a¤ecting the
labour market rms operate in, and eventually shed light on the challenges represented by
an imperfect overalap of goods and labour market integrations.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Appendix to Chapter 2
6.1.1 A simple model of inventory management
Drawing on the seminal contribution of Arrow et al. (1951) and the extensive work of Hadley and
Whitin (1963) I present a simple framework to demonstrate Hypothesis 1, namely that trade of higher
cost-share inputs responds to a fall in demand more than trade of lower cost-share inputs. I exploit the
simplest version possible of the so called "lot size-reorder point" model, or (S, s) model, abstracting
from uncertainty in the demand pattern for simplicity of exposition.
The aim of the (S, s) model is to derive the optimal quantity S of inventory to order and the
optimal reorder point r at which to place the order, given a rate of demand  and a procurement
lead time  . The reorder point denes the safety stock s, which consists of the amount of inventory
on hand when the procurement arrives. Here it is assumed that  and  are constant over time and
deterministic: this makes clear that the same quantity is ordered each time an order is placed, and
that the safety stock always has the same value116 . The optimal values Sand rminimise the average
annual cost function, which includes the cost of the units purchased, the cost of placing an order, the
cost of sourcing and handling inventories and the cost of carrying inventories.
Ordering costs are represented by a xed cost A, independent of the order size; whereas the cost
of the units purchased is represented by a constant marginal cost c. Sourcing and handling costs can
instead be conceived to be rising in the quantity purchased117 , and in the simplest formulation, to be
rising in a linear way, i.e. !S2, such that at the margin this corresponds to 2!S: With a constant
rate of demand  the quantity ordered S is going to be depleted in time T = S=: this is the length
of a cycle. The inverse of this ratio represents the average number of cycles, i.e. /S. Hence ordering
and purchasing costs are (A+ cS+!S2)=S = A=S+ c+!S: Furthermore, since the unit cost
c is assumed to be independent of the quantity ordered, the reordering rule need not to include the
variable cost term c: the expression for ordering and purchasing costs becomes A (=S) + !S.
Carrying cost are modelled as a constant instantaneous rate 0 < I < 1, proportional to the value of
the goods stored and to the length of time the goods remain in inventory. Per cycle, inventory carrying
costs therefore are: Ic
R T
0 (S + s  t) dt = Ic
h
(S + s)T   T 22
i
= IcT [(S=2) + s]. Multiplying
this by the average number of cycles gives Ic [(S=2) + s]. Lastly, in this simplied version of the (S,
s) model with deterministic demand and procurement time, a rm can minimise its carrying cost by
having s = 0, so that the system just runs out when a new procurement arrives.
The average variable cost is then:
C = A

S
+ !S + Ic

S
2

(77)
116The assumption of determinisic and constant demand also rules out the risk for the rm to stock out.
This assumption might not appear realistic, but, as mentioned, adding demand uncertainty into the model
introduces a layer of complexity which is unnecessary for the purposes of this section.
117This marginal cost that I refer to as "sourcing and handling cost" can in reality proxy a variety of
factors that make the cost of holding inventories rise with the quantity stored. An example could be rising
transportation costs, if the distance from suppliers increases when sourcing additional items from alternative
locations that are further away. Alternatively, there can be rising labour costs, related to the operations
of receiving, inspecting and handling a larger quantity of items. Also storage costs could be convex in the
quantity stored (Chazai et al. 2008). Finally and more generally, this rising cost could capture a higher degree
of complexity in coordinating the management of an increasing quantity of items stored.
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Minimisation of (77) allows to obtain the optimal quantity to order, S:
S =
r
2A
Ic+ 2!
(78)
Equation (78) is a popular expression in the literature, under the name of lot-size formula, or
economic order formula, or Wilson formula.
The optimal reorder point r is derived following again Hadley and Whitin (1963). If m is the
largest integer less than or equal to =T , then, an order is placed when the on-hand inventory reaches
r = (  mT ) =   mS; (79)
such that the on-hand inventory is zero at the time the order arrives.
When an optimal policy is used, the average amount of inventory in the system will be:
S =
S
2
=
s
A
2 (cI + 2!)
(80)
It follows directly from equation (80) that the average inventory increases with the square root of
the sales rate , and not proportionately with it. Similarly, the average inventory varies inversely as
the square root of the marginal cost c, so that the average inventory for high cost products should be
lower than for low cost products.
To verify Hypothesis 1 I compute the proportional rate of change of the value of the items in
inventory with respect to a change in demand (which is the theoretical counterpart of the mid-point
growth rate exploited in estimation),
@( Sc)=@
Sc ; and show how this changes with respect to the cost-
share.
Notice, however, that the cost-share does not appear directly in (80): the cost-share measures
the value of the imported item in total costs, whereas (80) relates the average quantity stored with
the unit-cost. A higher unit-cost determines a smaller quantity to be ordered, but it can be shown
that a higher unit-cost always corresponds to a higher value of the stock, hence to a higher cost-
share. Intuitively, this is because the negative e¤ect of the unit-cost on the quantity is less than
proportional. Consider two inputs h and l, where h denotes a high unit-cost intermediate and l
denotes a low unit-cost intermediate, such that ch > cl. Although S

h <
Sl ;the higher cost input
corresponds to a higher value, such that Shch > S

l cl, which in turn implies a higher cost-share
Shch=
 
Shch + S

l cl

> Sl cl=
 
Shch + S

l cl

. To see this consider that:
@
 
Sc

@c
=
(cI + 4!) (A)1=2
21=2 (cI + 2!)3=2
> 0; (81)
which implies Shch > S

l cl , since ch > cl. Alternatively, consider that the elasticity of S with
respect to c is less than unity: "S;c =   12(1+ 2dwcI ) :
Finally, to demonstrate hypothesis 1, observe that
@( Sc)=@
Sc is increasing in the unit cost c and
hence in the cost share, since:
@
 
Sc

=@
Sc
=
1
2(1 + 2!cI )
and
@
@c
 
1
2(1 + 2!cI )
!
=
!I
(cI + 2!)2
> 0: (82)
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Hypothesis 1 is indeed conrmed by this simple version of the (S, s) model, since inventory
adjustments can be shown to lead to changes in import ows. A larger responsiveness of higher cost-
share intermediates accelerates the reaction of imports during a crisis, conferring to the cost-share a
role of catalyst of the collapse.
6.1.2 Margin decomposition
I decompose mid-point growth rates, rather than standard growth rates, to correct for attrition bias.
Because of the way this variable is computed, each elementary monthly growth rate (gickt), which is
the monthly year on year growth rate of the shipment of each CN-8 digit product k, performed by
a rm i, to a certain destination c, in month t, will take a value between -2 and +2. This allows
to classify elementary growth rates into four types: increased (0 < gickt < +2) and decreased
( 2 < gickt < 0) ows, corresponding to the variation in the value of the shipment of the same
product by the same rm to the same destination with respect to the same month of the previous
year; and created (gickt = +2) and destroyed (gickt =  2) transactions. These latter ones can
correspond to new or destroyed shipments of a product to an already served destination by the same
rm (product margin), to an added or dropped destination by a continuing rm (destination margin)
or to a rm entering or exiting the export market (rm margin). This method allows to precisely
measure the contribution of each margin to the total variation of trade, as the sum of the margins
provides a correct approximation of the observed aggregate growth rate (Bricongne et al. 2012). It
should be noticed that such a ne level of disaggregation and frequency of observation inates the
contribution of the extensive margin compared to when more aggregate data are used. The intensive
margin is in fact only due to continued shipments of the same product to the same destination by a
continuing rm, year after year.
To perform the decomposition, each single ow is weighted by its share in total Slovenian shipments
during the same period:
sickt=
xickt + xick(t 12)P
c
P
i
P
k
xickt +
P
c
P
i
P
k
xick(t 12)
(83)
The year on year growth rate of the total value of Slovenian exports is then obtained by summing
each ow gickt weighted by sickt across all exporters, products and destinations.
Gt=
X
c
X
i
X
k
gicktsickt (84)
This aggregation can be made by subsets of the total growth rate, and this is how the decompo-
sition is performed. Once it is identied whether, say, a destroyed ow is due to rm, destination or
product exit, simply adding up the corresponding weighted growth rates yields a certain margin. In
this way for each month I identied the intensive margin and the three extensive margins, separating
these then further for intra-rm and arms length transactions. The net margins are given by the sum
of the positive and negative contributions.
6.1.3 Drawback of the related party trade proxy.
The strength of this exercise rests also on the identication of intra-rm trade, which however su¤ers
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from some imperfection in its measurement: my strategy is to label shipments as intra-rm when
originating from rms belonging to a group and directed to a country where there is a rm belonging
to the same business group. This causes some arms length transaction to be labelled as intra-rm: it
happens when, for shipments to a certain destination, a rm belonging to a group ships goods to rms
outside the group, opting for a mixed strategy of arms length and intra-rm in that destination. This
would somewhat inate the related party trade proxy, causing the estimates to be biased towards zero:
unfortunately the lack of data about intra-rm trade does not allow to x this issue in my context.
As a partial validation of this related-party trade variable I can compare the share of intra-
rm trade I measure to gures emerging from other works. In 1999 l Enquete sur les exchange
intra-group, a French survey of rms representing 61% of French exports, estimated that 32% of
transactions (not volumes) were among related parties: in Slovenia I measure this to be about 38%.
As a further cross country reference, I estimate about 49% of the value of exports in 2007 to be intra
rm: this value is extremely close to Altomonte et al.s estimate of 48% for French exports (obtained
using my same related party trade proxy) and, importantly, it is close to the 46.8% measured for
US exports (Census Bureau data). Lastly, the most direct validation is possible when considering
bilateral trade between Slovenia and the US: Lanz and Miroudot (2011), according to the Related
Party database by US Census Bureau, measure 51.3% of imports from Slovenia to be intra-rm, while
with my approximation I obtain a gure of about 52.6%.
Given these relatively reassuring similarities between the share of intra-rm trade estimated with
the related party trade proxy used in this paper and the quoted gures exploiting the actual measure-
ment by US custom authorities, I feel rather condent is relying on my approximation.
6.1.4 Orbis data for 2011 only
The full ownership data, including links up the 10th level of subsidiarity, was extracted from ORBIS as
for 2011: for the crisis years, 2008 and 2009, it was only possible to obtain the status of the ownership
network for the 1st level of subsidiarity. Furthermore, the coverage of rms in ORBIS for Slovenia
increased substantially from 2008 to 2011: a large number of rms and groups especially of smaller
size were absent in 2008, and were added over time. This imposed a choice between two pictures
of the status of ownership links to use in this work: the 2011 data export allows to obtain a great deal
more description about rmsa¢ liation (10 levels of subsidiarity instead of 1) with over 10 times the
number of rms about which ownership information is available.
Importantly, this large di¤erence in the number of rms is also due to the increase in coverage.
However, this richness of ownership data and the increase in coverage come at the cost of assuming
that the 2011 picture is accurate enough to represent the situation in 2008-09. The 2008-09 data
extract o¤ers in fact a more up-to-date image of ownership links: despite this, the signicantly lower
representation of smaller groups and the absence of information about links beyond the 1st level made
me opt for the 2011 extract.
6.1.5 Geographical disaggregation of Slovenian trade.
In terms of the geographical disaggregation of Slovenian trade, this country nds itself in between
of some of bigger EU countries on one side (Germany, Italy and Austria) and the block of former
Yugoslavian and eastern-European economies on the other one. This geographical divide is mirrored
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by the composition of the trade ows departing from Slovenia. The majority of transactions are with
countries of the former Yugoslavian republic (over 40% of the exports are directed to Croatia, Bosnia
and Serbia), but taking into account the value of shipments completely overturns this ranking, with
the three biggest Euro-zone economies (Germany, Italy and France) absorbing about 40% of the value
of Slovenian exports. Table 2.16 provides an overview of the 10 top served destinations.
Table 2.16: Geographical decomposition of Slovenian exports
Destination Shipments % Destination Shipments % Destination Shipments %
Number of Shipments, in %.
All Flows Intra-Firm Arms Length
Croatia 19.29 Croatia 6.2 Croatia 13.09
Bosnia 12.41 Bosnia 3.85 Serbia 10.00
Serbia 10.00 Germany 2.41 Bosnia 8.55
Germany 6.49 Austria 1.79 Germany 4.09
Austria 5.11 Italy 1.25 Italy 3.35
Italy 4.60 Macedonia 0.96 Austria 3.32
Macedonia 3.60 Czeck Republic 0.68 Macedonia 2.63
Montenegro 2.94 France 0.59 Montenegro 2.43
Hungary 2.06 Hungary 0.59 Kosovo 1.89
Kosovo 1.89 Poland 0.56 Hungary 1.47
Value of shipments: shares in %.
All Flows Intra-Firm Arms Length
Germany 19.81 Germany 10.24 Germany 9.57
Italy 11.2 France 7.14 Italy 6.01
France 8.68 Italy 5.19 Austria 4.66
Croatia 8.25 Croatia 4.27 Croatia 3.97
Austria 7 Russia 2.9 Serbia 3.36
Russia 3.72 Austria 2.34 Bosnia 1.99
Serbia 3.36 Poland 1.99 France 1.54
Bosnia 3.35 Great Britain 1.43 Hungary 1.34
Poland 2.99 Bosnia 1.36 Great Britain 1
Great Britain 2.44 Czeck Republic 1.31 Poland 1
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6.1.6 A rm level cost-share measure
The results presented in Tables 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 explore the unequal trade adjustment of products
accounting for a di¤ent share of rmscosts (or rmssales), where the CS measure is specic for each
CN-8 product in each NACE (4-digit) sector.
In order to explore the CS heterogeneity further, an attempt has also been made to compute the
CS measure at an even ner level of disaggregation, making the CS ratio product-rm specic. The
CS variables (6) and (7) therefore become:
CS
costs-rm
ki =
1
Y
2007P
y=2000
 P12
t=1 imkic;t
Ciy
!
; CS
sa les-rm
ki =
1
Y
2007P
y=2000
 P12
t=1 imkic;t
Siy
!
(85)
Table 2.14 shows the results from estimating specication (8) and (9) exploting the rm level CS
measures.
Table 2.14: The Cost-Share as a Catalyst of the Collapse - Firm level measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mid-Point Growth Rates Standard Growth Rates (Log-change)
PANEL A: CS costs-rm
CS -0.026* -0.043*** -0.040* -0.055*** -0.024 -0.046*** -0.046 -0.070***
(0.015) (0.013) (0.022) (0.017) (0.019) (0.012) (0.030) (0.020)
Int 0.046*** 0.053*** 0.019*** 0.023***
(0.005) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008)
Int*CS -0.026 0.025 -0.031 0.041
(0.015) (0.031) (0.021) (0.039)
CS*Rec 0.033 0.031 0.055 -0.120***
(0.021) (0.026) (0.039) (0.036)
Int*Rec -0.019*** -0.010
(0.007) (0.009)
Int*CS*Rec -0.001 -0.088*
(0.039) (0.049)
FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 4711097 4711097 4711097 4711097 1680951 1680951 1680951 1680951
PANEL B: CS sales-rm
CS -0.012 -0.011 -0.018 -0.010 -0.072** -0.050 -0.091** -0.056
(0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.071) (0.028) (0.040) (0.040) (0.047)
Int 0.046*** 0.053*** 0.019*** 0.025***
(0.005) (0.011) (0.006) (0.008)
Int*CS -0.001 -0.021** -0.040 -0.069
(0.003) (0.010) (0.049) (0.067)
CS*Rec 0.015** -0.003 0.011** 0.072
(0.007) (0.021) (0.004) (0.070)
Int*Rec -0.019*** -0.013
(0.007) (0.090)
Int*CS*Rec 0.034 0.071
(0.034) (0.090)
FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 4707816 4707816 4707816 4707816 1784484 1784484 1784484 1784484
Note: Standard errors clustered at the rm level in parentheses; p < 0.15, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The results support the main nding of this work: even when the CS is computed at the rm-
product level it appears that imports of products accounting for a larger CS underwent a larger fall
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in the downturn and a larger rebound in the recovery. This is shown for both the CS sales-rm and
the CS costs-rm measures in columns (3) and (7). A noticeable di¤erence compared to the results
exploiting the product-industry CS measures (Table 1.4 and 1.5), is that in Table 14 the accelerating
impact of the CS appears to be driven by non-intermediate goods rather than intermediates.
This however does not exlcude that also for intermediates a higher CS (measured at the rm
level) implied an accelerated reaction during the trade collapse. Table 2.15 shows the results from
reestimating the specications in Table 2.14 on the subsample of intermediates. The sign pattern in
columns (2) and (4) is consistent with the hypothesis that higher CS intermediates underwent a larger
adjustment, even though results are statistically signicant at the conventional levels only for the CS
measure in terms of rmssales (Panel B)118 .
Table 2.15: The CS as a Catalyst - Firm level measures- Intermediates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mid-Point Growth Rates Standard Growth Rates
PANEL A: CS costs-rm
CS -0.017 -0.033 -0.013 -0.025
(0.014) (0.026) (0.018) (0.034)
CS*Rec 0.037 0.025
(0.029) (0.035)
FEs yes yes yes yes
N 2478335 2478335 888694 888694
PANEL B: CS sales-rm
CS -0.012 -0.033* -0.079*** -0.120**
(0.008) (0.017) (0.026) (0.048)
CS*Rec 0.033* 0.132**
(0.017) (0.054)
FEs yes yes yes yes
N 2477753 2477753 888607 888607
Note: Standard errors clustered at the rm level in parentheses;
p < 0.15, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
118For the sake of brevity I omitted the tables showing the results for the quantity and the unit values
of imports. These results are in line with what found in the other sections of this paper, and namely that
quantity adjustments show very similar coe¢ cients to value adjusments, and with unit-values being mostly
insignicant.
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6.1.7 Additional Tables the Chapter 2
Table 2.6B: The Cost-Share as a Catalyst - CSsales:Only 06-07 for CS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mid-Point Growth Rates Standard Growth Rates (Log-change)
PANEL A: Imports - values
CS -0.004 -0.003 -0.011 -0.006 -0.023* -0.018 -0.045* -0.030
(0.005) (0.004) (0.073) (0.006) (0.013) (0.014) (0.026) (0.022)
Int 0.033*** 0.043*** 0.009** 0.014**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006)
Int*CS -0.004 -0.022 -0.014 -0.046
(0.011) (0.019) (0.025) (0.041)
CS*Rec 0.012 0.004 0.049 0.025
(0.008) (0.007) (0.034) (0.021)
Int*Rec -0.025*** -0.013
(0.007) (0.009)
Int*CS*Rec 0.040* 0.072
(0.023) (0.048)
PANEL B: Imports - quantity
CS -0.005 -0.004 -0.009 -0.006 -0.019* -0.013 -0.039* -0.022
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.020) (0.018)
Int. 0.031*** 0.039*** 0.001 0.004
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Int*CS -0.001 -0.014 -0.017 -0.049
(0.011) (0.018) (0.021) (0.042)
CS*Rec 0.008 -0.003 0.043 0.025
(0.008) (0.037) (0.026) (0.021)
Int*Rec -0.024*** -0.013
(0.007) (0.009)
Int*CS*Rec 0.032 0.072
(0.022) (0.048)
FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 5269440 5269440 5269440 5269440 1739618 1739618 1739618 1739618
Note: Standard errors clustered at the rm level in parentheses;
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.7B: Firm a¢ liation and cost-share - CSsales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mid-Point Growth Rate Standard Growth Rate
PANEL A: Imports - values
IF -0.012 -0.007 0.008 0.010 -0.013 -0.007 -0.007 -0.016
(0.022) (0.024) (0.029) (0.030) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.016)
CS -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.004** -0.003* -0.004 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
IF*CS 0.007 0.008 -0.056 -0.014 -0.058 -0.051 -0.207** -0.075
(0.006) (0.017) (0.072) (0.060) (0.052) (0.054) (0.103) (0.073)
Int 0.029*** 0.035*** 0.008** 0.009
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
Int*IF -0.011 -0.007 -0.013 0.015
(0.018) (0.024) (0.010) (0.015)
Int*CS -0.015 -0.064** -0.081** -0.160***
(0.015) (0.025) (0.019) (0.043)
Int*CS*IF 0.012 -0.072 0.057 -0.206
(0.059) (0.079) (0.086) (0.161)
IF*Rec -0.048 -0.042 -0.016 0.025
(0.033) (0.036) (0.021) (0.024)
CS*Rec 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.008)
IF*CS*Rec 0.076 0.025 0.443** 0.088
(0.070) (0.053) (0.172) (0.115)
Int*Rec -0.015* -0.001
(0.008) (0.010)
Int*IF*Rec -0.011 -0.069***
(0.025) (0.022)
Int*CS*Rec 0.096*** 0.265***
(0.045) (0.070)
Int*CS*IF*Rec 0.206** 0.511**
(0.101) (0.250)
FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 5388408 5388408 5388408 5388408 1753520 1753520 1753520 1753520
Note: Standard errors clustered at the rm level in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.8B: Intra-rm versus arms length trade. Quantity and Unit-Values.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mid-Point Growth Rate Standard Growth Rate
PANEL A: Import Quantities
IF -0.003 -0.005 0.018 0.024 -0.000 0.008 0.001 -0.003
(0.022) (0.0234) (0.029) (0.030) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017)
Int 0.020*** 0.017*** 0.001 -0.004
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
IF*Int -0.018 -0.013 -0.017 0.007
(0.018) (0.023) (0.012) (0.015)
IF*Rec -0.053 -0.048 -0.004 0.030
(0.034) (0.035) (0.021) (0.024)
Int* Rec 0.005 0.010
(0.008) (0.011)
IF*Int*Rec -0.011 -0.062***
(0.022) (0.022)
PANEL B: Imports - Unit Values
IF -0.008 -0.003 0.011 0.016 -0.014** -0.017* -0.013 -0.017*
(0.021) (0.022) (0.028) (0.029) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010)
Int 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.007** 0.009*
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
IF*Int -0.012 -0.011 0.006 0.006
(0.015) (0.022) (0.008) (0.009)
IF*Rec -0.049 -0.047 -0.000 0.000
(0.033) (0.035) (0.012) (0.013)
Int*Rec -0.001 -0.003
(0.008) (0.006)
IF*Int*Rec -0.004 -0.001
(0.025) (0.014)
FEs. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 5672551 5672551 5672551 5672551 1784484 1784484 1784484 1784484
Note: Standard errors clustered at the rm level; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.10B: Frequency of shipments - Inventory adjustment. Firm a¢ liation and CS sales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mid-Point Growth Rate Standard Growth Rate
IF 0.024 0.006 0.011 0.011 -0.001 0.004 0.001 0.002
(0.058) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.005) (0.006) (0.001) (0.007)
CS -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
IF*CS -0.003 0.003 -0.045 0.003 -0.056* -0.029 -0.087 -0.049
(0.015) (0.011) (0.035) (0.025) (0.032) (0.022) (0.058) (0.039)
Int 0.023*** 0.031*** 0.009* 0.008**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Int*IF 0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003
(0.009) (0.011) (0.005) (0.006)
Int*CS 0.002 -0.050* -0.049 -0.057*
(0.015) (0.026) (0.030) (0.031)
Int*CS*IF -0.054 -0.103 -0.051 -0.102***
(0.037) (0.065) (0.047) (0.049)
IF*Rec -0.022 -0.026 -0.005 -0.004
(0.016) (0.020) (0.088) (0.011)
CS*Rec 0.001 -0.000 0.004** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
IF*CS*Rec 0.049 -0.001 0.066 0.046
(0.031) (0.026) (0.058) (0.047)
Int*Rec -0.021*** -0.004
(0.006) (0.005)
Int*IF*Rec 0.009 -0.001
(0.015) (0.009)
Int*CS*Rec 0.111*** 0.016
(0.042) (0.012)
Int*CS*IF*Rec 0.103 0.085*
(0.087) (0.046)
FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 5309737 5309737 5309737 5309737 837032 837032 837032 837032
Note: Standard errors clustered at the rm level in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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6.2 Appendix to Chapter 3
6.2.1 Solutions to the Free Entry Conditions
Here I provide the solutions to the integration of the expressions for expected prots for the
closed and the open economy.
Free Entry Condition in the Closed Economy - (34)
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Free Entry Condition in the Open Economy - (54)
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The solutions to (34) and (54) presented here need then to be solved for cD. This last
step was peformed with the help of Scientic Workplace: unfortunately the solutions are too
lenghty for me to be able to include them in this thesis. Numerical simulations were therefore
performed to obtain the results exposed in Chapter 3.
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Figure 3.6: Closed economy FEC as a function of delta.
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Figure 3.7: Open Economy FEC as a function of delta.
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Figure 3.8: Closed economy ~c as a function of delta.
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Figure 3.9: Open Economy ~c as a function of delta.
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6.2.2 Reverse ranking
As mentioned in section 2:3:4 of Part II, the model in this chapter can accommodate both
the ranking of producers that I assumed and the reverse ranking assumed by Bustos (2011).
In other words, it makes no qualitative di¤erence for the main predictions of my framework,
whether selection into innovation happens at a lower productivity level relative to the decision
to enter exporting, or viceversa.
However, some of the conditions derived in chapter 2 would change. If the innovation de-
cision concerns rms that have already selected themselves into exporting at a lower produc-
tivity level, the industry would be populated by domestic producers, exporters non-innovators
and innovators-exporters. This implies that conditions (42), stating that cD > cI > cX > ~c
would have to be re-written as:
cD > cX > cI > ~c (86)
Condition (86) implies that the open economy version of my model would have to change
to accommodate the fact that now there are going to be two types of exporters: non-innovators
and innovators. Optimal prots would become:
(ci)
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L
4
(cD   ci)2 + L
f
4
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)2 (87)
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f
4
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 + !)2   fI (88)
(87) is identical to the expression for exporters prot in the original Melitz-Ottaviano
(2008) model, whereas prots for innovators-exporters remain unchanged with respect to
those derived in Section 3.
Reversing the cuto¤ ranking also implies that there will no innovator among domestic
producers, or else, that all innovators are also exporters. All this requires deriving new
expressions for the exporting and the innovation cuto¤s:
(ci)
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D;NI = (ci)

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1

(cD) (89)
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
(90)
The exporting cuto¤ crevX becomes identical to the Melitz-Ottaviano threshold to access
exporting, since now innovation is only selective at the top of the productivity distribution.
The liquidity constraint cuto¤ ~c remains the same an in Section 3, since this depends
on the prot functions relative to the 1st period over which the model works (which remain
unchanged).
~crev = cD   2
r
fI

L
(91)
After having derived the cuto¤s for the case where the marginal exporter is less productive
than the marginal innovator, I need to re-state the conditions that ensure that the reverse
cuto¤ ranking (86) holds.
Exporting is going to be selective as long as  > 1; hence this is enough for cD > cX :
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For the threshold to access exporting to be higher than the thereshold to access innovation
(and assuming the liquidity constraint is binding, i.e. cI > ~c), the following condition needs
to hold:
crevX > ~c
rev iff fI >
L
42
[cD(1  )]2 (92)
Condition (92) is similar to (51) in chapter 2, but of course the inequality is reversed.
Finally, for the liquidity constraint to be binding and the industry to have some mrs
that successfully export but did not generate enough liquidity in the rst period for them to
be able to also access innovation, the following condition needs to hold:
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With the expressions for the exporting and the liquidity constraint at hand, and assuming
conditions (92) and (93) are both satised, expected prots can be written as:
Z ~c
1
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
D;NI;t1dG(c) +
Z cX
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+
Z cD
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
NI;t1dG(c) (94)
Setting (94) equal to sunk entry cost fE denes the Free Entry Condition in the open
economy with the reverse cuto¤ ranking. This can nally be solved for the entry threshold cD;
which summarises the toughness of the competitive environment and all the other conditions
that derive from that.
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6.3 Appendix to Chapter 4
Table 4.6B: Disentangling the reduction in nancing and the competition e¤ects - Instrumenting Markup
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Innovation Exporting
Boot. SE Boot. SE
INNt 1 0.430*** 0.310*** 0.383** 0.284*** 0.310*
(0.165) (0.114) (0.151) (0.107) (0.177)
EXPt 1 0.248 0.283 0.374** 0.570** 0.283
(0.236) (0.234) (0.174) (0.236) (0.239)
LN*Crisis -0.059*** -0.058*** -0.062*** -0.061*** -0.058** 0.038+ 0.037+ 0.031 0.029 0.037
(0.019) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019) (0.027) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.034) (0.030)
Markup III 0.028 0.027 0.027 0.021 0.021 0.021
(0.025) (0.029) (0.031) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020)
Ln(Markup III) 0.096 0.065 0.228 0.367
(0.081) (0.055) (0.288) (0.313)
Cash-Flow 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.002 0.018 0.002
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.002) (0.028) (0.004)
Cash-Flowt 1 0.447* 0.454* 0.447 -0.165** -0.559 -0.165
(0.244) (0.241) (0.305) (0.075) (0.456) (0.107)
MCash-Stock -0.00042** -0.00045** -0.00042** -0.00002 0.00001 -0.00002
(0.00017) (0.00017) (0.00019) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002)
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Ind. Trends. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 7009 6984 6933 6908 6984 7010 6985 6967 6942 6984
Hansen-J test (p) 0.542 0.855 0.613 0.853 0.711 0.832 0.822 0.931
AR(2) test (p) 0.027 0.023 0.032 0.031 0.295 0.182 0.018 0.110
AR(3) test (p) 0.697 0.747 0.691 0.733 0.633 0.429 0.918 0.526
N GMM Instr. 100 132 99 131 132 102 134 101 133 134
Note: Robust S.E. clustered at the sector level in parenthesis, + p<0.20, p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 4.7B: Further hypothesis - Impact on Innovation and Exporting - Instrumenting Markup
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Innovation Exporting
Adding Instrumented Markup Adding Instrumented Markup
INNt 1 0.311*** 0.330*** 0.187** 0.165** 0.010 0.176 0.031 0.215*
(0.083) (0.073) (0.091) (0.083) (0.022) (0.271) (0.019) (0.130)
LN*Crisis -0.037* -0.044** -0.027 -0.028+ 0.038+ 0.052* 0.043 0.079*
(0.022) (0.022) (0.027) (0.019) (0.028) (0.030) (0.038) (0.036)
EXPt 1 0.289*** 0.301** 0.257* 0.259** 0.278 0.498** 0.592*** 0.581***
(0.132) (0.125) (0.133) (0.132) (0.235) (0.237) (0.203) (0.179)
R&Dt 2 0.279*** 0.287** 0.877 0.079
(0.138) (0.136) (1.090) (0.822)
Markup III 0.015 0.013 0.012 0.038
(0.020) (0.018) (0.010) (0.031)
Ln(Markup III) 0.061 0.137 0.169 0.091
(0.065) (0.087) (0.161) (0.101)
Cash-Flow 0.011+ 0.012 0.016** 0.002 0.002 -0.013 -0.001 -0.000
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.015) (0.002) (0.004)
Cash-Flowt 1 0.415 0.556** 0.503* -0.025+ -0.171** -0.089 -0.107 -0.090
(0.256) (0.023) (0.258) (0.018) (0.074) (0.083) (0.135) (0.113)
MCash-Stock -0.00044*** -0.00047*** -0.00054*** -0.00081** -0.00016 -0.00001 -0.00002 0.000001
(0.00014) (0.00015) (0.00014) (0.00035) (0.00002) (0.000016) (0.000018) (0.00002)
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Ind. Trends yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 6984 6908 3600 3563 6985 6974 3600 3596
Hansen-J test (p) 0.492 0.457 0.776 0.756 0.413 0.497 0.522 0.537
AR(2) test (p) 0.006 0.004 0.042 0.005 0.191 0.036 0.145 0.120
AR(3) test (p) 0.681 0.667 0.501 0.474 0.425 0.254 0.292 0.289
N GMM Instr. 145 144 136 136 143 142 137 137
Note: Robust S.E. clustered at the sector level in parenthesis, + p<0.20, p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 4.9B: E¤ects by Quartile of the Distribution - Innovation and Exporting - Intrumented Markup
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Innovation Exporting
Bustos ACF-r LP-r ACF-a LP-a Bustos ACF-r LP-r ACF-a LP-a
INNt 1 0.161** 0.282*** 0.285** 0.352*** 0.377***
(0.079) (0.094) (0.074) (0.101) (0.123)
EXPt 1 0.237** 0.549*** 0.447** 0.541*** 0.442***
(0.115) (0.135) (0.184) (0.162) (0.101)
LN*Crisis* 1st Q -0.039 -0.014 -0.052*** -0.021 -0.035 0.056 0.000 0.051+ -0.003 0.026
(0.044) (0.033) (0.014) (0.013) (0.022) (0.054) (0.018) (0.035) (0.019) (0.030)
LN*Crisis* 2nd Q -0.164*** -0.023 -0.104** -0.124* -0.199* 0.005 0.087 0.055 0.005 0.078
(0.038) (0.030) (0.043) (0.070) (0.112) (0.037) (0.057) (0.073) (0.039) (0.098)
LN*Crisis* 3rd Q -0.036 -0.135*** -0.002 -0.009 0.042 0.105* 0.075 0.014 0.055 0.039
(0.035) (0.031) (0.040) (0.020) (0.061) (0.063) (0.072) (0.026) (0.059) (0.057)
LN*Crisis* 4th Q -0.031+ -0.081 -0.087 -0.099** -0.069 0.039+ 0.089 0.081 0.094 -0.028
(0.023) (0.053) (0.057) (0.048) (0.081) (0.029) (0.061) (0.077) (0.075) (0.024)
Ln(Mar. III)* 1st Q -0.039 0.131 0.248*** 0.046* 0.174 -0.182* -0.142* -0.143+ -0.014 0.071
(0.037) (0.112) (0.092) (0.027) (0.120) (0.094) (0.082) (0.101) (0.091) (0.051)
Ln(Mar. III)* 2nd Q 0.116 0.067 0.320 0.161* 0.152* 0.043 0.194 0.197 0.465** 0.110
(0.092) (0.342) (0.304) (0.093) (0.087) (0.352) (0.377) (0.245) (0.189) (0.069)
Ln(Mar. III)* 3rd Q 0.153** 0.133 0.039 0.135+ 0.095 0.882* -0.108 -0.036 -0.442 0.090
(0.065) (0.482) (0.447) (0.103) (0.100) (0.463) (0.260) (0.425) (0.490) (0.064)
Ln(Mar. III)* 4th Q 0.168** 0.052 0.410 0.073 0.125*** 0.088 0.211 0.185 0.254 0.121
(0.080) (0.244) (0.265) (0.120) (0.042) (0.279) (0.193) (0.296) (0.282) (0.112)
IF controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Ind. Trends yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 6906 6908 6933 6908 6933 6941 6908 6966 6908 6966
Hansen-J test (p) 0.818 0.855 0.769 0.782 0.704 0.521 0.513 0.476 0.673 0.756
AR(2) test (p) 0.109 0.023 0.021 0.005 0.019 0.195 0.020 0.002 0.055 0.008
AR(3) test (p) 0.819 0.740 0.673 0.751 0.199 0.330 0.196 0.646 0.760 0.672
N GMM Instr. 171 166 171 163 171 169 168 168 169 168
Note: Robust S.E. clustered at the sector level in parenthesis, + p<0.20, p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 4.13: Main results by exploiting the median LN - Innovation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Innovation
OLS FE GMM-SYS OLS FE GMM-SYS GMM-SYS GMM-SYS GMM-SYS
Adding Markup Instrumenting Markup
INNt 1 0.386*** -0.109*** 0.245** 0.383*** 0.310* 0.251*** 0.258** 0.276*** 0.281**
(0.023) (0.021) (0.114) (0.023) (0.177) (0.0952) (0.113) (0.104) (0.115)
LN*Crisis -0.078* -0.049+ -0.107 -0.073* -0.058** -0.075 -0.083** -0.102** -0.091
(0.042) (0.036) (0.069) (0.040) (0.027) (0.051) (0.039) (0.049) (0.05)
Markup III 0.036+ 0.026+
(0.026) (0.018)
Ln(Markup III) 0.018 0.131 0.424** 0.044
(0.020) (0.111) (0.216) (0.154)
Cash-Flow 0.017*** 0.014*** 0.008 0.017*** 0.014*** 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.007
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.037) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Cash-Flowt 1 0.040 0.099* 0.547* 0.079* 0.102* -0.002 -0.227 0.306+ 0.433*
(0.041) (0.057) (0.282) (0.044) (0.059) (0.320) (0.422) (0.221) (0.240)
MCash-Stock -0.00006 -0.00002 -0.00044*** -0.00 -0.00042** -0.00091* -0.00079* -0.00094** -0.00043**
(0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00016) (0.00017) (0.00019) (0.00047) (0.00042) (0.00042) (0.00017)
Firm FE no yes yes no yes yes yes yes yes
Ind. Trends. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 7211 7211 7211 6941 6908 6941 6984 6908 6984
Hansen-J test (p) 0.413 0.351 0.396 0.484 0.435
AR(2) test (p) 0.038 0.047 0.075 0.052 0.034
AR(3) test (p) 0.987 0.738 0.709 0.690 0.731
N GMM Instr. 127 123 124 136 137
Note: Robust S.E. clustered at the sector level in parenthesis, + p<0.20, p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 4.14: Main results by exploiting the median LN - Exporting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Exporting
OLS FE GMM-SYS OLS FE GMM-SYS GMM-SYS GMM-SYS GMM-SYS
Adding Markup Instrumenting Markup
EXPt 1 0.651*** -0.027 0.491** 0.648*** -0.027 0.423*** 0.622** 0.590*** 0.274
(0.024) (0.025) (0.224) (0.023) (0.025) (0.250) (0.182) (0.224) (0.233)
LN*Crisis 0.117*** 0.049* 0.115*** 0.119*** 0.036 0.018 0.101 -0.045 0.044
(0.031) (0.027) (0.035) (0.025) (0.029) (0.091) (0.088) (0.123) (0.091)
Markup III 0.386** 0.032
(0.153) (0.025)
Ln(Markup III) 0.014 0.032 2.053+ 0.397+
(0.015) (0.058) (1.571) (0.302)
Cash-Flow 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.024* -0.001 -0.001 0.003
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.013) (0.002) (0.020) (0.002)
Cash-Flowt 1 -0.020 -0.067** -0.043 -0.019 -0.069** 0.0316 -0.126** 0.215 -0.172**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.064) (0.029) (0.063) (0.059) (0.260) (0.240)
MCash-Stock -0.00001*** -0.00001 -0.00001+ -0.00001*** -0.00001 0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00001
(0.00000) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
Firm FE no yes yes no yes yes yes yes yes
Ind. Trends. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 7211 7211 7211 6941 6908 6941 6984 6974 6985
Hansen-J test (p) 0.213 0.251 0.257 0.242 0.187
AR(2) test (p) 0.015 0.018 0.014 0.014 0.022
AR(3) test (p) 0.181 0.501 0.322 0.630 0.441
N GMM Instr. 128 124 125 132 133
Note: Robust S.E. clustered at the sector level in parenthesis, + p<0.20, p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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